DEMOCRATIZATION FROM BELOW
PROTEST EVENTS AND REGIME CHANGE
IN INDONESIA
1997-1998
Jay
Rafi
A DISSERTATION

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This research concerns the massive and protracted series of protest events that took place in Indonesia in 1997 and 1998. Triggered by a deep economic crisis, these protest events transformed Indonesia into the third largest democratic country in the world. The purposes of the research are as follows. First, to correct elite theories in the literature of transition by underlining the role of non-elite actors (the masses). Second, to elaborate the strengths and weaknesses of the three standard theories of mass protest/social movements (deprivation theory, resource mobilization theory, and political opportunity theory) by analyzing the protest events in Indonesia. And third, to highlight the positive and negative political consequences of protest events on democracy in divided societies, examining both the supporters advocating the issues of political reform, and the opponents involved in the religious and ethnic conflict and hatred.

The research examines three kinds of data related to the protest events. First are the national data (involving twenty-seven provinces), which provide general information about the evolution, the issues, the actors, and the forms of action. The second type of data details protest events as the center of movement in five of the provincial cities with the highest number of protest events (Jakarta, Bandung, Jogjakarta, Semarang, and Surabaya). Finally, the comparative data gathered from the eight provinces outside of Java, which had the largest and fewest number of protest events, will be used to test the theories. The data are mainly from national and local newspapers (Kompas, Media Indonesia, Pikiran Rakyat, Jawa Pos, Kedaulatan Rakyat, and Suara Merdeka).
The major findings here go against O’Donnell and Schmitter’s (1986) theory; as the transition from authoritarian rule in Indonesia is not initiated by a division within the elite (hardliners versus softliners). In Indonesia, the elite did not initiate the reform; they only responded later. The masses, the non-elite actors, initiated the reform as shown in the Statistical tables describing the rise and the evolution of those protest events. Economic crisis (deprivation theory) is “necessary but not sufficient” to explain them. Availability of resources and the role of political entrepreneurs (resource mobilization theory) also played a critical role in mobilizing the protest events. Support of influential elites and the negative policies of the incumbent government at the time of the crisis (political opportunity structure theory) contributed to the magnitude and the power of those protest events. However, protest events not only accelerated political reform, they also spread hatred and bloody societal conflict based on religion, race and ethnicity.
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CHAPTER 1
THE NON-ELITE ACTOR: THE FORGOTTEN VARIABLE IN THE THEORIES OF TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY

For more than three decades, theorists of transition to democracy have been exploring various variables to explain regime change. Political theorists in the 1950s and 1960s had a tendency to prefer macro-structural variables, such as economic development and political culture. Since the 1970s, the dominant theories have shifted to the role of human agency, the role of elite or the craftsmanship of leaders. The role of non-elite actors has seldom been mentioned.

However, the transition to democracy in Indonesia in 1997-1998 highlights the importance of non-elite actors. The role of mass protest in initiating democracy in Indonesia was too obvious to be ignored. It was the masses, not the elite nor the leader’s craftsmanship nor the economic development nor the political culture that transformed Indonesia into the third largest democratic country in the world.
On Monday, 18th of May 1998, in Jakarta, hundred thousand people marched to the building of the People’s Consultative Assembly. Most of them were university students from Jakarta and other big cities in Java Island. For three consecutive days, they occupied the building of the People’s Consultative Assembly day and night; sleeping on the floors and sofas. During the days, some of the protesters climbed to the building’s roof, raised banners, yelled, and made political speeches and protests.

Their goal was simple yet enormous: they wanted the Speakers of the Assembly to have the courage to respond to the economic crisis. In many ways, they exerted pressure on the Assembly to call a special session, one that would ask the personal ruler, the most powerful man in Indonesia and Asia, and the man who had ruled Indonesia for 32 years, Suharto, to step down. According to the protesters, Suharto was the most responsible actor leading Indonesia to the very serious economic crisis.

The masses knew that what they asked seemed next to impossible. Not only was President Suharto in a politically strong position, but also the Assembly’s speaker and deputy speakers supported him, Harmoko, the speaker of the Assembly, was known as a Suharto loyalist. In that era, all of the Assembly’s members had to be approved by Suharto. The masses had never before been successful in defying Suharto, a skillful politician who used to conquer his opponents.

But never before had Indonesia witnessed a protest event with such a level of mobilization as exhibited on that week of May. The unprecedented hatred toward Suharto ran high. Protest events occurred for months. In terms of frequency and number of participants involved, the protest events in Indonesia from 1997-
1998 may qualify as one of the largest protest events in human history. Only in one year, over ten million people took part in 1,702 separate protest events.

Finally, the pressure of the masses gained fruits. Harmoko and other Assembly speakers announced in a public speech that he and his colleagues in the Assembly had asked Suharto to step down for the sake of the nation. The resignation of Suharto, Harmoko said, would improve the country and offer hope to resolve the deep economic crisis. In this shocking turn of events, the Assembly finally supported the hope of the masses. The masses in the building of the Assembly and in many places in Indonesia yelled and screamed happily to welcome the news.

However, hours later, the military general and Minister of Defense, Wiranto, made a contradictory statement. He and other military leaders claimed that they firmly support Suharto, and that Harmoko and his colleagues’ statement asking Suharto to step down was an individual claim that had no bearing to the Assembly as an institution. The military general asked the people to calm down and obey the constitution, and to not illegally overthrow the government. Suharto, according to Wiranto, would not step down but would only reshuffle his cabinet.

Elite conflict between pro Suharto’s resignation and Suharto loyalists had opened and triggered a chaotic situation. After the response of the leader of the military, uncertainty and rumors abounded. Yet the masses, dominated by university students, once again showed their determination and courage. They consolidated their power, and offered no compromise; they continued to ask, despite who might discourage them, for Suharto to resign.
In their opinion, Suharto had brought Indonesia into an intense economic crisis, and the only way out of the crisis was for him to relinquish power. The pressure of the masses extended from Jakarta and the other big cities to almost everywhere in Indonesia. Their protest received support from a wide spectrum of political beliefs; more and more members of the political elite withdrew their support for Suharto.

The masses’ time had come. Suharto stepped down. The wave of protest events by the masses had forced the man who had dominated Indonesia for 32 years without significant challenge to surrender his power. After the fall of Suharto came a change of political regime. Political participation, political competition and civil liberties were introduced to the new Indonesia, which became the world’s third largest democracy.

This research concerns the wave of protest events in Indonesia from 1997 to 1998, leading to the transition from an authoritarian ruler to a democracy. There are three purposes of this research. First, the research will correct the elite theory in explaining the transition from an authoritarian ruler to democracy. The case of Indonesia is timely and illustrates the importance of the non-elite actor in the process of transition.

The second purpose of the research is to apply these three standard theories explaining the rise of political events (the politics of the masses): deprivation theory, resource mobilization theory, and political opportunity theory. This particular case demonstrates both the weaknesses and strengths of these theories.

Third, the research shows the political consequences of the politics of the masses in the transition to democracy in a divided society. Although the mass protest events were successful in
forcing the resignation of an authoritarian ruler and pressing the new regime to adopt a democratic political system, the politics of the non-elite incited bloody and violent conflicts among different religions, ethnicities, and political affiliations. The cruelty of the non-elite constrained the democratic process as well.

1.1. Theoretical Review

The starting point of this research is a series of four books by Guillermo O’Donnell and Philippe Schmitter, Transition from Authoritarian Rule (1986), as the main reference. Their perspectives, however, do not become the basis of this research’s theory. On the contrary, as explained above, the perspective to be developed in this research is to correct their theory.

The explication of this theory development is divided into three stages. First, it characterizes the state of knowledge prior to the publication of O’Donnell’s book. At that time, macro- and structural approaches dominated the theories of politics. Transitions and democratic stability were considered products of macro conditions, such as economic development (Deutsch; 1961, Lipset; 1960), or as a result of the prevalent civic culture and social and cultural modernization (Almond and Verba; 1963).

Second is O’Donnell’s theory itself. O’Donnell introduced a new perspective, stating that transition to democracy is not an automatic product of macro conditions. Rather, it is a result of a decision making and conflicts among political elites, regardless of economic conditions or political culture of a nation.

O’Donnell’s theory thoroughly illustrates the early process of break up of an authoritarian system to various categorizations of political elite to the birth of numerous elite compromises, which
can lead to the transition and to democratic consolidation. The cases O'Donnell uses as the objects of analysis in various Latin American and Southern European countries will also be discussed.

Third, various significant criticisms against the main thesis of O'Donnell are described. The more recent cases of transitions offer more varied insight on the process to transition. The approach of O'Donnell is then considered giving too much bias to the role of the elite. Cases examined in Africa and East Europe indicate the presence of non-elite actors (the masses) in protest actions or transitions to democracy.

1.1.1. The Macro-Structural Theories

In the 1950s and 1960s, modernization approach dominated political development theorizing. This approach frames the third world as traditional countries moving toward a western type of society. To be developed is to be modern, and to be modern is to be western. The progress is linear. The modernization approach gives explanations, predictions and recommendations all at once on how to become like a western society.

Two important articles in this era are from Deutsch (1961) and Lipset (1960). Deutsch argues that economic development will lead to a rise of demand for political participation; that exposure to mass media, literacy, urbanization, and education will affect the political demand of the people. They will begin to have a greater say about their own political situation. This new demand that various groups and individuals be allowed to participate in politics will break the old type of political system (non-democratic regime). The old system will no longer be able to accommodate this new demand. As a result, the political system will be restructured toward democracy, since democracy accommodates pluralism and civil
Economic development will lead to democratic political systems in the Third World.

The notion of progress from economic development toward democracy is strengthened in the work of Lipset (1960). Through empirical data and cases, Lipset shows the strong correlation between economic development and democracy. The higher the economic development is, measured by e.g. level of education and mass media, the greater the probability that a country will be more democratic.

Three decades after the work of Lipset, Huntington, in his book, The Third Wave (1991), explains more convincingly how economic development will lead a country to democratization. Huntington maps the correlation between economic performance (GNP, income per capita) and democracy. He divides the levels of GNP into three: low income (around US $130-500), middle income (around US $500-6000), and high income (around US $6000 and higher). He finds that almost all the low-income countries are non-democratic (except India and Sri Lanka), while almost all the high-income countries are democratic (except Singapore and oil-exporting countries). Among the middle-income countries, some are democratic and some are not.

From the above picture, economic development appears to be a significant factor for promoting democracy. Some possible explanations for this trend are as follows:

a) The level of economic well-being produces a certain attitude in its citizens. Interpersonal trust and life satisfaction increase with a rise in economic security (wealth). These attitudes are compatible with democratic institutions.
b) Economic development increases the level of education within a society, and education further brings people to technical competence and pluralism. These values support democracy.

c) Economic development produces a greater quantity of resources. Many more resources are available for distribution to various groups of people, and this better distribution facilitates accommodation and compromise. Democracy is the system for many various groups, and to survive, it must rest on the common ground of these various groups. The arts of compromise and accommodation are central to the stability of democracy.

d) Economic development promotes the opening of foreign trade, tourism, communication, and exposure to the global world. The involvement of non-government sectors of wealth and influence into the global world opens the impact of democratic ideas from the industrialized western countries.

e) Economic development gives birth to the rise of the middle class. Businesspeople, professionals, and various groups of civil society grow together with economic development and educational advancement. As argued by Barrington More, “No bourgeoisie. No Democracy.” Democracy is not led by peasants or landlords but by the middle class. The survival of the middle class relates to the survival of democracy since they want political participation and fair competition to economic and political power that only a democracy provides.

However, in the 1960s, a shocking event took place; democracy declined in many places from Asia to Latin America. In some cases, economic development didn’t bring its promise to produce democracy, on the contrary it created political instability and,
in the end, authoritarianism. O’Donnell (1979) argued that capitalism requires political stability to ensure the flow of capital. In Latin America, the military protected political stability through repression. Economic development didn’t support democracy instead it produced bureaucratic authoritarianism.

The studies of Lipset (1960) and O’Donnell (1979) gave contrasting arguments about the relation between economic development and democracy. No conclusive relation, thus, could be drawn between economic development and democracy as both researches above show. A different approach to explain democratization is the cultural approach developed by Almond and Verba, The Civic Culture (1963), Almond and Verba explore another independent variable, political culture, to explain the stability of democracy. To test their hypothesis, they conducted survey across five countries (the United States, Britain, Germany, Italy, and Mexico). They developed these three models of citizenship: participants (who took an active part in the political process), subjects (who were oriented to the output side of government e.g. paying tax and obeying law) and parochial (who largely ignore government). This categorization more or less classifies good citizens (participants), average citizens (subjects) and bad citizens (parochial), at least in terms of democratic values.

Almond and Verba failed to prove that democracy depends on the existence of the participant-type-citizenship as the majority. However, their research inspired the idea that democracy requires a certain type of culture, the civic culture. The attitude of moderation, trust in public institutions, and acceptance of pluralism are necessary to democracy; whereas values and a certain type of behavior matter for democracy. Civic culture became a popular term in the literature of democracy.
Three decades after the work of Almond and Verba, Samuel Huntington continued this tradition in his famous book The Third Wave (1991). As argued by Almond and Verba, Huntington claims that culture plays an important role in the establishment of democracy. In the era of the third wave democracy, said Huntington, there is a new interpretation of Catholicism, from being supportive or apathetic to the status quo to being active in promoting democracy. The Second Vatican Council (1960s) emphasized the importance of the rights of individuals, helping the poor, the collegial action of bishops, and the legitimacy of social change. This factor, according to Huntington, influenced the transition to democracy in many Catholic-dominated countries (e.g. the Philippines, Portugal, and Spain).

Religious beliefs matter to democracy. Huntington argues that Protestants and New Catholics’ beliefs are compatible with democracy, while Islam and Confucianism are not. Confucians prefer order to liberty, communalism to individualism, harmony to freedom, and loyalty to rights. In Islam, according to Huntington, no separation of the state and religion exists. Islamic law (shariah) must be implemented as a national law, and the Qur’an (Islamic holy book) as a national constitution. As a consequence, individual rights and social liberties as the foundation of liberal democracy are not protected in Islam.

Against Huntington, one could argue that just as the factor of economic development may result to democracy or authoritarianism, political culture offers the same ambiguity. Heterogeneity is always present in a culture and as a result, different researchers may have different understandings of the same culture.
One can take Confucianism and Islam as an example. What is Confucianism? Is this culture compatible with economic growth and democracy? A famous sociologist, Max Weber, claims that Confucianism is incompatible with economic growth, while another distinguished sociologist, Peter Berger, claims that Confucianism is the driving force of economic growth in East Asia. Lee Kwan Yew, a leader of East Asia, argues that Confucianism is not for liberal democracy while Kim Dae Jung, another leader of East Asia, claims that Confucianism supports liberal democracy. Do they observe the same Confucianism or different variants of Confucianism?

Cultures and religions as sources of identity and ways of life constantly change and can be interpreted differently by their followers. There is always liberal and orthodox interpretation. There are always (Met, moderate, and rightist positions. Although Huntington may choose the orthodox interpretation of Islam and claim that Islam is not compatible with democracy, Fazlur Rahman, a famous Islamic scholar, picked the liberal interpretation and said that Islam is in line with democracy. Any claim about a certain culture and religion will have always valid rival claims.

1.1.2 The Theory of Elite

Differing from the above two traditions, O’Donnell and Schmitter (1986) develop their own theory of transition from authoritarian rule and the transition to democracy. O’Donnell does not overestimate the role of macrostructure, such as the economic development or political structure. On the contrary, O’Donnell elaborates the role of human agency, the role of elites, regardless of the condition of
their macrostructure. The macrostructure obviously gives incentives and constraints to any political choice. However, it is still the political choice and strategies of the elites that most determine the political outcome.

In responding to the challenges of authoritarianism and democracy, some elites have a “stubborn” attitude (hardliners) while some are “soft” (soft-liners), depending on how they make choices in facing the changing situation. Hardliners support the continuation of authoritarian regimes, while soft-liners support regime change to democracy. The hardliners constitute several factions. Some ideologues believe that authoritarianism is the best solution for a given condition of a country. Some defend authoritarianism just to maintain their powerful positions in a profiting office.

The soft-liners are also varied. Some support the regime change just because they are not comfortable anymore and are isolated from the inner circle of the authoritarian regime. Some support limited liberalization because this is the only way to survive. The regime should accommodate the new political demands of society, they believe. Some support transition to democracy because they have faith ideologically in democracy as the better solution for governing the changing situation.

The basic conflict in the elite circle is the main cause of transition, whereas international factors, either in the form of ideological pressure or negative impact of the decline of the world economy, only influence their perspectives. This principle differentiates O’Donnell’s theory from various theories based on macro variables (e.g. economic development and political culture).
Several elements can accelerate transitions. The presence of democratic institutions from the period prior to establishment of an authoritarian power is important. For example, political parties, social movements, associations, and autonomous institutions can provide the impetus for acceleration. When a relatively free general election was held in 1974 in Brazil, a country that has such institutions, several organized outlets of political aspiration were ready. But in Italy, Portugal, Argentina, Chile, Peru and Greece, the authoritarian power destroyed all existing (democratic) institutions. Compared to Brazil, transition in those countries was rockier.

The settlement of violence and political conflict of the past and the position of the military can also speed a transition. These two are often interrelated because the military often behaves violently. Ideally, all the influential political elite are expected to forget past issues. It proves difficult to establish a new order when there is a strong tendency to judge the past, which can sharpen the conflict within the elite circle. However, political pressure always remains, especially from those who underwent oppression and mistreatment in the past. They cannot imagine how a community can continue to function if action is not taken to settle the painful parts of the past. Forgetting past oppression, even within the frame of creating a conducive atmosphere to establish a new order, may bring about public rage. Moreover, public rage intensifies if oppression is not too far from the country’s past.

The solution is to bring those who are suspected of committing gross human rights violations during the ruling authoritarian regime to the court, provided that there is a guarantee of legal protection for the accused. Because in many cases in Latin America, there is an
obvious Interrelation between oppression and violation of human rights by the military, it is necessary to find measures to approach the military by a compromise. On one hand, military institutions in a democracy still gain respect and dignity by being involved in reaching national goals, although they are left out of the decision-making process. On the other Hand, the role of the military is much more limited. Eventually the self-image of the military as the only institution, which has the right to interpret and guarantee national interest and security, must change. The military should be immune to the persuasion of frustrated civilian elite who compete in democratic ways and then try to use the military ihr the sake of their own political interest.

Various elite compromises in the frame of transition are formulated in numerous pacts. Formation of these pacts becomes a central part of the transition to democracy controlled by various elites.

Pacts can be defined as an explicit agreement among several elites who do not seek legitimacy from the people. In a pact, regulations are established concerning the application of power, and those regulations guarantee the vital interest of all parties involved. The effectiveness of these pacts is limited, and paves the way for a more permanent agreement that will settle a conflict. Some of their elements might become regulations, laws, or parts of the constitution; other elements might become institutionalized, and manifest as the operational standard procedures for a nation, a party or interest group. Because few people Formulate such pacts, the pact’s contents often lead the community and the nation into entering democracy thru undemocratic means.
Nevertheless, three significant moments, to use O’Donnell’s term, worth noting in the pacts are the military, politics, and economy. These pacts are a kind of give and take and win-win solution. Each might be interrelated with a pact or different pacts, with different actors negotiating several different regulations. In the real world, these three factors might overlap and complicate each other.

At the core of the military moment exists a kind of compromise.

The military tolerates improvement of individual rights, as well as expanded public access to policy making and decisions. In return, there is toleration for the political mistakes of the military officers in the previous authoritarian regime.

The political moment can be considered a kind of a package agreement between competing political leaders. They agree not to ask for military intervention and not to mobilize the masses to solve their disagreement and competition. The agreement may possibly result in a large coalition, which is necessary for settlement of primordial, classical, sectional, and regional conflicts.

The economic moments include an agreement concerning how the nation’s agencies, business associations, labor unions, and professional organizations should behave during and after the transitional period. Big businessmen are uncomfortable if in the new system there is no protection for their property. They need to be protected against the populist demand for the redistribution of their assets. In return, they will donate a part of their property to the new regime.
After pacts have been formed, the public sphere—for the civil society needs to be re-structured. The de-politicization conducted by the authoritarian regime leads the community to value personal goals, leading to the decline of public and citizenship affairs. Autonomous political freedom is destroyed and replaced by a public arena under the control of the government. However, the dynamics of transition, through mobilization toward liberalization led by the soft-liner elites, and supported by the circle of intellectuals and artists, can rebuild the civil society as well as restructure the ruined public sphere.

At the same time, support is also expected from those who have always been loyal partners of the authoritarian regime, such as industrialists, bankers, businessmen and landlords, when they realize that they no longer profit from the policies of the authoritarian regime. Some indicators also show other reawakening, including the resurgence of old political parties, the sudden publication of numerous books and media concerning long-censored themes, re-establishment of various institutions (labor unions, professional associations) as a means of articulating interests, and the reappearance of grassroots organizations that articulate the demands of the oppressed. Finally, there are the demands for conducting a democratic general election, where the reawakened parties play important roles, and how that election will create a democratic government.

Nevertheless, the first pioneering general election held after the ruling of the prolonged authoritarian government cannot be automatically expected to reflect people’s sovereignty. Not only do the voters have relatively little knowledge with which to elect candidates, the parties themselves have not had sufficient time to
introduce (disseminate) their programs. Therefore, after pioneering the general election there should be a choice of process in the next general election, which should continue until power organically develops among the parties - the strong survives, the weak disappears. The transition finishes when the political actors have stabilized and obey sets of explicit rules on the road to gain access to government offices, legal ways of handling conflicts, procedures in decision making, and the criteria of eliminating other parties from the arena of political game.

The above-mentioned numerous theoretical statements are the principles of the general transition of the authoritarian regime. In truth, nations’ political differences may not allow general principles to fully manifest themselves. The study of O’Donndl also examines various cases of transition in South Europe and Latin America in which numerous differences are discovered. However, everything is still within the frame of a similar principle. It is the choice and strategy of the elite, not the macro variables of the economic condition or political culture, which triggers transition.

1.1.3. Searching for a Non-Elite Theory

After ODonnell’s study, many experts conducted studies on transition by examining cases in different areas of the world. O’Donnell relies on cases in Latin America and South Europe, while other experts use cases of transition in Africa and East Europe. It is not a surprise that the studies in Africa and East Europe yielded different theoretical conclusions.

Various studies in these areas indicate that the theory of transition developed by O’Donnell is too biased to the roles of elites, and does not take into account the roles of non-elite actors.
In the case of Africa, elites do not initiate transition, but merely respond later after the incumbent government has weakened. The case in East Europe indicates the significance of the roles of the non-elite actors (the mass movement) as the pioneers of transition.

This description is based on the study developed by Bratton and DeWalle (1994). This study indicates that the type of regimes existing prior to the transition influences the process of transition and the final result of politics. Numerous opportunities and hindrances of political change structured the previous type of regime prior to the wind of change. The previous regime determines whether the elite or the masses, the ruling government and its opposition, can interact through negotiations, accommodations, or general election.

Bratton concludes that the type of regime in Africa differs from the one in Latin America and South Europe, which is the object of O’Donnell’s study. Generally, the type of regime in South Europe and Latin America is corporatist, while in Africa the chief characteristic of the regime is neo-patrimonial. In the corporatist authoritarian regime, the authoritarian ruler uses corporatist-bureaucratic networking to control politics. But in the neo-patrimonial regime, bureaucratic facilities are seldom used. Personal ruler and neo-patrimonial ruler prefer to use personal networking (personal patronage) to maintain and control power. The separation of personal sphere and public sphere is vaguer or even doesn’t exist in the patrimonial regime.

Although the corporatist-regime type is authoritarian, many varieties of elite subsist in the second layer of power. The elite diversification in this type of regime is wider than that in a neo-patrimonial regime, and is easily broken into the categories of
hardliners and soft-liners. The soft-liner elite initiate change and transition. The elite structure in the patrimonial government is more unified due to the grip of personal patronage. In the neopatrimonial regime, changes and transition are seldom rooted in elite conflict, as evidenced in Africa. The case of Africa does not allow the theory of transition developed by O’Donnell to be fully realized.

Three principles of transition in Africa exemplify weaknesses in O’Donnell’s theory. First, transition in the patrimonial regime begins with acts of social protest. The economic crisis, which makes the standard of life drastically decline, causes such protests. This decline in the standard of living spreads dissatisfaction throughout the community. At that time, mass protests can be found everywhere, not only opposing the ruling political actors, but also demanding a change of political regime.

Such protest events are then supported by other elements of the community. Various opposition groups, which so far have been repressed, begin to emerge and network. Even government elements, such as civil servants, join in the protest as a result of their threatened economic welfare. They unite and demonstrate in the streets or in government buildings. Although the government loses its control to overcome such various social protests, it usually can control the political stability through patronage networking and use of money (material reward). Economic crisis provokes this regime buy political loyalty, which intensifies the crisis if the local government cannot finance military expense. The crisis escalates and the government is in danger of falling.

In such a condition, unlike O’Donnell’s theory, political transition is not rooted in the political elite, but in popular
politics, O’Donnell says that there is no transition without a clash in the elite circle of the ruling regime. However, the case of Africa indicates that change begins in the hands of the opposition and non-elite actors outside the regime.

The second weakness to be examined is dealing with the emergence of the new elite brought about by the mass movement, which had previously been sporadic and without leaders. This new elite is not born from the old authoritarian regime; the actors outside the ruling government create this elite. O’Donnell calls this process elite fractionalization, but such a fractionalization is not formed out of the characteristics of the hardliners versus softliners, as he postulated, but between external and internal parties in relationship with the then ruling government The external elite are those born from the above-mentioned protest movement.

Third, in the transitions in Africa, political pacts do not have the tendency to emerge as they do in O’Donnell’s theory. A conducive atmosphere for the birth of a pact is the inability of any group to dominate groups that have relatively similar strength. However, such a condition does not occur in the type of a neo-patrimonial regime. The political polarization in the transition of the patrimonial regime is so high that it proves difficult to find the solution through negotiation. What happens is that the winner takes all.

In a corporatist regime, the elite can represent its constituents, which are wider and more organized. Elite meeting and agreement can represent compromise of the wider political constituents. However, in the neo-patrimonial regime, the elite does not position themselves in a good organizational network, and usually can only make decisions for several small groups. Because of this,
it is impossible to hope for a consensus among the elite that would represent the consensus of wider segments of the community.

Gregor Ekiert and Jan Kubik (1994), in their work also correct O'Donnell’s theory. Ekiert criticizes O'Donnell's belief that elite pacts are essential to achieving transition from a successful authoritarian regime, and also criticizes other theorists, such as Linz and Diamond (1989), who believe that the skill, values, strategies, and choices of the leaders color the process of democratic transition in Latin America. He also expresses disagreement with Higley and Gunther’s (1992) statement: “In independent states with long records of political instability and authoritarian rule, distinctive elite transformation, carried out by the elite themselves, constitute the main and possibly the only route to democratic consolidation.”

These various approaches that are biased toward the elite, according to Ekiert, can be traced back to the ease of finding data on elite politics. Written documents on elite politics can be found and read in the programs of political parties, speeches of leaders, interviews with the elite, reports on general election campaigns, results of general elections, and journalists’ comments, all of which can be accessed by the public. On the contrary, data on non-elite actors is far more difficult to obtain. Public opinion research becomes the only resource available to study non-elite politics.

Very little is known concerning non-elite politics and their role in the political transition from an authoritarian to a democratic country Ekiert develops transitional perspectives by underlining the roles of the non-elite actors (protest actions/protest events), specifically emitting the transition of East Europe. In creating these perspectives, Ekiert uses the literature of the social movement.
Ekiert elaborates about mass politics utilizing four theories. First, he applies the theory of relative deprivation, relating various protest actions to the decline of the economic standard of a community. Second, he uses the theory of instrumental institutionalism in which the concept of political opportunity structure was developed, and allows him to examine the existing obstructions and political opportunities on which the protesters expanded their acts. Third, he looks at historical-cultural institutionalism; a theory that emphasizes the interactions between the process of cultural learning, which also influences the tradition, and analyzing protest events in a country. Fourth, he examines the theory of resource mobilization in studying the availability of resources mobilized by the parties opposing the regime. Based on these four reorist, Ekiert illustrates the process of transition pioneered by non-elite actors.

My study of the transition in Indonesia, from 1997 to 1998, also corrects ODonnell’s theory of the elite. The case in Indonesia also illustrates the significance of the roles of the non-elite actors, as shown by Ekiert, and how the elite react to, rather than initiate change, as shown in Bratton’s research on Africa. In the case of Indonesia, the change of political rule is not solely reached through pacts, rather a consensus among elite. Mass pressure starts the change of political rule and remains the largest cause of such change. However, at the end of this dissertation, mass politics, in the transition to and development of democracy, is shown to have a negative side as well. Mass politics not only incites positive change, but bloody primordial conflicts and religious and ethnic-driven enmity.
1.2. Methodology

The time assessed in this research is from September 1997 until August 1998. In September 1997, the economic crisis that swept Indonesia began. This month gave birth to a series of protest events. Meanwhile, August 1998 marked the hundredth day of the formation of the new government. The reason for the selection of these months was to witness the evolution of the protest events from their birth to their climax, the fall of President Suharto, to the hundredth day after the fall of Suharto. The choice to study all 27 provinces was made to better view the general gradation of the protest events and distribution of such protest throughout Indonesia. Five major cities (provincial capitals with the highest frequency of protests) were chosen to examine in a more detailed way the growth of protest actions.

For the description of protest actions in general in Indonesia, the daily newspaper Kompas was used, as this newspaper is nationally considered to contain the most reliable and complete reportage. In compiling the chronology of the protest events in the five major cities (provincial capitals), these local papers were used accordingly; Daily Pikiran Rakyat for Bandung, Suara Merdeka for Semarang, Jawa Pos for Surabaya, Kedaulatan Rakyat for Jogjakarta, and Kompas and Media Indonesia for Jakarta.

1.2.1 Keywords and Methodology

The definition of protest events in this dissertation follows the one used by Kriesi (1997; 53). Protest events “constitute the basic units of an organized, sustained, self-conscious challenge to existing authorities or other political actors.” Further, Kriesi defines protest events as “any kind of public action of a demonstrative,
confrontational, or violent form, which is reported in the newspapers we analyzed."

To provide a sharper focus, this research also elaborates one dimension of protest events, namely the general level of mobilization. The level of mobilization is important in terms of its political impact. An authoritarian ruler can easily ignore a low level protest action in a situation of low to moderate protest, and even may successfully increase state repression toward society. However, a high level of mobilization is much more threatening and difficult to control. If unchecked, it may lead to the collapse of an authoritarian rule.

The level of mobilization refers to the number of persons mobilized in protest events, as represented in newspaper coverage of those events and as a percentage of the total population of a location in question over a certain period of time (Kriesi 1997; 55). For events where there is no information about the number of participants, Kriesi (1992; 55) estimates on the basis of the median of participant numbers in similar events in the same location.

For my research, the unit of location is the province, and the unit of time is the month. I measure the level of mobilization in all twenty-seven provinces of Indonesia for each of the twelve months from September 1997 to August 1998. From this basic data, I compile two data sets. First, I have national-level data (that is, the sum of all provincial data) for every month from September 1997 to August 1998. This data helps to evaluate the origins, the sudden growth, and the decline of protest events chronologically in the country as a whole, Second, I have data for every province per month and also per year (that is, the sum of all monthly data
per province), which can be used to make comparisons among the twenty-seven provinces in Indonesia,

I understand that newspapers have a problem of accurately counting the number of participants in protest events. In many cases, newspapers do not give the exact numbers of participants. The newspapers, for example, just report in the form of phrases such as “hundreds of people” or “thousands of protesters.” To reduce this problem, I have created size categories as follows: 2-100 people, 101-1,000 people, 1,001-10,000 people and 10,000+ people. I will use the mean of every category for calculating the level of mobilization (50, 500, 5,000, and 50,000).

Following “Mass Conflict and Political Change Codebook” (Jenkins, 2000), there are four elements elaborated in such protest events. First is the issue (and target) of the protest events. It is necessary to elaborate this issue because it is related to the causes and target of said events.

Second, the total number of the protesters involved is significant since the political impact of each mass is different. A movement, which is only represented by tens of people, has markedly different impact from a movement with a million people marching down the streets.

The third element is the actors and this element indicates why certain groups of actors are more dominant in their movement than others. From the plural segmentation of a community, we can sociologically identify who is more responsive in using protest as a response to certain situation.

The fourth is the form of movement. Protest actions can take various forms, ranging from marching down the streets to violent
vandalism. The selected form of protest also allows for examination of the relationship between issues, actors, and reason for choosing that particular form.

1.2.1.1 Issue of Protest Actions

Protest actions, which occurred during the period of September 1997 to August 1998, tackled different kinds of issues. To exemplify this, there is a classification of four big issues. The first issue, political reform, includes political demands for change of the political system or political actors, either locally or nationally. Any kinds of demands for democratization, clean governance and human rights are included in this category. The second issue, economics (monetary crisis) encompasses issues such as a demand for laborer’s welfare, rising cost of basic necessities, termination of work contracts, and general concerns about economic crisis. The third is the issue of cultural hatred or SARA (ethnic, religious, racial and class conflict). Included in this issue are all matters dealing with conflicts between religions, races, and ethnicities. The fourth is all issues not belonging to the first three issues, such as the environment, localization of prostitutes, or issues not reported clearly by the press. If there are protest events for which issues are not reported, then they are classified as “other issues”.

1.2.1.2 The Total Number of Masses involved

Although papers cannot accurately report the total mass involved in every protest event, their reports can provide some indications upon which one can make estimations. It is fortunate to find out in my preliminary investigation that 85% of the papers reported the total number of the masses involved.
1.2.1.3 Actors

Many actors support protest actions. Even in one protest action, many segments of the societies (students, the military, and doctors) are involved. However, since the protest actions in Indonesia from September 1997-1998 are dominated by students, the actors are divided into “students” and “non-students”. While “students” belong to student organizations, either formal or informal, those who belong to the “non-students” are all actors outside the students groups, such as the military, housewifes, and academy. If an organization reports student as its base, then the label “students” is used. The “non-student” category is applied to
those groups without students or even no report on the actors at all.

For a more detailed description of the actors at the local level (5 major cities), following the study of Grzegorz Ekiert and Jan Kubik (1998), the categorization of the actors is done in various ways. In this case, the categorization is not only between students and non-students, but includes, among others, laborers, civil servants, and professionals.

### 1.2.1.4 The Forms of Movements

Protest actions take various forms, ranging from marches to sit-ins on campus to bloody riots. At the national level, movements are only categorized in two ways. In peaceful protest events, there is no violence. Protest events are considered to involve violence, e.g. human casualty (wounded or dead) or destruction (building, cars on fire), even if only one act of violence is committed.

At the local level, delineation of protest events is more detailed, although it follows the existing standard. Generally, it is divided into conventional demonstration (non-disruptive actions) such as peaceful demonstration, threatening demonstration (disruptive actions) such as occupying a public building, and violent demonstration such as riots.

### 1.2.1.5 Frequency or Unit of Protest Action

A unit of protest events is for one day, one event, and one location of a protest event. If there is an act of protest with the same issue, the same actors, for three consecutive days, it will be counted as three protest events. If a protest event occurs in a major city, but in three different locations within one day, it will
be counted as three protest events. But if there is an act of protest that moves from one location to another in one day with the same actors (for instance marching in a street), it will be counted as one protest event.

### 1.3 Organization of the Study

This dissertation is basically a study of the movement and roles of the non-elite actors (the masses) in the transition of Indonesia from an authoritarian regime. To make it systematic, the writing of this dissertation is divided into various chapters as follows.

Chapter 1 discusses the theoretical significance of the study of transition in Indonesia from 1997 to 1998. In addition to its importance in documenting numerous political events leading Indonesia to its current status as the third biggest democratic country in the world, this chapter offers academic contributions. The process of transition in Indonesia asserts and corrects theories that are biased toward the role of the elite. This theoretical examination emphasizes the importance of the roles of non-elite actors (mass movement/protest actions) in the process of transition from an authoritarian country into a democratic one. Chapter 1 also discusses the methodology of data gathering.

Chapter 2 is a descriptive illustration of the protest events in Indonesia, from September 1997 to August 1998. September 1997 marks the birth of various protest actions throughout Indonesia and August 1998 marks the first hundred days of the establishment of the new government, which ousted the authoritarian regime. This chapter consists of three parts: general statistics of protest events, their size, organizers, peaceful or violent nature, and their ultimate target; a description of the political impact or achievement of the
protest events; and the framework of theory used in this dissertation to explain the phenomenon of these protest events.

Chapters 3, 4, and 5 are theoretical analyses that explore what caused the protest to begin and to strengthen. The chapters not only discuss social movement theory, they also apply it. Chapter 3 concerns economic crisis (deprivation) and tests how well it can explain the birth and the evolution of such a protest movement. Chapter 4 examines the approach of resource mobilization (resources mobilization theory) and how the role of political entrepreneurs can affect the acts of protests. Chapter 5 describes the roles, the elite support, and the negative policies of the incumbent government in developing protest events and ousting the authoritarian regime.

Chapter 6 describes the coTadicbo-s of tre mass rncverneii: and the roles of non-elite actors. Although the mass movement pressured the government to change rulers so there could be democracy, it also precluded a peaceful democratic transition as a result of the emergence of primordial conflict issues.

Finally, Chapter 7 summarizes how lessons from the case of Indonesia in 1997-1998 apply to the theoretical development of the literature of transition and protest events/social movements.
The case of Indonesia in 1997-1998 illustrates a transition to democracy initiated not by the elite or powerful organizations, but by ordinary people and once weak, unorganized masses. Since 1966, the year Suharto became the president of Indonesia, several political efforts had been made, to restore democracy. Elder statesmen and independent intellectuals had publicly stated, on numerous occasions, how important it was for Indonesia to have more liberty. An association of retired military leaders often criticized the incumbent government for not respecting the principle of the constitution. In 1974 and 1978, student marches articulated the younger generation’s disappointment with the existing authoritarian regime.

However, none of these political efforts had succeeded in changing the authoritarian political regime. Suharto’s power, as a personal ruler, was actually increasing. He, as an army general, had
saved Indonesia from the threat of communism in the 1960s, and both big business and the Armed Forces supported him. He was also supported by various powerful Islamic groups, in a society which is almost 90% Muslim. With other members of his family, he became one of the richest men in Indonesia, owning various large companies, from a highway construction business to commercial TV stations.

Political repression characterized Suharto’s rule. There was no opposition and no civil liberties. Many societal organizations were controlled through the politics of corporatism, in which the government appointed and closely supervised organization leaders. All three political parties, the government’s own Golkar (Golongan Karya/ Function a I Groups), and two nominally independent parties, repeatedly nominated him for reelection as a president over a 32-year period. Civil society was weak and fragmented along ideological and religious lines, which made it difficult for most groups to oppose him. Suharto’s reelection, in March 1998, to his seventh-five-year term as Indonesia’s president, did not surprise anyone. The People’s Consultative Assembly, mostly appointed by Suharto, elected him without challenge.

Yet the political reality in 1997-1998 soon turned the government on its head. The main actors initiating the change of political regime, the non-elite actors, quickly unified the segmented civil society, Previously powerless people began to march in the streets, and their numbers grew quickly. In various regions of Indonesia, protest of the powerless occurred almost every week. In some periods, these events took place daily.

Although many of the protests were small, with just a few persons involved, others brought hundreds of thousands of people
together, Many different groups participated, from student activists, professionals, retired military, and housewives to academicians, politicians, and business people. The strategies of participants in these events ranged from street marches, sit-ins, and campus demonstrations to occupying the Assembly building for days. The effect of their actions astonished the country. These series of protest events finally forced one of the strongest men in Asia, President Suharto, to relinquish his power. Suharto ended his authoritarian rule after thirty-two years, two months after his reelection in May 1998. The non-elite proved they were capable of great change, opposing the new ruler to make significant changes in the political system, including the promise of democratic elections in 1999.

What happened? How can we explain the sudden growth and transformation of people from powerless to powerful? How can we explain the sudden fall of a personal ruler who had sustained his power for thirty-two years? What made it possible for those people living under harsh state repression to rise above their social and cultural differences and personal fear? This research is designed to answer these questions. These questions are not only important for ordinary citizens and politicians who are searching for political freedom and a more participatory political system, but for scholarly researchers looking for explanations.

This chapter is divided into three sections: the first part gives general statistics of those protest events in Indonesia in 1997-1998; the second part describes the political achievement of protest events, the impact of protest events on the regime change; the third part discusses the theoretical framework used to explain the emergence and the outcomes of protest events.
2.1 General Statistics of Protest Events

To give a big picture of the protest events, this chapter will offer general statistics of such events. The statistics will answer these questions: How large were the protest events? What were the main issues? Were the protest events peaceful? Who participated in the protest events? What strategy did they use? Who was the ultimate target of the protest? The more detailed data of protest events, particularly related to the level of mobilization, will be discussed in other chapters to evaluate the theories.

2.1.1. How Large Were the Protest Events?

Table 2.1 shows that in a year, September ‘97- August ‘98 (365 days), 1702 protest events happened in Indonesia, with 107 million people participating in those events. In this period of time, there was an average of five protest events, each involving 30 thousand people, every day for a year. However, in reality, there is a tendency of the growing number of protest events. In the beginning, in September ‘97, only 44 protest events (3%) took place, involving only 4,000 (0%) people, Protest events peaked in May, the month of the fall of the authoritarian ruler, Suharto, In this month, there were 493 protest events, involving 5.1 million people. May 1998 showed an average of 15 protest events. with 150,000 participants a day. The protest events in Indonesia in 1997-1998 possibly rank among the largest series of protest events in human history.
Table 2.1 Magnitude of Protest Events

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Frequency Percentage (%)</th>
<th>Mass Participation</th>
<th>Percentage (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sept '97</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March</td>
<td>284</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apr</td>
<td>342</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>493</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jun</td>
<td>151</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August '98</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1702</td>
<td></td>
<td>10,718,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Were the protest events distributed equally across all regions of Indonesia? Some protest events did occur in all 27 provinces of Indonesia. However, only 86% of the actions happened in only five provinces (see Table 2.2). The remaining 22 provinces experienced 14% of the protest events. Since the five most active provinces are in Java, it can be claimed that the protest actions were mostly centered in Java. This was a movement dominated by Java. Less than 20% of all provinces (5 of 27 provinces) were the ground for 86% of the protest events.

Why these protest events are only centered in the five provinces? As can be seen from the concentration of the population in Table 2.3, majority of Indonesian people also center in the five provinces.
The total population in the five provinces is 50.6% of the whole population of Indonesia; in Jakarta 4.7%, in West Java 20.2%, in East Java 17.2%, in Central Java 15.1% and Yogyakarta 1.5%. In the 22 other provinces, the population is only 41.4%.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Islands</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Cumulative</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jakarta</td>
<td>314</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Java</td>
<td>307</td>
<td>36%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Java</td>
<td>298</td>
<td>54%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Java</td>
<td>245</td>
<td>68%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yogyakarta</td>
<td>312</td>
<td>86%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others (22 provinces)</td>
<td>226</td>
<td>(only 14%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>1702</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Table 2.2 Distribution of Protest Events*

Additionally, university student movement dominates these protest events. And in fact, the students are also concentrated in those five provinces. Table 2.4 shows the total number of the students in those five provinces is 66.5% of the entire Indonesian student population. In detailed numbers it is as follows: in Jakarta 29.9%. In West Java 10%, in East Java 14.8% in Central Java 7.5% and in Yogyakarta 4.3%. Meanwhile in the other 22 provinces, the total number of students is only 33.5% of the whole population of students in Indonesia.
2.1.2. What is the Main Issue?

Various issues were articulated in the protest events. However, those issues can be classified into four. The first is the issue of political reform. Included in this classification are any political demands for a change in the political system or the political actors, either locally or nationally. Any kinds of demands for democratization, clean governance and human rights are included in this category.
The second is the economic issue (monetary crisis). Included in this issue are demand for increase of labor welfare, reduction of the prices of basic necessities, termination of work contracts, and concern with economic crisis. The third is the issue of cultural hatred or SARA (ethnic, religious, racial and class conflict). The fourth is the other issues. Those included in this category are all issues not belonging to the first three issues, such as issues of environmental protection, localization of prostitutes, or issues not reported clearly by the press. If there are issues not reported, they are classified as “other issues”. In Table 2.5, as many as 1,157 protest events (68%) were concerned with political reform, while other issues include: 309 events of monetary crisis (18%), 68 events of cultural hatred (4%) and 171 “others” (10%). The dominant issues in these protest events demand the change of the actors or the political system.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issue</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Masses</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Political Reform</td>
<td>1157</td>
<td>68%</td>
<td>8,253,000</td>
<td>77%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Issue</td>
<td>306</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>1,072,000</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural hatred</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>750,500</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>171</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>643,000</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1702</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>10,718,500</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Table 2.5 Issues of Protest Events (Comparison in number and percentage)*
If examined from the total number of people involved in the different protest, the distance between the issue of reform and the other issues is much farther than seen from the number of protest. The number of people protesting the issue of reform totaled to 8,253,000, 77% of the whole mass involved in protest events from September 1997 to August 1998 throughout Indonesia. Meanwhile, the issue of monetary crisis only involved 1,072,000 people (10%), the issue of cultural hatred only 750,500 (7%) and other issues only 643,000 (6%). Again, in such protest events, the issue of political reform, more than other issues, mobilized a far greater number of people.

From Table 2.6 we can see that the dominant issues do not remain stagnant, but evolve over time. From September 1997 until March 1998, the dominant issue is economic crisis. Economic, not political, problems trigger these protest events. In March 1998 until June 1998, the issue shifted from economics to political reform. Only in March, April, May, and June 1998 did the issue of reform dominate the protest events. Political reform protest lessened after the fall of Suharto in May 1998. After June 1998, the protest events balanced the issues of reform and monetary crisis.

Of the total protest events (1,702 acts), 1239 acts (72.7%) took place peacefully. The protest events that were tainted with violence are only 27.3%; violence does not seem to be a strategic element of the general protest. Yet the issue dominating a protest event often determined whether or not it was peaceful. If the protest event concerned political reform, as many as 80% of protest took place peacefully. If the issue
Of monetary crisis dominated, as many as 79% of the protest actions were peaceful. Yet when the issue was cultural hatred, the number of peaceful protest actions drops to only 22%. Various protest actions using religious or ethnic issues tended to be violent. “Other” issues also tend to be brutal, where only 30% is peaceful (Table 27 and Table 2.8).

### 2.1.3 Were the Protest Events Peaceful?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Political Reform</th>
<th>Economic Issues</th>
<th>Cultural Hatred</th>
<th>Others</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sept '97</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan '98</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March</td>
<td>228</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>284</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apr</td>
<td>313</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>342</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>405</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>493</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jun</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>151</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jul</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>1157</strong></td>
<td><strong>306</strong></td>
<td><strong>68</strong></td>
<td><strong>171</strong></td>
<td><strong>1702</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2.6 Evolution of Issues

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Freq.</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Peaceful Protest</td>
<td>1239</td>
<td>72.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violent</td>
<td>463</td>
<td>27.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>1702</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0%</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2.7 Violent Protest Events
Why were the protest events on reform more peaceful than that with other issues? The element of the actors of the protest actions may be a factor, since students mobilized 84% of the acts of reform issues. In protest actions concerning cultural hatred (SARA) that incited violence, the actors were mostly non-students (90%), and considered to be an anonymous mass.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Peaceful Number</th>
<th>Violent Number</th>
<th>Peaceful Percentage</th>
<th>Violent Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Political</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reform</td>
<td>930</td>
<td>237</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic</td>
<td>242</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>79%</td>
<td>21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Issues</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>78%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>119</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>70%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Table 2.8 Distribution of Violence Based on Issues*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issue</th>
<th>Students</th>
<th>Non-Students</th>
<th>Students</th>
<th>Non-Students</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Political</td>
<td>967</td>
<td>190</td>
<td>84%</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reform</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>191</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>62%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>90%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>67%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Table 2.9 Actors Per-Issue*
2.1.4 Who Participated in the Protest Events?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Freq.</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Students</td>
<td>1145</td>
<td>67%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-students</td>
<td>557</td>
<td>33%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Table 2.10: Actors of the Whole Issue*

Statistically, the actors in these protest events were mostly students. Students dominate as many as 1145 protest actions from 1702 actions (67%). Only 557 protest events (33%) occur with minor or no student participation. Yet if the role of students is viewed from the evolution of the protest events, from September 1997 till February 1998, the dominant actors are not students. Around 70% to 80% of the actors in the said period are classified “non-students.” However, in March 1998, students groups took over.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Students</th>
<th>Non-students</th>
<th>Students</th>
<th>Non-Students</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sept '97</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>79%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>77%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>80%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>57%</td>
<td>43%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan '98</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>71%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>78%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mar</td>
<td>252</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>89%</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apr</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>95%</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>402</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>79%</td>
<td>21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jun</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>65%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jul</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>83%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>78%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1145</td>
<td>557</td>
<td>66%</td>
<td>34%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Table 2.11: Evolution of the Actors*
control of the protest events and in April and May 1999, students mobilized 70% to 90% of the protest events (Table 2.11).

However, the above national data doesn’t provide details about the various social groups that constitute the non-student element. The local newspapers in five provincial capitals (Jakarta, Bandung, Surabaya, Yogyakarta, and Semarang) offer such information.

From Table 2.12, it is clear that young people (mostly students) were the major participants in protest actions in the five major cities (58%). In these cities, the young people’s domination of protest events ranged from 45% (Semarang) to 70% (Yogyakarta). Workers just played a minor role, ranging from 6% (Jakarta) to 27% (Semarang).

Table 2.13 shows that social movement organizations dominated by student organizations mobilize the protest events in Jakarta, Bandung, Yogyakarta, Surabaya and Semarang. Their domination is strong, ranging from 59% (Jakarta) to 67% (Semarang). The courageous individuals not affiliated with any organization played moderate roles as political entrepreneurs, their numbers ranging from 15% (Jakarta) to 22% (Bandung).

Table 2.12: Socio-Vocational Category of Participants (In Percentage)
It is not surprising that all the five provincial capital cities show the same pattern of protest events, as they have the same historical setting. In Indonesia, since the 1920s, the major players in large protest events leading to political changes have always been the youth and the students.

Jakarta, Bandung, Yogyakarta, Surabaya, and Semarang were and are under the control of the same political regime. In those five cities, labor unions and farmers played only a very minor role, as Suharto’s political regime repressed politics of labor unions and farmers because of Indonesia’s traumatic experience with communism. The communist party that existed before the era of Suharto was a dominant party and one strongly supported by the laborers and farmers. Under Suharto’s rule, communism was forbidden and labor and farmers organizations were tightly controlled. By the time of the protest events in 1997 and 1998,

Table 2.13: Organizations Sponsoring or Leading Protest Action (In Percentage)

Table 2.14: General Protest Strategies (In Percentage)
labor and farmers had lost their capability and network to be significantly involved.

Political parties were also not the main players in those five cities. In Suharto’s era, one major political party, Golkar, reigned; Suharto controlled Golkar. Two other legal political parties were subordinated to Golkar, existing only as satellite parties. Suharto’s loyalists led Golkar, and other political parties lacked the infrastructure or network necessary to play a significant role in the 1997 and 1998 protest events.

2.1.5 What Strategy Did They Use?

The protest events used various strategies that can be classified into these three general categories: 1) Violent is used for all events in which violence, intended or unintended, occurs; 2) Disruptive is used for all events that threaten without actually ending in violence, such as a strike or occupation of a public building; 3) Non-disruptive or conventional protest is used for all events not classified under 1 and 2, such as open letters and peaceful demonstrations.

2.1.6 Who is the Ultimate Target of Protest?

Table 2.15 indicates that the President is the major target of the protest events in those five major cities, ranging from 27% (Semarang) to 59% (Jakarta). The focus of political reform issues is the downfall of the personal ruler, the President. The non-elite believed that, without a new president, Indonesia couldn’t escape an authoritarian rule and transit to democracy.

It was not surprising that the President was the main target, as he controlled all political power, from the military, political parties, bureaucracy, and business groups to influential societal
organizations, such as ICMI (Ikatan Cendikiawan Muslim Indonesia/Association of Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals). His sons and daughters ran many government-related businesses. Political entrepreneurs could easily exploit the economic crisis as a means to mobilize people against Suharto as the main focus of protest.

2.2 Political Achievement of Protest Events

In relation to the problem of democratic transition and regime change, the protest events in the Indonesian case, 1997-1998, showed contradictory faces. On one hand, the protest events contributed significantly to: 1) division of the elite, 2) the fall of the authoritarian ruler, and 3) the adoption of a democratic agenda. Yet on the other hand, the protest events also contributed to bloody conflicts and riots based on ethnic hatred. These conflicts seriously constrained Indonesia's ability to achieve democracy peacefully and to have a high level of trust in a civil society. The paragraphs below offer more details about the three political achievements of the protest events, while the destructive quality of some protest events will be described in Chapters.

2.2.1. Division of the Elite

Before the economic crisis swept Indonesia in 1997, and before the rise of the protest events in many places in Indonesia, the elite was ideologically unified under Suharto. A skillful politician, Suharto successfully controlled all elements of the elite within the government (e.g. military, bureaucracy, and the ruling party) and the elite outside the government (big business groups and influential religious groups). Although there was opposition, it was not politically significant.
In the beginning of the economic crisis from September to December 1997, the most influential members of the elite still did not oppose Suharto. In this period of time, no elite member imagined that Suharto might fall in the near future. No influential political scientist or Indonesianist predicted the end of Suharto. Based on rational calculation and previous experience, it was in the elite’s own self interest not to oppose Suharto; to not do so could end their political career. This political situation explained why the transition from authoritarian rule in Indonesia didn’t begin with the division within the elite. It was the non-elite actors, the masses, who began the opposition toward the incumbent government through protest events. The economic crisis and intensifying anger

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Jakarta</th>
<th>Bandung</th>
<th>Yogyakarta</th>
<th>Surabaya</th>
<th>Semarang</th>
<th>Average</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>President</td>
<td>0.59</td>
<td>0.31</td>
<td>0.47</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.37</td>
<td>0.39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assembly</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government’</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>0.67</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>0.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Management</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>0.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>of Industry</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign Comp.</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>0.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>0.16</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2.15: Ultimate Target (Percentage)

1. “Government” is for any issue which target is the government in general, not specific to the president or the Assembly, “Management of Industry” is for any issue which target is a company for better welfare or work condition of workers. “Domestic and Foreign Company” is for the issue, which target is a company but not related to the interest of workers. The issue of “Domestic and Foreign Company” is more political, such as monopolistic practices, such as the issue of national car and businesses owned by Suharto’s families and supporters. However, no foreign company is attacked and targeted by the protest events so far.
toward the corruption of Suharto’s family and loyalists served as a political opportunity that won the protest wide public support.

After the protest event’s level of mobilization turned high and widespread, the elite within the incumbent government began to split - fighting with each other. However, rather than use the terms hardliners and soft-liners, I prefer to use the term “Suharto loyalists” and “Suharto traitors” to describe the two elite factions. In the beginning, all of the elite were Suharto loyalists. The deep economic crisis and the huge protest events against Suharto had divided them.

Suharto loyalists defended and supported Suharto until the end; the economic crisis and the huge social protest did not affect their position. Suharto traitors changed their position, supporting the protest events, distancing themselves from the incumbent government and gradually opposing Suharto himself. The support of influential elites gave the protest events much more political influence.

Harmoko, the leader of the ruling party, Golkar, and speaker of the Assembly and the People’s Consultative Assembly, is an example of a Suharto traitor. Before the rise of protest events, he was a Suharto loyalist, but after the rise of protest events, he was among the first who asked Suharto to step down. Before the protest events escalated, Harmoko repeatedly said that Suharto still wanted to lead Indonesia. This led to Suharto’s nomination as the single candidate for the next presidential election. In the plenary session of the People’s Consultative Assembly on 10 March 1998, when Harmoko announced the result of the examination of the credentials of the sole presidential candidate, he said that the candidate had fulfilled the requirements stipulated in Article
1 of MPR Decision Number II/MPR /1973 on The Procedures of Election for President and Vice-President. Later, on the anniversary of Golkar, 19 October 1997, Harmoko stated that Golkar had decided to nominate Suharto as the president for the period 1998-2003.

The strong pressure of the community and students for the resignation of Suharto changed Harmoko’s views as the speaker of the People’s Consultative Assembly. The masses burned his house in the city of Solo. Thousands of students occupied his office in the Assembly building and threatened him for days and nights. The heaviest pressure to Harmoko came from Buyung Nasution SH, a famous lawyer supporting the protest events, and his group. On May 1998, Buyung and his group demanded an answer to the worsening situation: “Is the special session to fire Suharto included in the agenda of the speaker of the Assembly now?” Harmoko answered: “Yes, it is included in the agenda of the meeting between the speaker and the president to discuss that which has been said. We will soon hold a meeting with the president. We have to be realistic.”

But Buyung, with his inimitable style, kept on pushing his ideas: “Harmoko, everywhere buildings are being burned (in Harmoni, Glodok, Atmajaya, and other places). So we cannot just talk forever. We have to find a short cut.” He added, “Now, Harmoko has to go and see or catch him (the President). Tell him that to resign from the presidency is the people’s aspiration (Media Indonesia; 15 May 1998).

Another group pushing Harmoko was Gerakan Reformasi Nasional, the National Reform Movement (GRN). On 8 May 1998, under the leadership of the ex-secretary general of OPEC, Prof. Dr.
Soebroto, ex-minister Prof. Dr. Emil Salim, senior military officer Lt. Gen. (Retired) Kemal Idris, prominent Catholic intellectual JB Mangunwidjaja, senior politicians Frans Seda, Dr. Sri Edi Swasono, Dr. Dimyati Hartono, economist Rizal Ramli, artist WS. Rendra, academicians Dr. Koesnadi Hardjasono, Dr. Mahar Mardjono, and politicians Julius Usman, Solichin GPr Lt. Gen (Retired) Ali Sadikin, the GRN pushed Suharto to realize his words in Cairo; to be ready to resign if overthrown constitutionally. The process asked the special session of the Assembly to revoke the decision of the People’s Consultative Assembly giving the mandate to Suharto (Media Indonesia, 15 May 1998, p.l.).

The pressure of the masses and the independent intellectuals on Harmoko has increased over time. As the speaker of the Assembly, Harmoko is a key figure in the success of the protest, as he has the constitutional authority to remove Suharto from office. On 14 May 1998, after consulting the leaders of the Assembly, and receiving approximately 100 students, Harmoko explained that if there was no consultation with the President before Friday, they would hold a meeting with delegations concerning the possibility of calling a special session. The next step happened on May 16, 1998 when Harmoko, together with the secretary general of the People’s Consultative Assembly, consulted with Suharto at his home in Cendana Street.

Harmoko conveyed to Suharto the aspiration of the community as expressed in many forums at the time. The demands of the people were: 1) that the government undergoes a total reform; 2) that the president resigns because it was the wish of the people; 3) that a special session of the People’s Consultative Assembly be held.
Suharto was against the demands. He asserted that reform could continue, and the government would reshuffle the cabinet. Concerning the desire of the people for the president to resign, he answered, “I leave it up to the parliament”. Then Harmoko interrupted: “Sir, isn’t it better to leave it up to the delegation of the People’s Consultative Assembly2 because it is the People’s Consultative Assembly which appointed you as the president?” Suharto answered no, because the parliament, with a membership of 500 people, represented the members of the People’s Consultative Assembly. If the parliament considered the President unreliable and asked for his resignation, Suharto said, “I am willing to resign.”

After meeting with Suharto, Harmoko was still unsure about what he should do. Suharto would not resign, and he was Suharto loyalist; nopredence offered him the courage to defy his leader. However, Ihe mas jwessure on Harmoko intensified and he would have to make political statements about where he stood in this era of deep crisis. On 19 May 1998, Harmoko planned to officially meet the delegations. The result would be presented to Suharto. At 3:30 p.m. that very day, Hirmoko read a statement at a press conference that expressed the demands for Suharto to resign from office. Harmoko, together with the delegations, hoped to keep people calm, and hold the country together while also upholding the mandate that everything from the People’s Consultative Assembly be presented to the people by the existing press in the Assembly.

The complete statements are as follows;

People’s Consultative Assembly, in the framework of the littlekfship meeting, had studied carefully and seriously the rapid Ivceltjiftmmtand national situation related to the aspiration of the
people wishing reform, including the special session and the resignation of the President

To discuss this, on 19 May 1998 the Speaker of the Assembly will hold a meeting with the leaders of the delegations the result of which would be sent to the President. Such a mechanism was taken in line with the regulation of the procedure of the Assembly, because in making a decision, the leaders of the People’s Consultative Assembly had to work with the leaders of the delegations.

In responding to such a situation, the Speaker of the People’s Consultative Assembly or the deputy speaker expected, for the sake of the nation that the President should wisely resign.

The Speaker of the People’s Consultative Assembly calls for the people to keep calm, hold oneself, for the sake of unison and unity to realize security and order so that everything could work institutionally.

Jakarta, 18 May

Speaker of the People’s Consultative Assembly: Harmoko

Deputy Speakers: - Abdul Gafur (FKP)
                 - Lt.Gen.Syarwan Hamid (F-ABRI)
                 - Ismael Hasan Metareum (FPP)
                 - Mrs. Fatimah Acmad (FPDI),

(Forum Keadilan, No. 5 Year VII, 15 June 1998)

2. Indonesia has People’s Consultative Assembly and a parliament- All members of the parliament are members of the Assembly as well. However, not all members of the Assembly are members of the parliament. According to the constitution, the Assembly has the authority to elect and fire the president.
The shifting of Harmoko’s position was a milestone; initiating a radical change of the political climate. For the first time a member of the ruling elite had the courage to make a public statement against the “Indonesian King” Harmoko opened the door for the elite to shift loyalty and other members of the governing elite followed suit.

Before the rise of protest events, to resign from the cabinet was a kind of “statement of war” toward Suharto. No politicians had ever resigned; all the ruling elite had been solid and unified under Suharto’s command. But after the rise of massive protest events and after Harmoko distanced himself from Suharto, some members of the cabinet resigned, claiming that they didn’t want to work under Suharto anymore. The message behind their resignation was simple. They wanted Suharto to step down.

At the building of Bappenas (Badan Perancang Pembangunan Nasional, National Board for Planning and Development), fourteen ministers, under the coordination of Coordinating Minister of Economy, Finance and Industry Ginanjar Kartasasmita, held a meeting. The other ministers for economy, finance and industry: the Minister of Industry and Commerce Bob Hasan, and Minister of Finance Fuad Bawasir, did not want to attend the meeting. The decision of the meeting was: these fourteen ministers (Akbar Tanjung, Hendropriyono, Ginanjar Kartasasmita, Giri Suseno, Haryanto Danutirto, Justika Baharsyah, Kuntoro Mangkusubroto, Rachmadi, Bambang Sumadhijo, Rahadi Ramelan, Subiyakto Tjakrawerdya, Sanyoto Sastrawardoyo, Sumahadi, Theo Sambuaga, and Tanri Abeng) declared they were not willing to reshuffle the positions of ministers in the cabinet. They supported the aspirations of the community, especially as recommended by
the leading figures of the Assembly and the chairman of delegations in the Assembly that Suharto has to resign from the position of president (Suara Karya, 22 May 1998).

The action taken by Ginanjar and his friends was a deadly political stab to Suharto. According to Yusril Ihza Mahendra, one of the special staff in the State Secretariat who, together with Saadilah Mursjid, accompanied Suharto in this critical situation, Suharto was shocked and depressed. The day before, Ginanjar had helped him plan the formation of the new cabinet (Forum Keadilan, 27 May 1998).

However, mass pressure had changed Ginanjar’s mind. Hundred of thousand people occupied the Assembly building for days. Almost in every big city in Indonesia, mobs were marching in the street asking for the resignation of Suharto. They condemned the members of the ruling elite still supporting Suharto. The series of protest events divided the ruling elite more deeply in this era than ever before during Suharto’s rule.

2.2.2 The Fall of the Personal Ruler, Suharto

After dividing the elite, the protesters were emboldened to demand that Suharto step down. The resignation of Suharto was the second political achievement of the protest events in 1997-1998. Suharto himself didn’t want to resign because, according to him, he didn’t want the crisis to worsen. As a soldier, he believed his responsibility was to solve the crisis and remain in power. In the last hours of his office, he still attempted to stay in power by asking the military chief, Wiranto, to support him as president, and asking various Islamic leaders to join him in reshuffling the cabinet with him still in the presidential office. At about 5 p.m., the Minister of Defense and Security and Commander of the Armed Forces

At 8 p.m, General Wiranto, before the domestic and foreign press, communicated the military’s response to the statement of the leading figures of the Assembly. Wiranto said: “The statement of the leading figures of the Assembly to ask President Suharto to resign is an individual opinion, although it was articulated collectively. The military asks the people to stay calm, and to support the existing government. The military only supports the reshuffling of the cabinet, and not the resignation of Suharto (Kompas, 27 May 1998).

Meanwhile, Suharto invited and conducted a meeting with some experts and Islamic leaders at the Freedom Palace.3 Famous Islamic figures helped Suharto to obtain support from various Islamic communities. The meeting, also attended by a couple of senior military leaders, resulted in a political compromise with two stipulations. First, a committee for reform would be created, whose members would come from various elements of the community and universities. The committee would have the responsibility to

3. It was attended by, among others, the leaders of the influential Islamic organizations, such as Nahdlatul, Muhammadiyah and Paramadina: Nurcholis Madjid (Paramadina), Abdurahman Wahid, KH. Ali Yafie, KH. Cholil Baidawi (NU), Sumarsono (Muhammadiyah), Achmad Bagja (NU), Ma’ruf Amien (NU), Emha Ainun Nadjib (popular poet), Yusril Ihza Mahendra and Malik Fajar (Muhammadiyah).
prepare laws (for general election, structure and positions of the Assembly, law on party, law on corruption, and law on monopoly). These laws would respond to the community’s aspiration. Second, Suharto would reshuffle the cabinet and the next cabinet would be named “Reform Cabinet” (Kompas, 20 May 1998).

However, the protest events once again changed the political mood and showed the determination of the protesters. The statement of Wiranto triggered more students and other academic circles, as well as non-campus and non-activist circles, to come to the building of the Assembly. They wanted to show, in numbers, that they fully supported the political attitude of the leading figures of the Assembly. In various major Indonesian cities, similar protest took place. In Yogyakarta, Sri Sultan Hamengkubuwono X, a prominent traditional ruler, directly led the students and people in protest events (Jawa Pos, 20 May 1998).

Since morning, the speaker of the Assembly had been holding a meeting with the chairmen of delegations in the Assembly (at the time): Irsjad Sudiro (Golkar), Hari Sabarno (military), and Budi Hardjono (PDI, Partai Demokrasi Indonesia/Indonesian Democratic Party). This meeting resulted in the decision to support the demands of the public in protest events to ask President Suharto to resign. On the very hour of the National Awakening Day, a day to celebrate the rise of Indonesian nationalism, 20 May 1998, the situation grew more serious. Student activists rejected the elite’s political compromise. Militant protesters had been trying, since early in the day, to make a long march from the building of the Assembly toward the National Monument, a monument where the independence of Indonesia is celebrated, in order to join in the commemoration of the National Awakening Day led by Amren Rais, an opposition leader.
The program was canceled and Amien Rais was forced to announce the cancellation on TV. This enraged the student activists. In the afternoon, several figures, among them are prominent intellectuals came to the building of the Assembly. They gave speeches before several groups of students, principally showing sympathy and supporting the students’ acts of protest (Pernbaruan, 20 May 1998). At his home on Cendana Street, Suharto invited three former vice-presidents, Umar Wirahadikusumah, Sudharmono and Try Sutrisno, to discuss the changing situation and Suharto’s intention to form a “committee for reform” (Kornpas, 27 May 1998). But the rising pressure finally forced Suharto, the personal ruler for 32 years, to resign.

Unlike all the other political turmoil he had faced, Suharto in 1997-1998 lost the battle. He could no longer use his power and skillful political maneuvering to break his challengers or even use his money to buy political loyalty. In 1997-1998, the huge militant protest events won support from a wide array of social groups, influencing political groups, families and individuals. Suharto lost his power to the politics of the protest events.

2.2.3 Adoption of a Democratic Agenda

The fall of Suharto was not the ultimate goal of the protest events. During the three months before the resignation of Suharto, the main issue of the protest events had been democratic political reform. Vice-President Habibie, who became the new president replacing Suharto, had no choice other than to adopt these democratic agenda: a multi-party system, free press, constitutional amendments and an earlier general election. This was carried out through rewriting of several laws.
The frequently heard demands during March to May 1998 were: “Revoke the Five Political Laws!” These were Law No. 1/1985 on the General Election; Law No. 2/1985 concerning the Structure and Position of the Assembly, Local Parliament Law No.3/1985 on Political Parties and Functional Groups; Law No. 8/1985 concerning Community Organization, Mass Organizing, Mass Organization; and the Law concerning Referendum for the Amendment to the 1945 Constitution. These laws facilitated the existence of the authoritarian regime.

Therefore in March 1998, when the wave of student acts of protest re-emerged, the demands for the revocation of the package of the five political laws became one of the central issues. When, in May 1998, the pro-democracy protest spread to small campuses in small Indonesian cities, the issue of the revocation of the package of the five political laws of 1985 became an integral part of the reform issues. As a result, soon after the formation of the development reform cabinet, the new president, Habibie, agreed with the leading figures of the Assembly on some agenda, including forwarding the conduct of the general election from 2004 to June 7,1999; this new law would replace the package of five political laws of 1985.

On 1 February 1999, three draft political laws officially became laws. These were Law No. 2/1999 on Political Parties; Law No. 3/1999 on General Election and Law No, 4/1999 on the Structure and Position of the People’s Assembly, Parliament, and Local Parliament There were several interesting issues in line with the reform demands, such as the general election conducted by KPU (Komite Pemantau Pemilu, an independent general election commission).
Simultaneously, the law of the press underwent a significant change. The stipulation concerning the press publishing business permit was abolished and the possibility to form more than one press organization opened. The same thing happened to the broadcasting organizations. The stipulation concerning the compulsory relay of official news by TV channels and private radios was terminated, and broadcasting crews were free to form professional organizations.

The administration of President Abdurrahman Wahid went further. For the sake of providing a guarantee on press and electronic media freedom, the administration abolished the Department of Information. The protest events in 1997-1998 significantly contributed to the regime change in Indonesia.

2.3 The Framework of Explanation

How can the rise and the power of serial protest events described above be explained? What makes powerless people able to quickly transform themselves and mobilize a series of protest events leading to the collapse of a powerful authoritarian ruler? How are powerless people, living under state repression, fearful for their personal security, able to force a strong and experienced personal ruler to step down? How is a weak and segmented civil society able to mobilize more than one hundred thousand people to march in the streets and occupy the Assembly, acts that lead to fundamental political change?

The literature on social movements offers these three standard theories to explain: deprivation or breakdown theory, the theory of resources mobilization and the theory of political opportunity structure. However, each of these theories emphasizes a certain dimension of protest events and no single theory can fully answer the above questions. Studies in the social movement literature,
for example, explore only certain variables, such as widespread discontent caused by economic decline (deprivation), the leadership role played by movement entrepreneurs (resource mobilization theory) and the context of opportunities available to actors (political opportunity theory). In political science, democratization theory (transition and consolidation of democracy) has made great progress in recent years, but since my primary focus is on the breakdown of an authoritarian rule, I can only use some ideas and concepts from these literatures.

Protest events in Indonesia, in the era of economic crisis, under a patrimonial system, and in the condition of a divided society, show a complex and multi-faceted reality. To bridge the gap between theory and reality, I develop my own framework that combines several theories from sociology and political science, including social movement and democratization theory.

My research framework combines the following four explanatory elements in the case of Indonesia: (1) the existence of a major national crisis, which triggered the protest; (2) the presence of political entrepreneurs who were able to mobilize resources and to expand the protest movement; (3) deep splits in the ruling elite, which reduced Suharto’s ability to maintain his regime; and (4) Suharto’s own tactical errors. The purposes of my study are to empirically demonstrate the importance of each element in overthrowing Suharto and to persuasively argue that each is logically and empirically dependent on the others.

First, the existence of a wide and deep national crisis creates the opportunity for a social movement to emerge and grow quickly. Only in the context of a nationwide crisis can a powerless people transform themselves against state repression and personal fear to
become a powerful machine. In the case of Indonesia, that crisis was the deep economic crisis of 1997-98. This economic crisis turned Indonesia upside down, from an “Asian miracle” to an “Asian meltdown” country, and created widespread discontent among the people. The crisis also caused the decline of legitimacy of the authoritarian ruler, as his legitimacy was based on his previously strong economic development. Because of the crisis, economic development turned to economic disaster, and changed the image of the personal ruler from the father of development to the father of economic bankruptcy.

This logic of economic crisis and its impact is in line with the breakdown theory in sociology associated with Smelser (1962). According to the breakdown theory, protest events are byproduct of a rapid social change; disintegration and breakdown of a society triggered by economic hardship, war, or disaster. In turn, this disintegration leads to widespread discontent and public frustration. The protest events are the means by which this discontent is channeled and expressed. According to scholars who work within this theoretical tradition, protest events are rare and tend to be reactive (McAdam and Snow, 1997).

Many studies on social movements and revolutions have been conducted elaborating economic hardship as the cause of widespread discontent. Some of these studies use economic hardship or economic deprivation as one variable among several others (e.g., Spilman, 1976), Others use it as the basis of selection for case study analysis of the growth of social movements (Piven, 1977).

However, economic crisis alone is not sufficient to explain the series of protest events that occurred in Indonesia in 1997 and
1998. Economic crisis only provides the opportunity and the necessary condition for those events. Protest events are not only a result of conditions, but also a product of actions, which leads to the second element that explain the case of Indonesia: there must be movement agents to initiate and mobilize the events. These movement agents take political risks to lead the protest, network, and expand the constituency of protesters. It is the movement agents who transform opportunity into action.

This logic is in line with resource mobilization theory in sociology. According to this theory, protest events are caused, not only by widespread discontent or public anger, but also by action. Protest events are the strategic choices taken by rational actors for their own political purposes by mobilizing the available resources. Movement agents mobilize protest events (McCarthy and Zald, 1977).

In this literature, the most important movement agents are called the new Social Movement Organizations (SMOs) (McCarthy and Zald, 1977). The difference between the new SMOs and older social movements is that the new organizations are professional with paid staff. Their primary concern is to represent the underrepresented; the disadvantaged in the contemporary society. McCarthy and Zald argue that the SMOs dominate the new wave of social movements in the 1960s and 1970s. Through political entrepreneurship, these new SMOs mobilize all available resources, such as cadres (for example, students and workers), the mass media (newspaper, TV), as well as finances.

McCharty and Zald may overlook the role of the new SMOs. Jenkins and Ekiert (1986) have demonstrated a different conclusion. Students, universities and the churches (traditional SMOs, not the
professional or new SMOs) still dominated protest events in the civil rights movement in the United States from 1953 to 1980. In those movements, the new SMOs played only a marginal role. Based on above fact, while I tend to discount McCarthy and Zald’s propositions on new SMOs, their concept about the movement agents who mobilize and initiate protest events is useful.

However, the movement agents can be any agents, not only new SMOs, or traditional ones. Some of the movement agents can be any courageous individuals. Among all the movement agents, there exists what I labeled as political entrepreneurs. Most of them are not political entrepreneurs. In my framework, political entrepreneur only refers to the agents who give deep political impact to the movement, by taking political risk and innovation.

Third, nevertheless, political entrepreneurs themselves are not strong enough to topple a strong personal ruler like Suharto. Governmental power is in the hands of the elite, defined as the people who have power to influence national political outcomes through their individual actions. There must be a shift in the attitudes of these elite, away from support for the authoritarian ruler toward opposition to the ruler and tolerance and support for the social movement. To have a powerful impact, the social movement must, in the final analysis, receive support from the governing elite.

This logic is in line with political opportunity structure theory (and also with Jenkin’s theory of public support). While the breakdown theory explores widespread discontent, and the resource mobilization theory describes the role of political entrepreneurs, the political opportunity structure theory elaborates on the political environment that provides incentives for protest events by affecting people’s expectation for success or failure (Tarrow, 1998, p.77).
Many varieties of political opportunity structure theory exist. McAdam (1996) compares all the versions of this theory based on the work of other scholars such as Tarrow, Brockett, Kriesi and Rucht. These versions vary enormously, and include the openness or closure of a policy, divisions within the elite, the formal institutional structure, the configuration of power, and the level of repression.

Jenkins and Perrow (1977) demonstrate the role of political opportunity structure in their empirical research. The dramatic success of farm workers’ insurgent movement could be better explained by changes in the political environment; the movement confronted than by internal characteristics of the movement organization or the social base upon which it drew. In their conceptualization, political environment refers to external support, such as the support of a coalition of liberal organizations. Elite support was also an important variable.

The elite variable is further developed in the literature on democratic transition in political science. Q’Donnell and Schmitter (1991) argue that “there is no transition whose beginning is not the consequence -direct or indirect - of important divisions within the authoritarian regime itself, principally along the fluctuating cleavage between the hardliners and soft-liners.” The term hardliners refers to the factions who believe that an authoritarian rule is not only possible, but also desirable. These factions truly support authoritarianism and are willing to maintain their belief even in the face of the crisis. The term soft-liner refers to those factions supporting the need for change, from authoritarian rule to democracy or at least to a more liberalized regime. The split between the hardliners and soft-liners opens an opportunity for the breakdown of the authoritarian rule.
Burton and Higley (1987) propose a similar argument. They divide the structure of the elite into these three categories: 1) ideologically unified; 2) disunified; and 3) consensually unified. Ideologically unified refers to the outward appearance of nearly complete unity of the elite under authoritarian rule in that all factions publicly profess the same ideology and support the same policies. The ruthless, often violent, intra-elite factions deeply distrustful of each other are considered to be disunified. Consensually unified refers to the pattern of elite competition within an agreed-upon democratic procedure. According to Burton and Higley, “divided or disunited elite operates unstable regimes in which coups, uprisings, revolutions, and other forcible seizures of government power occur frequently and are widely expected” (p.296-297).

For the 1997-1998 Indonesian case, however, elite support for protesters cannot be separated from the actions of the personal ruler; the crisis might have been overcome if a strong personal ruler had made the right policy adjustments. The fourth and final element, therefore, is the political success or failure of the national leadership. The powerful authoritarian ruler could not be forced to step down, certainly not so quickly, if he was able to adjust policy to restore public legitimacy. In other words, there might be some miscalculations or bad judgment by the ruler that leads to the growth of the movement against him. A personal ruler is autonomous and strong. His actions and decisions during the crisis cannot be ignored in the analysis of the reasons for his fall.

This logic is in line with William Liddle’s theory of the relative autonomy of the Third World politician. In his book (1996), Liddle argues that Third World politicians, in his case as mine is President Suharto, are autonomous. Personal rulers are capable of adopting unpopular policies against structural forces, such as
culture or interest groups. For example, a personal ruler can help his country to grow economically while also strengthening his own position, through adopting unpopular liberal economic policies.

In Indonesia in 1997-1998, however, the personal ruler used bad judgment and miscalculated the power of Indonesia’s masses. In Liddle’s case, which dealt with Suharto from the 1960s to the 1980s, the personal ruler succeeded, defeating various protest groups that mobilized against him. In my case, he failed. A series of poor decisions had negative consequences for his country and also for his own position, finally leading to his fall. But the main point is the same as Liddle’s: what the ruler himself does makes a difference for the success or failure of the protest movement against him.

A plausible explanation to describe the sudden growth of a previously divided and powerless people to become a strong and unified force should combine the four above variables into a single framework. To repeat, the four variables are the role of economic crisis as a trigger, the role of political entrepreneurs to initiate and lead the movement, the supporting role of at least a part of the governing elite, and the tactical mistakes of the national leader which led to his sudden fall. These four variables will explain why the Indonesian political struggle in 1997-98 resulted in the process of democratization, rather than under military rule or in an Islamic State.

Detailed explanation and data concerning those four variables will be introduced in Chapters 3, 4, and 5. In Chapter 6, I will describe the risk of massive serial protest events in the condition of economic crisis and in a society as divided as Indonesia. Bloody conflicts and riots happen side by side with protest events for democracy.
CHAPTER 3
ECONOMIC CRISIS AS A TRIGGER:
A NECESSARY BUT NOT SUFFICIENT CONDITION

This chapter argues that deep economic crisis is a necessary variable in explaining the rise and expansion of serial protest events in Indonesia from 1997 to 1998, which led to the transition to democracy. The first reason, as shown by the data in this chapter, is that Indonesia’s deep economic crisis occurred prior to, and gave to, the rise of protest events. The existence of a wide and deep Indonesian economic crisis created the opportunity for the protest events to emerge and grow quickly. Only in the context of a national crisis can powerless people transform themselves, almost simultaneously across regions, against state repression and personal fear, to become a powerful machine. The common denominator of those people in different regions was the economic crisis.

The second reason, which is obvious from the data in this chapter, is that the issue of economic crisis dominated the initial protest events. Most political events occur as a response to economic
crisis. After months of protesting, the focus turned from issues of economic change to the issue of Political reform since protesters believed that the solution to the economic crisis lies in political reform.

The economic crisis in Indonesia is far worse than the one in Thailand and South Korea. Tragically, domestic economic experts or international institution and boards cannot predict the crisis. Ironically, the largest financial institutions like the IMF and World Bank had appraised positively Indonesia’s economic performance, either by means of public statements or closed comments until the first half of the year of 1997.

However, as shown later by the data in this chapter, economic crisis alone cannot explain the evolution and dynamic of protest events in some places. Economic crisis is necessary but not sufficient to explain the complexity and the richness of the rise, expansion and political impact of protest events. Many places hit hardest by the economic crisis had a lower level of mobilization of protest events.

This chapter, divided into four parts, will discuss Indonesia’s economic crisis and its role as a trigger of protest actions. The first part offers data on the depth of the economic crisis in Indonesia and general comments on why it occurred, while the second part explains the political effect of economic crisis on various societal segments. In the second part, the link between economic crisis and the rise of protest events is shown. That economic crisis alone is not sufficient to explain the level of mobilization of protest events is explained in the third part. Comparative cases in some provinces are used to verify the above statement. The fourth part is to elaborate another explanation, which is the availability of resources for mobilizing the protest events.
3.1 Data of Economic Crisis

Table 3.1 shows high Indonesian economic growth before the era of economic crisis. From 1993 to 1996, the growth rate of the Indonesian economy varied from 7.3% to 8.2%. On the average, this growth is much higher than the average growth of the world economy, industrialized countries, and developing countries in Africa, Middle East and Latin America. The growth of the economy in Indonesia was comparable only to other East Asian countries such as Malaysia, Thailand, Singapore and Vietnam.

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Source: Tambunan (1998)

*Table 3.1: The Economic Growth of Indonesia before the Crisis.*
However, economic crisis changed the economic performance of Indonesia. Economic indicators in Table 3.2 show the severity of the economic crisis. Indonesian economic growth was reduced to 4.7% in 1997 and went down very sharp to -13.6% in 1998. GDP per capita decreased from US$ 1,155 in 1996 to US$ 1,088 in 1997 and to only US$ 425.8 in 1998. Import was reduced from US$ 42.9 billion in 1996 to US$ 417 billion in 1997 and US$ 11.15 billion in 1998. For complete comparison between Indonesia prior to and after the economic crisis see Table 3.2

Table 3.3 and Table 3.4 show other features of the Indonesian economic crisis. Indonesian GNP per capita of US$ 1,088 in 1997 dropped to US$ 610 in 1998.

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<td>GDP Per capita</td>
<td>30.4</td>
<td>34.9</td>
<td>38.1</td>
<td>41.8</td>
<td>16.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Export (US$ billion)</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>40.6</td>
<td>42.9</td>
<td>41.7</td>
<td>11.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Import (US$ billion)</td>
<td>-2.9</td>
<td>-8.8</td>
<td>-7.8</td>
<td>-5.8</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Balance of Payment</td>
<td>13.2</td>
<td>14.7</td>
<td>19.1</td>
<td>17.4</td>
<td>13.92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Debt</td>
<td>106.0</td>
<td>116.5</td>
<td>118.0</td>
<td>20.5</td>
<td>130.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Tambunan (1998)

Table 3.2: Economic Crisis, Macro-Economic Indicators, Indonesia 1994-1998.
Inflation rate increased dramatically from 6.47% in 1996 to 11.05% in 1997 to 77.63% in 1998.

However, the decline of the Indonesian economy was not equally distributed among economic sectors. While some sectors dropped drastically, others were moderate, and some were still positive. Table 3.5 and Table 3.6 show that, in the year of economic crisis, the sector of farming, fishing and forestry (including agribusiness) still profited, as did the sectors of electricity, gas and water. All other sectors were negative; with construction and manufacturing the most badly hurt by the crisis.

Although in the year of the crisis, farming, forestry and fishing and the sectors of electricity, gas and water still absorbed new employment, other sectors cut their employment drastically. More than six million people found themselves unemployed because of the crisis. The sectors most negatively affected were trade, hotel, restaurant and construction.

How bad was the Indonesian economic crisis compared to other countries? In terms of economic growth, Indonesia ranked among the worst case. Table 3.7 compares 30 countries transitioning to democracy, including Spain, Brazil, Turkey and Peru. The measurement of comparison was calculated as follows: first, the average of the economic growth rate in the transition year and two previous years was calculated; second, the average of the economic growth rate of the five previous years was calculated; third, the average of the first is reduced by the average of the second. This measurement shows the severity of economic crisis by examining it within a framework of five consecutive years before the year of transition. The score for Indonesia is -7.3. This score is worse than any other country on the list except Honduras. Indonesia’s
### Table 3.3: Indonesian GNP Per Capita (US$)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>GNP (US$)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>56.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>126.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>260.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>494.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>467.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>833.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>1088</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>610</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Tambunan (1998)

### Table 3.4: Inflation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Inflation Rate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>9.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>8.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>6.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>11.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>77.63</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table 3.8 displays and compares Indonesia to other countries by measuring inflation rather than the economic growth rate. Table 8 shows that, compared to other countries, inflation in Indonesia was not as affected by the crisis as its economic growth rate. Inflation in Indonesia in 1998 was still better than Brazil in 1985, but worse than more than other twenty countries.

Table 3.9 indicates how Indonesia’s exchange rate compared to other Asian countries in the era of the meltdown of Asia. Indonesia’s local currency dropped more significantly than any of the other Asian countries. Thailand’s currency lost its value as much as 36%, Malaysia 33.6%, and South Korea 36.2%. However, Indonesia’s currency dropped as much as 73.8%.

Table 3.10 displays the increase in the interest rate in Indonesia compared to other countries. Compared to Thailand and South Korea, two countries that were swept by the Asian crisis in 1997-1998, the increase in the interest rate in Indonesia was four times higher.

Thailand’s percentage was 11%, South Korea was 10.5%, but Indonesia was 56.7%.

Various economists have given tentative explanations to the phenomena. Hal Hill (1999) and Tambunan (1998), for example, have listed some variables. First, Indonesia maintained the exchange rate at a pseudo level; the domestic interest rate level being higher than the international interest rate. Many domestic
companies were indebted to foreign countries, and have not secured the debt position of their exchange rate. When domestic and foreign capital was suddenly withdrawn on a large scale, the Indonesian central bank could no longer maintain the exchange rate of rupiah. The depreciation of rupiah reached 400 per cent.

Table 3.5: GDP of Indonesia, (1997 and 1998, in billion rupiah)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>1997</th>
<th>1998</th>
<th>Growth Rate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Farming, Fishing, Forestry</td>
<td>64,289.5</td>
<td>64,433.5</td>
<td>0.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mining</td>
<td>38,385.9</td>
<td>36,787.5</td>
<td>-4.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manufacture</td>
<td>108,828.6</td>
<td>94,808.3</td>
<td>-12.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electricity, Gas and Water</td>
<td>5,498.6</td>
<td>5,702.1</td>
<td>3.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction</td>
<td>35,040.6</td>
<td>21,116.4</td>
<td>-39.74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade, Hotel and Restaurant</td>
<td>73,503.6</td>
<td>59,572.2</td>
<td>-18.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport, &amp; Comm.</td>
<td>32,169.4</td>
<td>28,051.4</td>
<td>-12.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finance</td>
<td>38,730.1</td>
<td>28,372.4</td>
<td>-26.74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service</td>
<td>37,649.1</td>
<td>35,874.9</td>
<td>-4.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>434,095.4</td>
<td>374,718.8</td>
<td>-13.68</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: BPS; Sistem Neraca Sosial Ekonomi Indonesia, 1998

Table 3.6: Termination of Work Contract after the Crisis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>1998 Growth (in thousand) Rate (%)</th>
<th>Termination Per 1% up or don GDP</th>
<th>Termination</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Farming</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>432.35</td>
<td>1113</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mining</td>
<td>-4.16</td>
<td>-290.50</td>
<td>-70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manufacture</td>
<td>-12.88</td>
<td>-1,386.34</td>
<td>-108</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electricity, gas and water</td>
<td>3.70</td>
<td>6.54</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction</td>
<td>-39.74</td>
<td>-1,748.28</td>
<td>-120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade, Hotel and Restaurant</td>
<td>-16.95</td>
<td>-2,276.37</td>
<td>-120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transp. &amp; Comm.</td>
<td>-12.90</td>
<td>-749.82</td>
<td>-58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finance</td>
<td>-26.74</td>
<td>-141.77</td>
<td>-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service</td>
<td>-4.71</td>
<td>-270.31</td>
<td>-57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>-13.68</td>
<td>-6,424.53</td>
<td>-470</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Biro Pusat Statistik, Sistem Neraca Sosial Ekonomi Indonesia, 1998
(December 1997, Rp.17, 000 = US$ 1). Although companies had solid and professional management, they struggled to pay foreign debts, which had quadrupled. The pattern of Indonesia’s foreign debts intensified the problem. The short-term capital, either in the form of debt or short term “hot money”, amounted to 30-40 billion US dollars. If such debts had been mostly long-term, they would be easier to manage.

The second issue is that the domestic financial system being used as a channel for foreign loans had little control or supervision. Since their financial reports were not reliable, people’s trust over banks’ credibility had dissolved. Furthermore, people panicked when Bank of Indonesia, the central bank, liquidated 16 banks on November 1, 1997 without prior notice or further explanation.

At the end of 1997, there was doubt about government’s commitment to existing reform, especially when the projects of Suharto’s children were exempted from the then new, strict regulation. Indonesia needed international support, firm and strict leadership, and a conducive international neighborhood, as well as luck, to survive the crisis. However, the international community’s trust and support grew less and less because of Suharto’s ambivalence to obeying the IMF’s framework.

Domestic politics is the third issue, as the political instability and disputes about SARA (Suku, Agama, Ras, Antar Golongan/ Ethnicity, Religion, Race and Class) between indigenous and non-indigenous people, heightened the crisis. The frantic Sino-Indonesian business community began to secure their assets, particularly after the May 1998 riot.
Table 37: Comparative Economic Performance in Democratic Transition, GDP Growth

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Avenue Performance</th>
<th>Transition Year, incl. Two Previous Years (A)</th>
<th>Ave. Performance Five Previous Years (B)</th>
<th>A-B</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Honduras, 1982</td>
<td>-0.5</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>8.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia, 1998</td>
<td>-0.33</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>-7.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania, 1990</td>
<td>-4.3</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>7.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines, 1986</td>
<td>-3.2</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>-7.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>13.2</td>
<td>-7.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bolivia, 1982</td>
<td>-1.5</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>-5.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal, 1976</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>-6.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Argentina, 1983</td>
<td>-3.2</td>
<td>-5.6</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uruguay, 1985</td>
<td>-2.4</td>
<td>-4.4</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary, 1990</td>
<td>-2.3</td>
<td>-4.1</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain, 1977</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>-3.7</td>
<td>6.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nicaragua, 1990</td>
<td>-4.6</td>
<td>-3.7</td>
<td>-0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece, 1974</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>-3.5</td>
<td>7.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand, 1973</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>-3.4</td>
<td>9.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria, 1979</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>-2.9</td>
<td>5.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senegal, 1978</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>-2.4</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand, 1963</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>-2.0</td>
<td>7.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Argentina, 1973</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>-1.2</td>
<td>4.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland, 1989</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>-0.9</td>
<td>3.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guatemala, 1986</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>-0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru, 1980</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>-0.6</td>
<td>4.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czechoslovakia, 1989</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>-0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey, 1974</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>-0.4</td>
<td>6.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil, 1985</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>3.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El Salvador</td>
<td>-0.9</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>-1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey, 1983</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korea, 1988</td>
<td>11.7</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>8.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile, 1990</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>3.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghana, 1979</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>-1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paraguay, 1989</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3.8: Comparative Economic Performance in Democratic Transition, Inflation.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Ave. Transition Year and Two Previous Years</th>
<th>Ave. Transition Years</th>
<th>AB</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(A)</td>
<td>(B)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil, 1985</td>
<td>188.7</td>
<td>75.5</td>
<td>113.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland, 1989</td>
<td>112.2</td>
<td>34.1</td>
<td>78.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bolivia, 1982</td>
<td>69.7</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>54.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghana, 1979</td>
<td>81.3</td>
<td>26.4</td>
<td>54.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru, 1980</td>
<td>61.2</td>
<td>24.3</td>
<td>36.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Argentina, 1973</td>
<td>51.4</td>
<td>19.7</td>
<td>31.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia, 1998</td>
<td>31.7</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>22.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal, 1976</td>
<td>22.2</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>14.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece, 1974</td>
<td>15.6</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>13.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary, 1990</td>
<td>20.5</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>13.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uruguay</td>
<td>58.9</td>
<td>45.6</td>
<td>13.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guatemala, 1986</td>
<td>19.7</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>12.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines, 1986</td>
<td>24.7</td>
<td>13.8</td>
<td>10.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain, 1977</td>
<td>18.8</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>8.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey, 1974</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>6.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand, 1973</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>4.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honduras, 1982</td>
<td>12.2</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>4.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paraguay, 1989</td>
<td>23.6</td>
<td>19.5</td>
<td>4.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania, 1990</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria, 1979</td>
<td>15.7</td>
<td>15.0</td>
<td>-0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czechoslovak, 1989</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>-1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El Salvador, 1984</td>
<td>12.2</td>
<td>14.4</td>
<td>-2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecuador, 1979</td>
<td>11.7</td>
<td>14.1</td>
<td>-2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand, 1983</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>9.8</td>
<td>-2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korea, 1988</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>-3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile, 1990</td>
<td>18.2</td>
<td>23.5</td>
<td>-4.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Argentina, 1983</td>
<td>204.4</td>
<td>211.2</td>
<td>-6.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senegal, 1978</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>13.9</td>
<td>-8.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey, 1983</td>
<td>32.9</td>
<td>51.7</td>
<td>-18.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3.9: The Change of Exchange Rate in Some Asian Countries, June 30, 1997- May 8, 1998

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>US$100 Local Currency June 30 '97</th>
<th>Dec 31 '97</th>
<th>May 8 '98</th>
<th>Cumulative Change (%) June 30 '97 - May 8 '98</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>4.05</td>
<td>2.08</td>
<td>2.59</td>
<td>-35.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>39.53</td>
<td>25.70</td>
<td>26.25</td>
<td>-33.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>-73.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>3.79</td>
<td>2.51</td>
<td>2.54</td>
<td>-33.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hong Kong</td>
<td>12.90</td>
<td>12.90</td>
<td>12.90</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Korea</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>-36.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taiwan</td>
<td>3.80</td>
<td>3.06</td>
<td>3.10</td>
<td>-13.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td>69.93</td>
<td>59.44</td>
<td>61.80</td>
<td>-11.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Tambunan (1998)

Table 3.10: Interest Rate in Some Developing and Developed Countries, September 23, 1998

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Developing Countries</th>
<th>Percentage/Year</th>
<th>Developed countries</th>
<th>Primer</th>
<th>Overnight</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>8.10</td>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>8.75</td>
<td>4.98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hong Kong</td>
<td>9.42</td>
<td>English</td>
<td>8.50</td>
<td>7.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>9.00</td>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>7.50</td>
<td>5.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>56.70</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>6.55</td>
<td>3.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>7.56</td>
<td>German</td>
<td>5.05</td>
<td>3.39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>12.25</td>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>1.50</td>
<td>0.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td>4.78</td>
<td>AS</td>
<td>8.50</td>
<td>5.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Korea</td>
<td>10.50</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>11.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Tambunan (1998)
The role of KKN (Korupsi, Kolusi, Nepotisme/Corruption, Collusion, and Nepotism) as the triggering factor in the crisis is rejected. Several countries considered to have major problems of KKN (such as China and Taiwan) were able to cope with the crisis. It is worth noting that KKN will only become serious when it is related to government’s capability to deal with the crisis.

The last complication is that the government was facing an agenda of a populist reform policy. New politicians tried to create political goals for their own interests by giving money (subsidies and cheap loans) to lower class people. This is reflected at the macroeconomic level with the policy of populism, which is difficult to be justified as a macroeconomic policy. Such a situation worsens because of the opposition of the civil servants. Their attitude results from the quick drop of real income and income source, and causes the weakening of government bureaucratic competence.

3.2 The Social Cost of Economic Crisis

As shown by Tables 3.5 and 3.6 in this chapter, not all sectors of the economy were rooted in the crisis. Sectors such as farming, fishing, forestry, electricity, gas and water all attained positive progress. All the segments in those sectors, especially the businessmen involved in agribusiness, profited, and profits actually increased during the crisis.

Yet most of the nation suffered economic downturn, sometimes as much as minus 13.6%. This economic crisis caused a political impact and incited political reaction to various groups. For the incumbent government, this economic crisis meant a loss of legitimacy. The administration under Suharto had previously won support from various political segments, despite the authoritarian style of governing and the widespread corruption, because they
increased economic prosperity. Economic development was the key of the regime’s legitimacy. In the wake of severe economic crisis, the incumbent government had no other issue on which to stake its credibility.

The incumbent government, especially Suharto as a personal ruler, had fewer economic resources with which to buy political loyalty. The political elite strongly supported Suharto because he was able to distribute material reward in his personal patronage to various elite members. The economic boom helped Suharto to skillfully execute this political maneuver. However, with the economic crisis in 1997-1998, the IMF asked Suharto to reform all the privileges, such as monopoly, used by his administration. Without offering material reward and privilege, Suharto lost his grip on the elite.

For businessmen, the economic crisis threatened the survival of their companies. Many Indonesian businessmen have large debts in dollars. Table 3.11 shows the devaluation of the local currency (rupiah) to the dollar.
Many businessmen felt uncomfortable with their economic situation and this feeling allowed them to shift their political support from the incumbent government to the growing opposition. Also, many of them had negative experiences with the families of the president. The sons and daughters of the incumbent president were famous for their aggressiveness in business by exploiting their father’s power. Arifin Panigoro and Sofyan Wanandi are the examples of businessmen with shifting loyalties. Before the crisis, they moved in to Suharto’s elite circles. After the crisis, they supported the opposition to the incumbent government.

Professionals, including bankers, doctors and civil engineers feared that the economic crisis might cost them their jobs. Dozens of banks were liquidated. Price of medicine increased fourfold because of the devaluation of rupiah. Construction projects were delayed because the price of building material was too high. Many professionals involved in the protest events asked for a change of regime.

For the masses, the economic crisis was a nightmare. Even under normal economic conditions, most of them struggled financially. The economic crisis decreased their already shaky standard of living. The price of basic food skyrocketed, and in some cases, basic foods were not even available for purchase. The widespread disappointment caused by the economic crisis easily channeled into public anger. Riots and collective destruction by the masses occurred in various parts of the country.

For the students and the youth, the main actors of the protest events, the issue of economic crisis was an incentive to initiate a movement. In Indonesian history, student movements have always played significant roles in changing the political climate. In the
1920s, 1945, 1966, 1974 and 1978, the students and the younger generation were among the main players changing or confronting the existing government. The economic crisis gave the students and youth one more chance to be the hero. They embraced the chance and asked for large changes: the resignation of Suharto and political reform.

Before the economic crisis in 1997-1998, Indonesia was a politically stable country. Riots and protest events occurred infrequently or not at all. President Suharto, a skillful and a strong personal ruler, controlled domestic politics with an iron hand. Political repression was high. There were no civil liberties. Government controlled the press and political organizations. Suharto’s strategy of cooptation and punishment unified the elite.

The economic crisis changed the landscape of Indonesian politics. Discontent and deprivation caused by the severe economic crisis spread to every region of Indonesia. The non-elite, the masses, suffered the most in the economic crisis. However, the students largely and actively participated in the protest events.

Table 3.12: Frequency of Events, Sept. ‘97-Feb. ‘98 (the first six months)
From September 1997 to February 1998, protest events occurred everywhere. Table 3.12 shows 117 protest events took place in that period. Protest events were dominated by economic issues (49.5%), compared to political issues (25.6%) and others (24.9%).

Table 3.13 shows that the number of people involved in the protest events, from September 1997 to February 1998, equaled to 147,000 people. An estimated 59% of the protest events focused on economic issues. The protest events occurred in Indonesia’s large islands: Sumatra, Java, Kalimantan, Sulawesi and others. Table 14 indicates that although the protest events from September 1997 to February 1998 were concentrated in Java (66%), other islands struggled with public anger of the protest events as well.

In Indonesia, a country tightly controlled by Suharto, the rise of extended and widespread protest was unprecedented. The wave of protest events achieved the nearly impossible feat of occurring in 27 provinces at the same time.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Political</th>
<th>Economic Reform</th>
<th>Others Issue</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sept’97</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>9,500</td>
<td>4,500</td>
<td>15,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>18,000</td>
<td>6,500</td>
<td>26,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>6,000</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>7,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec</td>
<td>2,500</td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>6,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan’98</td>
<td>7,500</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>15,000</td>
<td>14,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb</td>
<td>18,500</td>
<td>45,000</td>
<td>14,500</td>
<td>78,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>32,000</td>
<td>86,500</td>
<td>28,500</td>
<td>147,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3.13: Masses Involved in the Protest Events, Sep.’97-Feb.’98 (the first six months)
The economic crisis was the common denominator shared by the provinces in Indonesia at that time. Based on the dominant issue carried by the protesters, the economic crisis once again fueled public anger.

The Indonesian case would therefore appear to confirm the deprivation theory, which explains widespread deprivation as a strong cause of the rise of protest events. The spread of deprivation gave the students and the masses courage to march in the street, occupy public buildings, and criticize the government. The high level of state repression, the threat of punishment from the government toward protesters and oppositions to past reform didn’t deter the public’s desire to publicly express their anger. Although past protesters had been jailed, widespread deprivation and discontent still drove the students and the masses into the streets.

Table 3.14 Distribution of Protest Events, All Big Islands, Sept’97-Feb’98 (the first six months)
3.3 Insufficiency of Explanation of Economic Crisis

Although the economic crisis or deprivation triggered the rise of protest events, economic crisis alone is not able to explain the level of mobilization of protest events. Economic crisis or deprivation is necessary, but not sufficient, to explain the events.

The logic of deprivation theory is that the worse the economic crisis, the higher the level of mobilization of protest events. Nevertheless, this was not the case in Indonesia. Some provinces experiencing the worst economic crisis had the lowest level of mobilization of protest events. Other provinces had the same degree of economic crisis, more or less, but differ significantly in the level of mobilization of protest events. The Indonesian case highlights the insight that other variables outside of economic crisis and deprivation factor contribute to the level of protest events.

As described in Chapter 1, the level of mobilization refers to the number of persons mobilized in the protest events, as represented in newspaper coverage of those events, as a percentage of the total population of the location in question and over a certain period of time (Kriesi, et. al, 1997). For events where there is no information about the number of participants, Kriesi (1997) estimates based on the median number of participants in similar events in the same location.

For my research, the unit of location is the province, and the unit of time is month. I measured the level of mobilization in all the twenty-seven provinces of Indonesia for each of the twelve months from September 1997 to August 1998. From this basic data, I compiled two data sets. First, I have national-level data (that is, the sum of all provincial data) for every month from September
1997 to August 1998. This data helps evaluate the origins, the sudden growth, and the decline of protest events chronologically throughout the country. Second, I provide data for every province per month and also per year (that is, the sum of all monthly data per province). This data is used to make comparisons among all twenty-seven provinces in Indonesia.

I understand that newspapers have a problem of accurately reporting or counting the number of participants in protest events. In many cases, newspapers do not give the exact numbers of participants. Newspapers, for example, just report in the form of phrases such as “hundreds of people” or “thousands of protesters.” To reduce this problem, I have created size categories as follows: 2-100 people, 101-1000 people, 1001-10000 people and 10000+ people. I will use the mean of every category for calculating the level of mobilization (50, 500, 5,000, and 50,000).

To compare the levels of mobilization, I examine eight provinces in Indonesia outside of Java. I intentionally choose the provinces outside of Java because Java is unlike from any other Indonesian
island since development was concentrated in Java. The comparison of eight provinces outside of Java will yield fairer and more valid results.”

Based on the data of the protest events in 22 provinces outside of Java, I choose four provinces with the lowest level of mobilization and four provinces with the highest level of mobilization. These provinces are West Kalimantan, North Sulawesi, Central Sulawesi and Southeast Sulawesi (lowest) and Bali, North Sumatera, West Sumatera, and South Sulawesi (highest).5

The economic crisis is measured by some comparable indicators. In Table 3.15, the economic indicators are unemployment and inflation. In Table 3.16, the economic indicators are income per capita and the Gini coefficient. Unemployment and inflation in Central Sulawesi are more significant problems than in North Sumatera, Bali, and West Sumatera. However, the level of mobilization in Central Sulawesi is much lower than it is in North Sumatera, Bali and West Sumatera. In other words, the level of mobilization of protest events in North Sumatera, Bali and West

4. Indonesia has thousand small islands and five big islands. Among others, Java is the center of development as the result of centralized government and centralized development. There is a big gap between Java and other islands in terms of socio-economic indicators and modernization symbols, such as percentage of graduate students, TV stations, readership, factories, and service sectors. To compare provinces in Java and outside of Java will hurt the sense of comparability since they differ significantly in socio-economic indicators. This is the reason why in this research, the comparison is conducted only to the 22 provinces outside of Java, since they are more alike.
Sumatera are much higher than in Central Sulawesi, although North Sumatera, Bali and West Sumatera are in far better economic condition.

Income per capita in Southeast Sulawesi is much lower than in Bali, North Sumatera, West Sumatera, and South Sulawesi. However, the level of mobilization of protest events is lower in Southeast Sulawesi than in Bali, North Sumatera, West Sumatera, and South Sulawesi. The Gini coefficient of these eight provinces is almost the same; however, they differ significantly on the level of mobilization of protest events.

Deprivation and economic crisis established a condition that was conducive to the rise of protest events. However, the comparative data in those eight provinces show that mobilization of protest events is caused by more than just deprivation and economic crisis.

5. The data I have is 27 provinces. Since the number of cases (N) is less than 30 (small N) and all is from the year of economic crisis, I don’t employ inferential statistics, such as multiple regression to analyze my data. I use descriptive statistics only, by comparing the highest and the lowest. Outside of Java, I have 22 provinces. I divide them all to two categories: the highest and the lowest. I choose randomly 4 provinces from the highest and 4 provinces from the lowest.
In addition to economic crisis, availability of political resources should be considered a factor in the rise of the protest events. A place that has more political resources that could be mobilized, compared to a place with fewer resources, has a higher potential to incite and extend protest events. Every location and era has its own type of political resources. This logic is in line with the theory of resource mobilization as described in Chapter 1.

In the case of Indonesia in 1997-1998, the dominant political resources to be mobilized and manipulated were, among others, students and the media. The students from various universities and academies dominated protest events; 60% of the masses involved in the protest events were students. Students are a resource to be mobilized and the higher the percentage of students a province has, the higher the level of mobilization of protest events. All four provinces with the lowest level of mobilization have a percentage of students lower than 1%, except North Sulawesi (1.3%). All four provinces with the highest level of mobilization have a percentage

Table 3.16: Level of Mobilization and Economic Indicator (2)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Income Per capita</th>
<th>Gini Coef</th>
<th>Level of Mobilization (Mass Involved/Population) X 1000</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>West Kalimantan</td>
<td>72,138</td>
<td>0.300</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Sulawesi</td>
<td>72,157</td>
<td>0.344</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Sulawesi</td>
<td>62,172</td>
<td>0.302</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southeast Sulawesi</td>
<td>57,419</td>
<td>0.311</td>
<td>2.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bali</td>
<td>96,292</td>
<td>0.309</td>
<td>41.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Sumatera</td>
<td>75,290</td>
<td>0.301</td>
<td>13.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Sumatera</td>
<td>79,108</td>
<td>0.278</td>
<td>36.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Sulawesi</td>
<td>63,635</td>
<td>0.323</td>
<td>31.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Indicator Kesejahteraan Rakyat 1998, Biro Pusat Statistik

3.4 The Complementary Role of Resources

In addition to economic crisis, availability of political resources should be considered a factor in the rise of the protest events. A place that has more political resources that could be mobilized, compared to a place with fewer resources, has a higher potential to incite and extend protest events. Every location and era has its own type of political resources. This logic is in line with the theory of resource mobilization as described in Chapter 1.

In the case of Indonesia in 1997-1998, the dominant political resources to be mobilized and manipulated were, among others, students and the media. The students from various universities and academies dominated protest events; 60% of the masses involved in the protest events were students. Students are a resource to be mobilized and the higher the percentage of students a province has, the higher the level of mobilization of protest events. All four provinces with the lowest level of mobilization have a percentage of students lower than 1%, except North Sulawesi (1.3%). All four provinces with the highest level of mobilization have a percentage
of students higher than 1.4%, except West Sumatera (1.1%). Table 3.17 shows the data.

Media plays an important role in disseminating information that establishes a climate conducive to the rise of protest events. Television, radio and newspapers publish and inform the public of problems and crises, triggering public anger. The more the people watch, listen and read the media, the higher the level of mobilization of the protest events. All four provinces with the lowest level of mobilization have a percentage of readers, listeners and viewers (on average) less than 52%, All four provinces with the highest level of mobilization have percentage of readers, listeners and viewers (on the average) more than 52%. Table 3.18 shows these figures.

Outside of the media, telephone facilitates the mobilization of protest events. By using the telephone, the public can communicate to mobilize protest events. The greater the percentage of telephone owners a province has, the higher the level of mobilization of protest events. All four provinces with the lowest level of mobilization have a percentage of telephone owners of less than 1.17%. All four

Table 3.17: Level of Mobilization and Students/Population

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>(Students/Population) (%)</th>
<th>Level of Mobilization (Mass Involved/Population) X 1000</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>West Kalimantan</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Sulawesi</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Sulawesi</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southeast Sulawesi</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>2.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bali</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>41.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Sumatera</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>13.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Sumatera</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>36.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Sulawesi</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>31.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Statistik Indonesia, 1997
provinces with the highest level of mobilization have a percentage of telephone owners of more than 1.17%. Table 3 shows this tendency.

The density of population may also be an important variable for mobilizing protest events. The denser the population, the easier it is for the public to mobilize. All four provinces with the lowest level of mobilization have a density of less than 25, except North Sulawesi. All four provinces with the highest level of mobilization have a density higher than 25, except West Sumatera. Table 3.19 shows this data.

**Table 3.18: Level of Mobilization and Readership**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Level of Mobilization (Mass Involved Population X1000)</th>
<th>Listening Radio (%)</th>
<th>Watching TV (%)</th>
<th>Reading Newspapers (%)</th>
<th>Average (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>West Kalimantan</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>46.5</td>
<td>77.1</td>
<td>15.8</td>
<td>46.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Sulawesi</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>41.4</td>
<td>81.2</td>
<td>32.9</td>
<td>51.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Sulawesi</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>50.4</td>
<td>80.5</td>
<td>20.3</td>
<td>50.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southeast Sulawesi</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>44.8</td>
<td>70.2</td>
<td>20.3</td>
<td>45.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bai</td>
<td>41.6</td>
<td>72.8</td>
<td>69.9</td>
<td>26.6</td>
<td>63.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Sumatera</td>
<td>13.6</td>
<td>48.3</td>
<td>85.7</td>
<td>29.1</td>
<td>54.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Sumatera</td>
<td>36.2</td>
<td>56.6</td>
<td>79.6</td>
<td>310</td>
<td>55.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Sulawesi</td>
<td>31.3</td>
<td>64.4</td>
<td>69.9</td>
<td>22.2</td>
<td>52.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Indikator Kesejahteraan Rakyat, 1998 (BPS)*

This chapter argues that deprivation or economic crisis triggers the protest events. Indonesia’s economic indicators before and in the era of crisis differ very significantly. High inflation, high unemployment, depreciation of rupiah to the US dollar, liquidation of many banks, and bankruptcy of various companies shocked the people. Indonesia turns upside down from the miracle of Asia to
the meltdown of Asia. Suharto is a national leader turns upside down as well, from the father of development to the father of bankruptcy. Disappointments and discontents spread to all levels of society,

Protest events rise in the whole country almost at the same time. This kind of protest event in the whole region is only possible if the whole regions have a common denominator. Indeed, the common denominator for the whole country is national economic crisis. In the first quarter of protest events in the whole country, the dominant issue is the economy. In various ways of expression and words, protesters express their anger and disappointment on the issue of the economy. It is very obvious that economic crisis explains the rise of protest events very well. However to explain the evolution, the ups and downs and the provincial difference of protest events, economic crisis explanation is not sufficient. The level of mobilization of protest events differs significantly among

Table 3.19: Level of Mobilization, Density and Telephone Subscribers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>The Lowest Level</th>
<th>Density of Population</th>
<th>Level of Mobilization (Mass Involved/Population X 100 000)</th>
<th>(Telephone/ Population X 1000)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>West Kalimantan</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>21.7</td>
<td>11.6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Sulawesi</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>26.3</td>
<td>14.2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Sulawesi</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>22.9</td>
<td>9.7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southeast Sulawesi</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>22.4</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Highest Level</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bali</td>
<td>41.8</td>
<td>34.3</td>
<td>30.9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Sumatera</td>
<td>13.6</td>
<td>41.1</td>
<td>17.6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Sumatera</td>
<td>36.2</td>
<td>25.1</td>
<td>15.2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Sulawesi</td>
<td>31.3</td>
<td>283</td>
<td>11.8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Indikator Kesejahteraan Rakyat, 1998 (BPS)
the provinces. If the economic crisis is the only variable, the worse the economic crisis a province experiences, the higher the level of mobilization the province shows. Nevertheless, in reality, it is not the case. Some provinces hurt deeper economically, but have lower levels of mobilization. Some provinces have more or less similar level of crisis, but still differ significantly in terms of level of mobilization.

This condition needs other explanations outside of economic crisis. Availability of resources to be mobilized enriches the explanation. Its availability in the provinces also influences the level of mobilization of protest events. In case of protest events in Indonesia, the students, media (TV, newspapers, magazines, and radios), and telephone are the resources that can be used and manipulated to mobilize protest events. Resources available in the provinces tend to influence the level of mobilization. The more the percentage of students, televisions, and telephones a province has, the bigger the possibility of the province to have higher level of protest events.

Availability of political resources, as formulated by the theory of resource mobilization, should be considered to enrich the explanation of the dynamic of the protest event. However, the availability of resources is only a part of the theory of resource mobilization. Another essential component is the availability of leaders, the political entrepreneurs, who take political risks to initiate, direct and expand the protest events. The role of political entrepreneurs will be elaborated in the next chapter.
The protest events are not only the fruits of a certain condition but also the results of action of various agents. The conditions, such as economic crisis or availability of political resources, offer incentives and constraint. However, agents must decide whether to use their skills to manipulate the incentives and overcome the constraints of certain condition to mobilize protest events.

The literature of protest movements establishes a positive role for agency. While Karl Mara emphasized the structural variable as the root of protest, Lenin emphasized the role of vanguards (a party or intellectuals) leading the movement (Tarrow, 1998:10-12). The role of agency is important not only in mobilizing resources and multiplying followers, but also in enlightening people’s consciousness to reality. A bifurcated social structure, according to Marx, may produce “false consciousness” that leads people to
accept an oppressed reality. Lenin believes the role of vanguards is to correct the false consciousness and disadvantageous structure.

The vanguard or the agents of movements are not necessarily courageous individuals or a group of leaders. Organizations may also play a significant role in mobilizing a movement or protest events. The theory of resource mobilization highlights the role of SMOs (Social Movement Organizations) as the agents behind social movements, these organizations may be the conventional ones based on voluntary commitment, such as in the case of students movements, or they may be the professional ones based on business-like contracts and salaries, as in the case of established NGOs (Non-Governmental Organizations),

Although agents are involved in leading and mobilizing protest events, the quality and political impact of their involvement vary. Some may be ordinary agents who yield no significant impact, while others may be political entrepreneurs who create innovative strategies for mobilizing protest events and have a meaningful political impact. In short, agents can be inclusive and exclusive as political entrepreneurs.

The term political entrepreneur is taken from the field of economy and business. Schumpeter used the term entrepreneurs when he theorized about economic development. Entrepreneurs in economics and business refer to an agency willing to take risks, initiate new approaches, or apply a common approach but in new ways, significantly impacting the pursuit of economic or business goals. In entrepreneurship, there are elements of risk, innovation, and contribution to certain fields or goals (Kuratko and Hodgetts, 1998; 29-53).
However, entrepreneurship is not only in the field of business or economics. The development of various problems in politics requires a kind of entrepreneurship as well. In the analysis of protest events, political entrepreneurs refer to any agents (individuals, groups of people, or organizations) who fit the criteria below:

1) Agents take political risks to be involved in the movement. The failure of the movement may hurt the agents politically, possibly resulting in imprisonment, especially in an authoritarian country.

2) Agents develop new strategies or common strategies but in new ways to mobilize protest events. They develop a kind of innovation in their action.

3) Agents lend significant impact in the development of protest events. The impact varies depending on the kind of their involvement. Agents may be among the first that initiate and direct a movement, and may develop new ways of network to recruit as many participants as possible. These agents may develop new strategies to gain attention from the media and a third party. In any front in which they are involved, their contribution to the movement is prominent.

In the case of protest events in Indonesia, 1997-1998, various agents were involved in mobilizing and leading the movement. All of them had contributed to the evolution and dynamic of the protest events. However, very few of them can be labeled political entrepreneurs.

This chapter describes the role of various agents in mobilizing the protest events in Indonesia. The first part details what those various agents do and who they are, and is divided into two sections:
a) general statistics of those agents in all regions of Indonesia from 1997-1998; and b) a closer view of agents and their work in five provincial capital cities: Jakarta, Bandung, Yogyakarta, Surabaya and Semarang. Those five capital cities have the largest number of protest events and participants involved in those events. The second part of the chapter describes the so-called political entrepreneurs: who they are and what they do.

4.1 The Agents of Protest Events in Indonesia, 1997 - 1998

The following data show the important work of agents in mobilizing the protest events. The economic crisis and the quality of resources to be mobilized remained the same, but the frequency of the protest events and the masses involved exploded. The dominant issue of the protest events later shifted from economic issues to political reform.

Table 4.1 shows, in the first six months that the masses at protest events in Indonesia equal about 157,000 people. In the next three months, the masses involved increased by 1900% (3,012,000 people). Table 4.2 shows, from the first six months, that the frequency of protest events 117. In the next three months that frequency increased by 400% (496 times). Table 4.1 and Table 4.2 also indicate that the dominant issue of protest events in the first six months was economic crisis (58%, 49.5%). However, in the next three months, the focus changed to political reform (86%, 84%).
From the first six months (Sept, 1997 to Feb. 1998) to the next three months (March 1998 to May 1998), the resources available are nearly equivalent. During these two periods, the percentage of students, media, telephones and population density in Indonesia remain stable. The economic crisis likewise remains unchanged.

However, in those two periods, the protest events suddenly increased drastically, in terms of the masses involved and the frequency of protest events. And in those two periods, the issue dominating the protest events changes from economic crisis to political reform. Agents of movements are responsible for this result by mobilizing the masses, mobilizing the frequency of protest events, and changing the issue around which protests are mobilized.

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**Table 4.1: Masses Involved In Protest Events, In Two Stages**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Political Reform</th>
<th>Economic Issues</th>
<th>Others</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The First Six Months</td>
<td>32,000</td>
<td>86,500</td>
<td>28,500</td>
<td>157,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Sept’97-Feb’98)</td>
<td>(21%)</td>
<td>(58%)</td>
<td>(19%)</td>
<td>(100%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Next Three Months</td>
<td>2,599,600</td>
<td>69,500</td>
<td>335,000</td>
<td>3,012,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Mar-May’98)</td>
<td>(86%)</td>
<td>(2%)</td>
<td>(12%)</td>
<td>(100%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Total B/A = 19 times (1900%)*

**Table 4.2: Frequency of Protest Events, In Two Stages**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Political Reform</th>
<th>Economic Issues</th>
<th>Others</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The First Six Months</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Sept’97-Feb’98)</td>
<td>(25.6%)</td>
<td>(49.5%)</td>
<td>(24.9%)</td>
<td>(100%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Next Three Months</td>
<td>418</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>496</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Mar-May’98)</td>
<td>(84%)</td>
<td>(8%)</td>
<td>(8%)</td>
<td>(100%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Total B/A = 4 times (400%)*
Table 4.3: Evolution of Issues

4.1.1 General Statistics of Protest Evolution

Based on the data shown in the three tables below, the protest events evolved through three stages. Every stage shows different quantity and quality of protest events, as well as its own agents that mobilize, multiply the participants and give direction to the protest events.

In the first stage, the first six months of the wave of protest events, from September 1997 - February 1998, the protest events were still infrequent and sparsely attended. Political reform was not yet an issue, and many of the protest events had no single focus on politics. The dominant participants were not yet the students.

During the second stage, between March 1998 and May 1998, the quantity and quality of protest events changed. The frequency of the events increased and the masses, mostly students, involved in the second stage-multiplied three- and fourfold. The protest
events peaked in May. The total frequency and the masses involved in this second stage (3 months, 25%) constitute 65%-85% of the whole year of protest events under study. The protest events become more and more focused on the issue of political reform. In May, the focus narrows down to a single solution: the resignation of President Suharto.

After peaking in May, protest events slowed during the third stage, from June 1998 to August 1998. Students no longer dominated the events. Political reform no longer dominated the events. The frequency of the events and the number of people involved dropped considerably.

Table 4.6 shows that social movement organizations dominated by student organizations are the main agents mobilizing the protest events in Jakarta, Bandung, Yogyakarta, Surabaya and Semarang. Their domination ranges from 59% (Jakarta) to 67% (Semarang). The courageous individuals (the None Category) who were not affiliated with particular organizations also played a moderate role as political entrepreneurs. Their contribution to the mobilization of protest events spanned from 15% (Jakarta) to 22% (Bandung).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Students</th>
<th>Non-Students</th>
<th>Students</th>
<th>Non-Students</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sept97</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>79%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>77%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>80%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>57%</td>
<td>43%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan98</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>71%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>78%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mar</td>
<td>252</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>89%</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apr</td>
<td>330</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>95%</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>402</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>79%</td>
<td>21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jun</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>65%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jul</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>83%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>78%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Table 4.4: Evolution of the Actors*
The role of peasants and labor union was inconsequential

In general, the compositions of the protest event’s agents throughout Indonesia are as shown in Table 4.6.

As described in the previous chapter, the economic crisis helped trigger protest events (Stage I). However, the multiplication of protest events cannot be explained by economic crisis alone. Other environmental factors contribute to the increase or decrease of number of protest events. In March ‘98, the growth of protest

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
<th>Masses</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sept'97</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4,000</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>63,500</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>17,000</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>15,000</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>34,000</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>188,500</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>820,500</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apr</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>1,322,000</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>5,150,000</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jun</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1,200,000</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jul</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>890,000</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August'98</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1,212,500</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1702</td>
<td>102,718,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4.5: Magnitude of Protest Events

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Jakarta</th>
<th>Bandung</th>
<th>Yogyakarta</th>
<th>Surabaya</th>
<th>Semarang</th>
<th>Average</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>None</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>0.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Parties</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>0.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labor Union</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peasant</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interest Groups</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social</td>
<td>0.59</td>
<td>0.62</td>
<td>0.62</td>
<td>0.64</td>
<td>0.67</td>
<td>0.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Movement Org</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>0.12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4.6: Agents Mobilizing the Protest Events (In Percentage)
events and the shift of issue to politics (Stage II) were partly caused by the election of a new president and the new cabinet. In June 1998, the decline of protest events was partly caused by the fall of Suharto (Stage III). After Suharto left office, some protest events lost their ground to continue to other political protest.

However, as shown by the data below and as framed by the theory, the movement’s agents had a critical role in the protest events. They took advantage of opportunities provided by a certain environment to add members to the movement or to halt protest events. Their actions are described below.

6. None is for any individuals without affiliation with any particular organization
4.2 A Closer View

This section describes, in more detail than the above general statistics, the agents: who they are and what they did in the three stages of protest events. The examples of agents are taken from these five major provincial capitals: Jakarta, Bandung, Yogyakarta, Surabaya and Semarang.

4.2.1. The First Stage of Protest Events

In this stage, as described above, the protest events were still a rare occurrence. Issues varied. The students did not protest in large numbers. The time frame of the first stage is the first six months, from September ‘97 to February ‘98.

4.2.1.1 Jakarta

In September 1997, the protest events in Jakarta started with the issue of the proposed labor law. The actors of the protest included labor organizations and individuals, among them FPSI (Forum Serikat Pekerja Seluruh Indonesia/Forum of All Indonesian Workers Associations), LBH (Lembaga Bantuan Hukum/Legal Aid Institution), and KNDP (Komite Perjuangan Demokrasi/National Committee for Democratic Struggle). They often protested at the Assembly building. Their demands concerned the inadequacy of the said draft law to protect laborers’ freedom of association and laborers’ right to strike Political reform was not a popular issue in this month.

In October 1997, the issues and actors of protest events became more diverse. For example, an Islamic mass organization, a branch of HMI (Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam/Muslim Students Association) in Jakarta, held protest events in the government building of Bulog (Badan Urusan Logistik/Logistic Affairs Board).
Dozens of them insisted that the price of basic necessities be reduced. The economic crisis began to impact the community by a rise in food prices and unemployment. They also demanded that the head of Bulog (Badan Urusan Logistik/Logistic Affairs Board), who is responsible for the supply of basic necessities, resigns from his office.

In the same month, Ismahi (Ikatan Senat Mahasiswa Hukum Indonesia/Association of Law Students Senates of Indonesia) also protested. Dozens of its members staged protests at the Parliament building. The issue behind their protest actions was not economic but political. They rejected the idea of reinstating the Decision of the People’s Consultative Assembly, which would give too much authority to the president. Through this decision, the president could take extra-constitutional measures if he deemed them necessary to secure and improve national development.

Demonstrators from numerous universities used the 70th anniversary of the Youth Oath Day, a day when young leaders declared Indonesia as one nation, celebrated and commemorated on October 21, 1998, as an opportunity to gather at the Proclamation Monument, a monument to celebrate Independence. Hundred of protesters took part but no specific agenda was pushed. The issue of political reform grew in this month.

Several protest events marked the months of November and December 1997. An important event took place in December, when two hundred UI (Universitas Indonesia/University of Indonesia) students, led by the chairman of the student senate, Rama Pratama, protested in the Parliament building. The issue dominating the event was suspected corruption in the Department of Manpower. They discussed the misuse of the social insurance program of the
department by government officials, and pronounced that such money was the entitlement of workers. The use of public money should be supervised.

In December 1997, an estimated twenty artists, calling themselves Artistic Solidarity of Indonesia, held protest events. This group was supported by, among others, a famous artist and activist Ratna Sarumpaet. They came to the office of the Minister of Education and Culture, protesting the prohibition of a political drama performance titled “Marsinah, the Accused.” In this month, the issue of political reform was not significantly raised.

The national issues of economics and politics gained attention in January 1998 through several important events. HIPPI (Himpunan Pengusaha Pribumi Indonesia/Association of Indigenous Businessmen of Indonesia) initiated a meeting attended by critical economists, such as Rizal Ramli, Sri Mulyani, and academicians and politicians such as Loekman Soetrisno, Arbi Sanit, and Rudini. The participants in this event, which was held in Le Meridian hotel, stated that the economic crisis was a virus already spreading to other various sectors. To solve this crisis, total reform, including political change, was necessary.

In that same month, senior politicians met at the home of a senior politician, Mrs. Supeni, from the Indonesian Nationalist Party (which no longer exists). Several public figures joined the meeting, including prominent opposition members Amien Rais, Megawati, Ali Sadikin, academician Sri Edi Swasono and Baharuddin Lopa, and senior politician Usep Ranuwijaya, and showed deep concern.

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7. Marsinah is a female labor activist found dead. Many observers accused the state apparatus killing her.
about the existing national crisis. Presidential candidates Amien Rais and Megawati Soekarnoputri began to seem like a solution to the economic crisis, as they would replace President Suharto, who had failed to develop the economy.

But perhaps the most significant event of January 1998 was a bomb explosion at an apartment building in a lower-class urban neighborhood of Jakarta, TanahTinggi. Such an act had never happened before, and it marked the beginning of political chaos in Jakarta, Authorities claimed activist(s) from the banned leftist PRD (Partai Rakyat Demokratik/ Democratic People’s Party) planted the bomb,

Protest actions became widespread due to the involvement of unions and organizations such as the SBSI (Serikat Buruh Seluruh Indonesia, All Indonesian Labor Unions), Komite Aksi Pendukung Mega (Action Committee of Supporters of Megawati), and Kelompok Cipayung, a federation of five largest youth organizations. They were about 200 people and together they came to the Assembly.

Significant governmental elements began to distance themselves from the political rulers. LIPI (Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Indonesia/ Indonesian Science Institute) issued a statement of concern signed by its nineteen researchers, among them, the political commentators Syamsudin Haris, Ikrar Nusa Bakti, Riza Sihbudi, Hermawan Sulisty, and Asvi Warman Adam. In its own government building, LIPI, before the press, asked President Suharto not to run for reelection.

Close to February 1997, protest actions flourished, concentrating on a number of issues. A petition, with signatures collected at
Cut Meutiah mosque and signed by approximately five hundred thousand people, was made in support for presidential candidate Amien Rais. At this event, Amien Rais spoke, stating that Indonesia needed an expert with moral impetus to save it from the existing crisis.

A new group named SIAGA (Solidaritas untuk Amien Rais dan Megawati/Indonesians Solidarity for Amien Rais and Megawati), which supported the candidacy of Amien and Megawati, was established. Artist activist Ratna Sarumpaet coordinated the group. They staged a rally in the Plaza of TIM (Taman Ismail Marzuki/ Ismail Marzuki Garden); a center for arts in Jakarta, then marched down the street towards the building of LBH (Lembaga Bantuan Hukum/Legal Aid Institution). This silent and peaceful action expressed sadness and anger in the face of the existing crisis.

Another group, Suara Ibu Peduli (Voices of Concerned Mothers), consisted of dozens of people, includes public figures like the feminist Karlina Leksono, Gadis Arivis, and Toety Heraty Nurhadi. During their peaceful action in front of the roundabout at Hotel Indonesia, they waved a banner stating mothers’ frustration at the high prices of milk and basic necessities. The economic crisis mobilized them and attracted the attention of mothers directly impacted by the crisis.

In this month, Iluni (Ikatan Alumni UI/Association of Alumni of University of Indonesia) held the most significant protest event, an event that soon incited widespread campus protests. Iluni was led by Hariadi Darmawan, a figure close to retired military officers. Among those present were the ex-president of the University of Indonesia, Mahar Mardjono and academicians Selo Sumardjan and Sri Edi Swasono, They covered over a notice board on which
were written the words “Welcome to the Campus of the New Order,” symbolizing withdrawal film the current New Order. They highlighted various issues such as lirruption, collusion, and nepotism. In the same month, such popular stage and screen artists Titik Puspa, Ateng, Iskak, and Edi Gombloh attracted national attention by gathering at Al Ikhwan Mosque, and distributing basic necessities packages for low prices. They sold for just Rp.2.000,00 a food package normally costing Rp. 40.000,00 to one thousand poor people.

4.2.1.2 Bandung

From September 1997 until December 1997, the protest events in Bandung had stagnated. In October 1997, FIM (Forum Indonesia Muda/ Indonesian Youth Forum) came to the local legislature of West Java, but only dozens of students participated in protesting economic crisis (the fall in the exchange rate and the rise in unemployment).

In November 1997, after the banking crisis struck Indonesia, hundreds of Harapan Sentosa Bank’s clients came to the bank to ask for their money. Panic and hysteria spread. In the same month, students of IAIN (Institut Agama Islam Negri/State Islamic Study Institute) Sunan Gunung Jati also held protest events, involving only dozens of students. They tried to call attention to the increase in the price of basic necessities and to stopping of corruption, collusion, nepotism, and manipulation. They also demanded that a national car project, owned by Suharto’s son, be halted.

In a different location, another group, naming itself FIM, held protest events concerning similar issues; they also mobilized fewer than a hundred people. But the political atmosphere was warmed
by Amien Rais’ visit to the campus of Pasundan University. He declared that a true leader is the one who enjoys the comfort last, in reference to President Suharto, who still prospered while the nation was in a great crisis.

More strategic political issues began to develop in December 1997. The student senate of IAIN (Institut Agama Islam Negri/State Islamic Study Institute) Sunan Gunung Jati nominated Amien Rais as the next president of Indonesia, and in the same month, Students of Unisba (Universitas Islam Bandung/Bandung Islamic University), numbering to hundreds of people, commemorated Human Rights Day on December 10, charging various violations of human rights in Indonesia. In January 1998, mass panic struck the area due to the rise in prices. The leaders of the Kelompok Cipayung came to the local legislature of West Java. They demanded political reform as a solution to the ongoing economic crisis. In this month, Amien Rais once again came to Bandung. In front of the discussion forum organized by Bandung press, he stated the need for succession in Indonesia.

By February 1998, Bandung feared riots. The people were in panic, many shops were closed, and people gathered in many locations. A riot erupted in Pengalengan, Cicalengka, a suburban neighborhood, for using destruction of shops and cars. Actions of students flourished in various campuses such as Pasundan University and Pajajaran University, as they protested against the soaring prices of basic necessities.
4.2.1.3 Yogyakarta

From September 1997 to December 1997, protest events in Yogyakarta began. The Press Bureau of Philosophy Students of Gadjah Mada University, the largest university in the province, marched down the streets in dozens, demanding reduction of soaring prices. At the same time, Amien Rais spoke in front of the students of IMM (Ikatan Mahasiswa Muhammadyah/Muhammadyah Students Association), about the need for a clean government. Religious leaders, from MUI (Majelis Ulama Indonesia/Indonesian Islamic Scholars Association), Muhammadyah, to Christian and Catholic churches, called for a national solution to the existing economic crisis. At IAIN (Institut Agama Islam Negri/State Islamic Study Institute) Sunan Kalijaga campus, only 50 students were involved in the protests concerning food prices.

The most strategic actions in October 1997 were initiated by students from various universities who gathering in hundreds to commemorate the Youth Oath Day. In November 1997, hundreds of bank clients panicked and rushed to the liquidated banks to try and retrieve their livings, as they did in almost every major Indonesian city. In Gadjah Mada University that same month, Amien Rais stated that he accepted the nomination for presidency.

The head of Yogyakarta’s political party, PPP (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan/United Development Party), an Islamic-based political party, supported Amien Rais for presidency. This was a brave and extraordinary political maneuver in that political period. The political atmosphere of Yogyakarta intensified because of the human rights day commemoration on December 10. The event took place in various campuses: UII (Universitas Islam Indonesia/
Indonesian Islamic University) and IAIN (State Institut Agama Islam Negri/Islamic Study Institute) Sunan Kalijaga.

In the same month, students from various universities held a joint action in the boulevard leading to Gadjah Mada University. Although the total number of the masses was still small, several issues were put forth, including collusion and corruption of the fund of the state social insurance. In this month, the students of HMI (Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam/Muslim Students Association) came to the legislature demanding the reduction of prices of basic necessities. Students of Gadjah Mada University protested the same issue by walking around the campus.

When rupiah weakened in January 1998, hundreds, possibly thousands, of people rushed into department stores to purchase food. In this month, the issues of succession and change of the national leader were reintroduced. Amien Rais spoke in front of thousands of students of Gadjah Mada University, reiterating the issues he had discussed on different occasions. The Yogyakarta branch of the Kelompok Cipayung (Cipayung Group), an association of the five largest youth organizations, began to get involved in protest actions by coming to the local legislature. The crowd totaled to one hundred people and their protests were both courageous and strategic, as they demanded change of national leadership and price reduction. It was in this month and political climate that joint actions of various universities began. One thousand people gathered at a protest event at Gadjah Mada University that was coordinated by the chairman of the student senate, Ridaya La Ode Ngkowe, which focused on political and economic changes.

In February 1998, hundreds of people came to warehouses, forcing the owners to sell basic goods to them. At the same time,
in front of 100,000 members of Muhammadyah, the second largest Muslim organization, Amien Rais urged national leaders to fight against corruption and nepotism to form a new and clean government. Influential campuses became more actively involved in the actions. The alumni of Gadjah Mada University stated that the national crisis brought about the vulnerability of the present government and such requires a new government. A thousand Gadjah Mada University students holding a meeting at their campus to demand a reduction in prices then followed this action.

4.2.1.4 Surabaya

From September 1997 to December 1997, Surabaya began to witness the introduction of protest actions. In October 1997, the students of Airlangga University (attended by 200 people) and other private universities commemorated the Youth Oath Day, a day when young leaders declared Indonesia as one nation. They made political speeches and asserted the need for democracy.

By November, people begun to panic; hundreds of people rushed to newly liquidated banks asking for their money. Megawati, one of the symbols of the opposition, came to Surabaya to celebrate Hero’s Day, a day for Indonesian leaders who fought for independence, in November. Speaking to thousands of people, Megawati discussed many issues related to the economic and political crises. Also in this month, people marched from Mojokerto to Surabaya. But this protest march was colored by riots; mass destruction, burning, and looting. In December 1997, as many as 13 student organizations came to the local legislature if East Java. Hundreds of people demanded the repeal of five political laws, the return of the social
insurance of the manpower department, and the rejection of military intervention in all aspects of life.

In January 1998, Amien Rais gave a speech at the Muhammadyah University in Surabaya, saying that a change of national leadership was inevitable. In the same month, the panic increased. Hundreds of people stood in line to buy basic necessities in nearly every shopping center Airlangga University students held campus protest where hundreds rallied for reduction of prices of basic necessities. The activists of IMM (Ikatan Mahasiswa Muhammadyah/Association of Muhammadyah Students), in dozens, came to the local legislature to demand the same thing. The students of Airlangga University also demonstrated with unemployed laborers, marching towards the local legislature to ask for the reduction of prices of basic necessities as well as economic and political reform.

The members of PDI-P, the illegal branch of PDI (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia/Indonesians Democratic Party) also made a move, their thirty-seven branch advisory councils presented a letter signed by 1,000 people who declared their readiness to support the candidacy of Megawati as a president. The Cipayung group also gave speeches in front of hundreds and was turned away by security forces when they tried to march toward the local legislature building. They also gave speeches at PMKRI (Perhimpunan Mahasiswa Katolik Republik Indonesia/Association of Indonesian Catholic Students) office, demanding the hanging of corrupters responsible for the economic crisis. Businessmen became involved in the protest events through the Salim Group, the richest company in Indonesia, which distributed basic necessities to 12,000 people of Surabaya.
In February 1998, six medical institutions and the association of Indonesian hospitals became concerned with the rising cost of all components of health services. In the same month, thousands of students of Airlangga University held protest events and recommended to the national Parliament the repeal of five political laws, and the rejection of Suharto as a candidate for president of the Republic of Indonesia. Social actions of businessmen became more frequent. They held bazaars and distributed basic necessities to thousands of people. Student actions also increased and hundreds of ITS (Institut Teknologi Surabaya/Surabaya Institute of Technology) students held an act of concern and demanded economic reform.

4.2.1.5. Semarang

From September 1997 - December 1997, only local issues marked protest actions in Semarang. National issues came to Semarang slowly. In January 1998, people began to panic about the rise in prices. They flooded markets, supermarkets and various shopping centers to buy household necessities. Social actions in the form of selling basic necessities at cheap prices or distributing them for free occurred at the same time as the panic. Students from Diponegoro University, PWI (Persatuan Wartawan Indonesia/Association of Indonesian Journalists), RRI (Radio Republik Indonesia/Indonesian Radio Station), a state owned radio station, businessmen of Gapensi Kodya Semarang (Gabungan Pengusaha Nasionat Seluruh Indonesia/Association of Indonesian businessmen) and members of NU (Nahdlatul Ulama/the Awakening of Islamic Religious Scholars), the largest Islamic organization, were involved in these social actions.
In February 1998, the students of Diponegoro University and other private universities, as many as 150 people, came to the local legislature. They voiced their concern about the economic crisis to the members if the Parliament. At the same time, Sutrismo, an ex-member of the local legislature, collected signatures to nominate Megawati as president of Indonesia. The open opposition against national leaders had never before been done in this country. Islamic teachers and Islamic people held an act of great dzikir, chanting God’s name repeatedly, attended by hundreds of people, to pray for a solution to the existing crisis.

4.2.2 The Second Stage of Protest Events

In this stage, the frequency of protest events and masses involved in them grew three to fourfold. The issues of protest focused on political reform, and in May, took on a single focus: the resignation of Suharto, The students become the main participants in the protest events during the Second stage, which lasted from March 1998 to May 1998.

4.2.2.2 Jakarta

The reform movement started in March 1998 as various campuses began to hold protest events concerning political reform issues. Protest events occurred in various campuses of UI (Universitas Indonesia/University of Indonesia), IKIP (Institut Kejuruan Ilmu Pendidikan/Teachers’Training Institute), IAIN (Institut Agama Islam Negeri/State Islamic Study Institute) Syarif Hidayatullah, Yarsi University, Jayabaya University/STF (Sekolah Tinggi Filsafat/College of Philosophy) Driyarkara, Muhammadyah University, Christian University of Indonesia, and Pancasila University. Various mass organizations outside campuses were also involved, such as KAMMI (Komite Aksi Mahasiswa Muslim
Indonesia/Action Committee of Indonesian Muslim Students) Front of Red and White, Islamic Youth Movement, and HMI (Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam/Muslim Students Association). In March, protest events happened daily, and occasionally, and were even simultaneous.

In this month, a new president was elected and a new cabinet was formed. The Assembly once again elected President Suharto without opposition. In the cabinet of Suharto, many of his loyalists gained positions, such as Bob Hasan and his own daughter, Tutut. Amien Rais, who was becoming well known as a leader of the reform movement, spoke on various occasions about mobilizing people’s power if the new-formed government failed to present solutions to the crisis within six months.

At the end of March 1997, protest actions in campuses solidified. Various private and state campuses took turns in holding events. The issues raised in these events were still general and did not yet specifically ask for Suharto’s resignation. Many of the students refused to negotiate with any government officials, except President Suharto, to deal with the problem. But the important actions in this month involved Islamic teachers. Various Islamic teachers from East Java came to the parliament building to state that the urgent demands for political and economic reform, expressed sincerely by the people, had to be taken into consideration by the Parliament and executed as soon as possible.

Campuses in Jakarta began to be vividly active in April 1998. The joint actions in campuses increased in frequency and, more importantly, their leaders devised a new strategy: leaving campuses to march down the streets. This action attracted attention from
people outside universities and encouraged them to join. In one week, there might be twenty protest actions involving thousands of people. The most important event was a common act at the University of Indonesia in the second week of April. About two thousand students came from various campuses in Jakarta while others were representatives of other universities, such as Hassanudin University from Ujung Pandang, and Diponegoro University from Surabaya. At this meeting, the existing government was criticized for a variety of offenses; at the end of the program, a memorandum was set to the President, asking him to carry out total reform.

A meeting in the trade building of PRJ (Pasar Raya Jakarta/Jakarta Expo, a complex for selling various goods and services) is also considered a landmark action. Attending this meeting were various representatives from the military, 25 community leaders, 39 youth organizations, 39 student senate leaders from various universities, and 17 new cabinet ministers. Also present were Commander General Wiranto, academicians Syafii Maarif and Daniel T Sparingga, and government ministers Muladi, Bob Hasan and Alwi Dahlan. This dialogue discussed all the various crises in Indonesia. On this occasion, Syafi’i Maarif, also a leader from Muhammadiyah, the second largest Islamic organization, asked the ruling political elite to confess their sins.

Also in this month, the case of Pius Lustrilanang, the victim of kidnapping by the military, emerged. He openly discussed his kidnapping by the army’s special forces, detailing the tortures and speaking about other activists who had also been kidnapped. His case escalated public anger about the crime and violence in Suharto’s regime,
The protests climaxed in May 1998. The frequency of the protests and the number of protesters rapidly increased. No day passed without protest. Hundreds of thousands of people could be involved in one event as the actions of students and other elements of the community escalated. More students marched in the streets. In the beginning, security forces tried to suppress such actions with violence. However, because the intensity was too frequent and widespread, the actions proved unstoppable.

The actions culminated in the student occupation of the Assembly building, which lasted for days and ended only with the fall of President Suharto. Several significant political events occurred in May, leading up to the occupation of the Assembly. First, the Trisakti tragedy happened in the second week of May, when thousands of members of the academic community of Trisakti University held a protest action. This action began with a gathering in a parking lot of Trisakti University, and then moved towards the main road. On the front lines, students distributed flowers to security forces. Many female students even kissed them. Late in the afternoon, when the action was about to end, a security guard fired shots, killing these six Trisakti University’s students: Elang Muliana Lesmana, Alan Mulyadi, Heri Hariyanto, Hendriawan, Vero and Hafidi Alifidin.

This event shocked every segment of the community and was broadcast widely by the mass media. The public anger toward the government rose sharply and sympathy to the student movement increased. Many more people demanded President Suharto’s resignation. The condolence and burial ceremonies of the deceased gained public attention; cries and prayers accompanied each funeral ceremony. Thousands of people watched the funerals on television,
and the song “Gugur Bunga” (The Falling Flowers) was played on almost all radio stations. “Gugur Bunga” is a sad song for saying good words to the late hero. The public considered the dead to be heroes of reform. The broadcast of this event through various TV channels and radios saddened people and changed public mood to hate the incumbent government.

For two days after the tragedy of Trisakti, Jakarta was filled with great unrest. Hundreds of shops were burnt down. Police offices were destroyed by the masses. Cars, houses, and any kinds of state and private buildings became targets of people’s violent actions and looting. Meanwhile, hundreds of people were found dead and had been killed in the burning shops. The security forces seemed paralyzed. The people of Jakarta panicked and lived in great fear. These powerful criminal actions crippled all of Jakarta. Many expatriates and the Sino-Indonesians fled the country. Although people have tried to discover who incited the seemingly well-organized riots, they have not met with success. It is still unclear why the security forces looked powerless and could not restore peace. After the unrest, government lost its credibility.

The third event was a meeting held among the faculty, staff, students, and graduates of University of Indonesia (UI) which attracted thousands. The chairman of the alumni/alumnae of UI, Dr. Haryadi Dharmawan, read a statement, which condemned the shooting of the Trisakti students. But this forum also made radical demands, such as the conduct of a special session of the Assembly to force the resignations of Suharto. They called for the wearing of dark band on the left upper arm on May 13, 1998.

Another event, which is a meeting with president Suharto, involved UI lectures and academicians led by Prof. Dr. Asman.
Boedisantoso, the president and university of indonesia. As a representative of the academic community, boedisantoso offered his input on the reform movement. The issue of resignation of Suharto flourished.

Fifty, elements of the community unitid in the Assembly building. In addition to thousands of students, there weher several pulic figures from GRN (gerakan Reformasi Nasional/National reform Movemet) present such as ex-ministers Porf. Dr. Subroto and frans seda, intellectual YB Mangunwijaya, senior political Ali Sadikin and Solichin and prominent opposition leader Amien Rais. They pushed the government to conduct a special session as soon as possible. The issues gradually focused on the resignation of Suharto and the election of new president and vice president.

Sixth hundreds of thousands of students from various campuses occupied the Assembly building. University leader formally stated their support for the student movements, which demanded a change in the national leadership. Retired military officers such as Kemal Idris, Ali Sadikin—long-term dissidents and previous Suharto supporters—, Kharis suhud, and Solichin GP, also supported this act. These protest actions focused on one issue: the resignation of President Suharto.

The seventh action happened on May 21, 1998 when President Suharto officially stated his resignation from the presidential officel. After pressure from his unwillingness of public figures to be appointed as Suharto’s assistants in leading the reform, he had no other choice. This was the end of a tyrant who ruled for 32 years. Constitutionally, Vice President Habibie assumed the office.
The fact that Habibie’s role as a president did not satisfy many political actors, is the seventh significant political event. Various protest actions abounded to demand a change. In the circles of students, the mass-based network Forkot (Forum Kota/Town Forum, a large militant student network) and FKSMJ (Forum Komunikasi antar Senat Mahasiswa Jakarta/Communication Forum of Student Senates of Jakarta) came to the Assembly building. One thousand students demanded for a special session of the People’s Consultative Assembly to fire Habibie, and conduct a new general election,

Tarumanegara University also organized a protest action attended by approximately three hundred people in front of the campus. They demanded the resignation of Habibie. Meanwhile, various public figures met. They included senior politicians Mrs, Supeni and SK, Trirmurti, academician Dimyati Hartono, political activist Mathori Abdul Djalil, labor leader Mochtar Pakpahan, and political commentator Christiano Wibisono, all of whom demanded that a special session of the Assembly be held no later than July 1998 to elect a new leader who would meet the people’s requirements.

The biggest protest event after the fall of Suharto took place in University of Indonesia, Depok, with 10,000 people in attendance. In addition to thousands of students, the leaders of Iluni UI (Ikatan Alumni Universitas Indonesia/Association of Alumni of the University of Indonesia) and prominent intellectuals and activists Mulya Lubis, Arbi Sanit, Selo Sumardjan, and Sri Bintang Pamungkas, attended. Various student representatives from other private universities also participated in the night of meditation, showing that the political reform was not yet over.
4.2.2.3 Bandung

In March 1998, campus actions, involving various campuses, began to spread. The frequency of protest actions increased, with fifteen protest events specifically focused on political reform. The popular political reform issues were the special session of the Assembly and the election of a new president. The issues put forth varied, from the rise in prices of basic necessities and the act of solidarity of distributing basic necessities to the demand for the change of the president. The number of people gathering to protest reached thousands. ITB (Institut Teknologi Bandung/Bandung Institute of Technology, the largest university in the province), for example, held a big ceremony in Soekarno Plaza involving 5,000 people. Pajajaran University held an act of solidarity by distributing basic necessities that was attended by 6,000 people.

New ranks of people joined the masses in their pursuit for reform. Businessmen became involved in the protest actions, generally joining actions of solidarity such as distributing basic necessities. Among those involved were private companies that distributed 1,000 packages of basic necessities to the villages of Bandung and Sumedang. Artists also participated in the events, including Harry Roesli, a famous musician who coordinated a theatrical performance and poetry reading in an open place, which was attended by the Bandung association of students.

In April 1998, the frequency of protest actions once again increased. Forty-four actions, which focused on the issue of reform happened Justin that month. On the average, protest events occurred daily. The total number of students involved in the April actions totaled to more than 50,000 students. In this month, joint protest events from different universities began. In the third
week of April, around 5,000 students from various campuses in Bandung gathered at the Bandung Institute of Technology, raising issues leading to the change of the national leader. Students began to move actions into the streets. The network of inter-city Muslim students, KAMMI (Komite Aksi Mahasiswa Muslim Indonesia/Action Committee of Indonesian Muslim Students) had solidified and sponsored some actions. Professors, recent graduates and alumni also started to participate in the actions, including thirteen professors of ITN (Institut Teknologi Nasional/National Institute of Technology) including the president of Bandung Institute of Technology, Prof. Lilik Hendrajaya. These elements invited the whole nation to join them in striving for reform.

The Bandung protest actions climaxed in May 1998, with 66 protests that month. On the average, there were two protest actions every day. The total mass involved in this month multiplied to twelve-fold (from 50,000 to 700,000). Campuses, which had not previously participated in the actions joined the movement, creating more joint campus protests. In such actions the participants tended to march down streets in order to make direct contact with other elements of the community. The protests repeatedly called for a change of the national leadership. The rise in protests was also triggered by a rise in the prices of electricity and oil, as well as the shooting of the Trisakti University students in Jakarta. The economic trouble was obvious and solidarity between the students and other components became more firmly established.

Academicians and intellectuals in cities began to make contact and hold meetings. In the scientific meeting hall of Bandung Institute of Technology, academicians from different cities, such as Ichlasul Amal, the president of Gadjah Mada University, Emil Salim,
a professor from University of Indonesia and local academicians of Bandung Institute of Technology, pledged their support to the student movement. They would strive to develop networks among state and private universities throughout Indonesia.

The climax of the May protest actions was the gathering of 5,000 students from various universities. They came to the building of the local legislature, after long marches from their own campuses. These actions occurred simultaneously with the burial of one of the victims of the Trisakti tragedy who was from Bandung. The actions continued into the next day with a multiplied crowd of 100,000 students. They demanded the resignation of President Suharto.

Dozens of doctors held a peaceful protest action demanding reform in every sector. The doctors repeated the action and invited the entire staff of hospitals numbering to 500 people. In addition to demanding a reduction in prices of medicines, they also demanded total political reform,

Another element that joined the movement was the federation of SPSI (Serikat Pekerja Seluruh Indonesia/All Indonesian Workers Association). Thirteen workers associations insisted that a special session of the Assembly be held to audit the misuse of power that had plagued the presidency.

The presidents of state and private universities from, among others, Pajajaran University, IKIP (Institut Kejuruan Ilmu Pendidikan/Teachers’ Training Institute), IAIN (Institut Agama Islam Negeri/State Institute for Islamic Studies), and Unisba (Universitas Islam Bandung/Bandung Islamic University) gathered. They came to the local legislature of West Java to submit the concept of reform issued by state and private universities. As many
In March 1998, the frequency of actions increased, as did the number of people involved. During this month, thirty protest events had taken place that focused on political reform, with 70,000 people participating in such protests. Some of the campuses involved were: Gadjah Mada University, IKIP (Institut Kejuruan Ilmu Pendidikan/Teacher’s Training Institute) Yogyakarta, IAIN (Institut Agama Islam Negeri/State Institute for Islamic Studies) Sunan Kalijaga, Sanata Dharma University, Kelompok Cipayung, and Ahmad Dahlan University. At one event at Gadjah Mada University, 50,000 people attended. The issues of March protest events ranged from the economic crisis to the issue of succession to the national leadership.

Universities held joint actions, which sometimes took place in Gadjah Mada University. In this month, Ichlasul Amal was inaugurated as president of Gadjah Mada University, and played a central role in creating the dynamic of the reform actions in Yogyakarta. In April 1998, the frequency of protest events increased again, as did the total number of participants. On the average, protest actions occurred daily, and the total mass of participants increased from 70,000 to 200,000. The number of involved

4.2.2.3 Yogyakarta

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CAMPUS PROTESTS AND DIALOGUE IN YOGYAKARTA

In this month, senior high school students also began to participate. Together with their university seniors, they joined the mass marching toward the local legislature. Also in this month, security forces began to take repressive measures against the protest actions. When the actions left the campus area, the security forces sometimes acted violently. Several physical clashes left both sides wounded. To balance their repressive actions, the security forces invited all campus elements for dialogue.

The presidents from various universities in Yogyakarta, such as from Gadjah Mada University, IKIP Yogyakarta, and IAIN Sunan Kalijaga, attended, as well the military district commander of the region. They tried to find a solution to the growing campus protests.

KAMMI (Komite Aksi Mahasiswa Muslim Indonesia/Action Committee of Indonesian Muslim Students) was active in mobilizing student actions; in just one event, the number could reach as high as 20,000. They called for peaceful reform. The wives of lecturers, including the wife of University President Ichlasul Amal and the famous social scientist Loekman Soetrisno, participated in such protest actions and made use of the celebration of Kartini Day, a day to celebrate Indonesian heroines.

The climax of the protest events in Yogyakarta occurred in May 1998. In this month, ninety-three protest actions focused on the issue of reform. On the average, such actions occurred every day in three locations. The number of people involved in the May actions totaled to over a million people. The leading student activist was
Ridaya La Ode Ngkowe, the chairman of the student senate of Gadjah Mada University and Fikri, the secretary general of KAMMI (Komite Aksi Mahasiswa Muslim Indonesia/Action Committee of Indonesian Muslim Students). The joint actions of universities increased, while non-campus student organizations also participated in the actions, such as Angkatan Muda Muhammadiyah (Young Generation of Muhammadiyah) and Cipayung Group. Junior or senior high school students became involved under the name of GAPCI (Gabungan Aksi PelajarCinta Indonesia/Association of Actions of Students Who Love Indonesia).

Various protest events were attended by more than ten thousand people. They came closer to demanding the resignation of Suharto. Several important events in this month were as follows:

Many people panicked due to the rise in the price of fuel oil. People waited in long lines at gasoline stations in almost all locations, the lines sometimes one to two kilometers long. The policy that raised the price of fuel oil enraged people against the regime of Suharto,

Students and security forces clashed in different locations. Joint actions involving various universities numbered to 10,000 people and violence at this event left Mozes Gatot Kaca dead, a victim of violence of the Armed Forces, and dozens of motorbikes destroyed. This tragedy expanded the waves of protests, and fueled the masses’ anger toward The ruling politicians. Two opposing parties, PPP (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan/Development United Party) and PDI-P (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan/Indonesian Democratic Party-Struggle) sent their delegations to Gatot Kaca’s funeral.
In the second week, the Gadjah Mada University campus, as the main campus in Yogyakarta, brought together different segments of the nation, including university students, high school students, housewives, and farmers to form KARP (Komite Aksi Rakyat Peduli/Action Committee of Concerned People). Their number was more than 10,000. Their concern was the change of the national leader.

Riots struck Yogyakarta, and mass convoys involving thousands of people encircled the city. Shouting reform, they began to destroy and break into shops and car showrooms of Timor, the automobile company owned by Suharto’s son. This added to the revolutionary atmosphere of the protest events.

Thousands of Muslim students of the Islamic boarding school of Ali Maksum Krapyak, the biggest and best-known Islamic boarding school in Yogyakarta, gathered to form a special prayer of request for reform. In the same week, thousands of members of the second largest Islamic organization Muhammadyah and the Islamic party PPP held a rally in Kota Cede, a manufacturing center near Yogyakarta. Rally participants urged that Amien Rais replaces Suharto.

Artists began to involve themselves. Together with students, they held an act of concern in the sultan’s palace reading their manifesto. Well-known artists involved were Butet Kertaredjasa and Bagong Kussudiardjo, who, along with other artists, asserted the need for freedom of thought and democratization.

The president of Gajah Mada University, Ichlasul Amal, led all elements of the academic community, and issued a statement demanding the resignation of Suharto and the formation of a
national leadership presidium. The climax of these protest events in Yogyakarta happened during the commemoration of the National Awakening Day on May 20. Approximately a million people from various elements of the community crowded the streets and marched toward the palace. Two traditional Javanese rulers, Sri Sultan Hamengkubuwono and Paku Alam, read declarations as they led the march. This program remained peaceful and was guarded by security forces from the Islamic party PPP, secular party PDI-P and the largest Islamic organization NU (Nahdlatul Ulama/Awakening of Islamic Scholars). On the way to the palace, the masses cried out for the resignation of Suharto,

4.2.2.4 Surabaya

March 1998 marked the awakening of student protest events in Surabaya. The frequency of protests increased by thirty-six times over the previous month; the protests concerning political issues by thirty-three times. In this month, the number of people involved in the protest came close to a hundred thousand.

Student protest events flourished, involving many campuses. In addition to Airlangga University, various private universities were involved. The protests centered on the economic crisis and demands for political reform. The academic community of Airlangga University, such as senior lecturers, graduates, and professors began to take part in supporting the movements; the ex-president of Airlangga University, Prof. Marsetio Donosaputro, led actions of concern. Students from Airlangga University in Surabaya held several hunger strikes to demand change.

In March, many issues have intensified because of the implementation of the special session of the Assembly to elect a new
president. Two hundred Chinese students from Petra University and almost a thousand students from IAIN (Institut Agama Islam Negeri/State Institute for Islamic Studies) Sunan Ampel criticized the special session as a joke. The leading intellectual supporting the Airlangga University protest actions was Dr. Daniel Sparinga, who participated in several of the students actions. Also in this month, joint protest actions began at several universities. More than 10,000 people representing ITS (Institut Teknologi Surabaya/Surabaya Institute of Technology), Airlangga University, and various other universities planned a long march outside their campuses to demonstrate their concern about the economic crisis. But security forces blocked their march.

In April 1998, hundreds of bank clients rushed into troubled banks. Amien Rais spoke in front of thousand of members of Muhammadiyah, the second largest Muslim organization, stating that, if necessary, people power could be used to press the ruler, as long as it was done peacefully.

Joint university protest actions continued. Daniel T. Sparingga continued to actively protest with students, along with thousands of other people. At ITS (Institut Teknologi Surabaya/Surabaya Institute of Technology), the number soared to 5,000 in demanding that a special session of the Assembly be held to fire the incumbent president.

8. As the social heritage from the colonial era, Indonesia has two monarchs in Java Island. However, in the political system of modern Indonesia, the monarchy has no political authority. The role of monarchy is only as cultural symbols
The climax of protest events in this city also happened in May. Sixty-six protest actions focused on political reform, with an average of two locations every day. The number of people involved reached a hundred and fifty thousand. As in other cities, in May, the number of campuses involved doubled. Junior as well as senior high schools students participated. The active campuses in this month were many.

In May, actions spread protesting the rise in oil prices and electricity. These protests were usually held in campuses. Doctors became involved in protest events; 2500 people from the largest hospital in the province, Dokter Soetomo Hospital, held protest actions in the parking lot. The president of the hospital, Prof. Dr. Dikman A was present as they shouted for reform.

Thousands of religious believers also joined the protests, including Christians, Muslims, Confucians, and Javanese mystics. Religious leaders, including Fr. Sandyawan (Catholic), Mother Gedong Oka (Hindu), and Said Aqil Siraj (Muslim) issued an open letter to the president and state institutions, demanding reform in all sectors. This demonstration took place at the front yard of St. Aloysius Church in downtown Surabaya.

In the same month, the news about the Trisakti tragedy spread and became a rallying issue nationwide. Even though such event occurred in Jakarta, the dead students united student activists in Surabaya. Several campuses commemorated the Trisakti tragedy, the tragedy in which four students were shot dead by the Armed Forces. One hundred fifty lawyers of the IKADIN (Ikatan Advokat Indonesia/ Association of Indonesian Advocates) branch of Surabaya demanded that the Commander of the military be held
responsible for the violence in Trisakti University. After the Trisakti case, more campus actions called for Suharto’s resignation.

Some gatherings of thousands of people erupted into widespread riots. People threw stones at and destroyed various police stations and shops. At the same time, students from various universities, numbering to 5,000 people, occupied government radio station and broadcast the students’ beliefs on reform. Six senior generals of the military also participated in the riots, including Lt Gen. Moergito (retired), ex-commander of the East Java military district who demanded the president to return his mandate to the People’s Consultative Assembly.

4.2.2.5 Semarang

In March 1998, a bazaar designed to aid poor community was organized by AMPI (Angkatan Muda Pembangunan Indonesia/Younger Generation for Indonesian Development, a large government-affiliated youth organization), the Budi Luhur Foundation, IAIN (Institut Agama Islam Negeri/State Institute for Islamic Studies) Wall Songo, and Diponegoro University. The campus-based student movement in this city was initiated by Diponegoro University students. The bazaar reached thousands of people and drew attention to the need to reform five existing political laws contradicting the principles of democracy.

The protest events focusing on political reform were frequent and involved various universities. Thousands of Muslims gathered in the main mosque, praying for the safety of the country and nation. Dozens of students came to the local legislature to insist that the prices of basic necessities be reduced.

In April 1998, hundreds of bank clients rushed into troubled banks. In the same month, thousands of Diponegoro University
students tried to march in the streets but were held back by security forces. Other universities also tried to march and once again, security forces stopped them. The issues of these protests varied from the local issue of rejecting the candidacy of Soewardi as the governor of Central Java to the demand for the resignation of Wiranto Arismunandar as Minister of Education. The figure leading Diponegoro University student protests was Tarikhan, the chairman of Diponegoro University’s SMPT (Senat Mahasiswa Perguruan Tinggi/Student Senate of Universities).

Fifty-nine protest actions were held in May 1998, one to three actions per day. The total number of participants jumped from 30,000 to over a million. Although protests in Semarang had not been as active as in other parts of Indonesia, in May, demonstrations spread rapidly throughout the other provinces in Java. Some of the important events that happened were as follows:

People rushed to gasoline stations due to the rise in oil prices. Protests of students in every university, or several universities, became more frequent. Universities involved, beside Diponegoro University, were six private universities in the province. The issues focused on political reform and the change of national leadership. Thousands of students attended these campus protest actions.

The rise in the price of fuel oil not only incited student protests, but also caused the strike of hundreds of public transportation drivers/commuters. Thousands of Christians prayed together around churches to express concern about the existing crisis. Thousands of students from various universities gathered in Diponegoro University, leaving their campuses and joining the long march to the local legislature.
The Trisakti incident also unified 500 students who occupied the government radio station of Semarang. The chairman of Diponegoro University’s student senate, Tafrikhan M, read their demands on the radio. Hundreds of students from various universities took over the office of the governor in Semarang to demand the resignation of Suharto.

Female protesters who were active in Semarang also submitted a statement of pushing the Assembly to hold a special session. Senior high school students joined with thousands of university students. Artists also took part, organizing a pro-reform art performance. Eighty lecturers from Diponegoro University led by its president Eko Budihardjo, submitted suggestions and ideas for political reform.

4.2.3 The Third Stage of Protest Events

In this stage, from June ‘98 to August ‘98, protest events declined after peaking in the second stage. The diverse issues of protest spanned from politics to the economy and to various other local and national concerns. The students, though still involved in the protest events, were not as dominant as in the second stage. The protest events, which had united in the second stage, began to be divided and protesters fought over their attitude toward the new government. The protest events started to end.

4.2.3.1 Jakarta

In June, July, and August 1998, after the fall of Suharto, various protest actions still lingered as protesters demonstrated about a number of issues. First, supporters of the movement against Habibie’s new government, students from Forkot (Forum Kota/ Town Forum) and UKI (Universitas Kristen Indonesia/ Christian
University of Indonesia) held an action, attended by at least 10,000 people, to reflect on reform in early June. Participants, including politician Bondan Gunawan, labor leader Mochtar Pakpahan, academician Dimyati Hartono, and famous artists WS. Rendra and Harry Rusli, called for the formation of an independent government to hold a new general election.

In the third week of August, as many as two thousand people gathered at Proklamasi Street, a memorial to the founding fathers. More than a hundred non-government organizations and students met, along with prominent opposition leaders Amien Rais, Sri Bintang Pamungkas, Mangunwijaya, ex-minister Prof. Subroto, and famous journalist Goenawan Muhammad. At that meeting, Habibie’s government was declared illegal and participants planned a working committee that would promote total reform. Forkot held a rally during the fourth week of August in front of Hotel Indonesia in Central Jakarta, where three hundred people expressed their disapproval of Habibie as a president, and formed KRI (Komite Rakyat Indonesia/People’s Committee of Indonesia) as a new governmental presidium,

The second issue, the movement for the investigation and trial of Suharto, heightened during this stage. People wanted to bring Suharto to the court and investigate how he obtained such wealth. In the first week of June 1998, thousands of students again came to the Assembly building. They stated their disbelief in the legislature and pushed for the trial of Suharto. Student/youth groups organized under Forbes (Forum Bersama/Joint Forum, a students organization from various universities) supported this issue and, in the second week of June 1998, came in hundreds to the Attorney General’s office. They demanded that the attorney
general form an independent team to investigate the wealth of ex-
President Suharto,

Third, the release of political prisoners became an issue. After
the fall of Suharto, people called for the release of various political
prisoners imprisoned under Suharto’s government. KSM (Komite
Solidaritas Muslim/Committee for Muslim Solidarity) and PUDI
(Partai Uni Demokrasi Indonesia/United Democratic Party of
Indonesia, an illegal political party), numbering to hundreds of
people, also conducted a protest action in the second week of June
1998 at the Attorney General’s office. They demanded the release
of political prisoners still held in winction with the Tanjung Priok
case in 1984; an event that ends with dozens of dead people at the
hand of the Armed Forces. Dozens of people repeated this action
at the Department of Justice, waving posters and banners ordering
the reopening of the Tanjung Priok case, end release of all political
prisoners. The same group in the second week of July 1998 came
to the previous ruling party, Golkar They claimed that Golkar as
a previous ruling party was responsible for the national situation,
and demanded the re-investigation of the Tanjung Priok case in
which a lot of the victims were Muslim activists.

Fourth, the issue of economic crisis continued to be a focus of
protest At times, it took the form of an enraged mass movement,
looting and robbing. On the first week of June 1998, hundreds of
people looted department stores in East Jakarta. On the fourth week
of July 1998, a mob set the office of the sub-district government
of Taman Sari in West Jakarta on fire and destroyed 17 vehicles.
But it also continued to be an issue of organized, peaceful protest
against the declining economic condition. In early June 1998,
various NGOs and doctors came to the house of the Minister of Health F.A. Moeloek to demand a reduction of prices of medicines. A coalition of laborers throughout Jakarta, numbering to 200 people, came to the office of the Department of the Manpower on the fourth week of June, demonstrating for the termination of various work contracts.

On the third week of August 1998, a joint network, formed from various student organizations, sent two hundred people to the head office of Bank of Indonesia. They marched to the bank asking the government to bring corrupt bankers, whose actions were partly responsible for the economic crisis, to trial.

4.2.3.2 Bandung

During June 1998-August 1998, after the fall of Suharto, protest events decreased drastically, from seventy-nine actions in May to forty-two actions in June. The number of people involved also declined, from around 700,000 to 80,000. The issue of protests also began to shift as follows:

First, some protesters believed that reform must happen locally, in smaller towns as well as major cities. Mass organization, including HMI (Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam/Association of Muslim Students) supported this issue. The second issue was the release of political prisoners and convicts, which is supported by, among others, the Legal Aid Institution of Bandung. Bringing Suharto to court was the third issue, supported by a combination of students and youth from the Kelompok Cipayung. Fourth are the issues related to the economic crisis, such as the reduction of prices of basic necessities and increasing work opportunities, supported by students from various universities.
4.2.3.3 Yogyakarta

After the fall of Suharto, protest events decreased drastically from 108 times in May to only twenty-three times in June and seven times in July, and the number of participants declined from over a million in May to only 20,000 in June. The number of participants decreased to one-fiftieth. After the fall of Suharto, the protest actions focused on several key issues.

The first issue was acceleration of the general election that would eject new government, supported primarily by the academic community if Gadjah Mada University. They believed that the reform cabinet under Habibie would not be able to regain people’s trust. Muslim university students in Yogyakarta, senior high school students, and students from Gadjah Mada University took over the second issue, demanding that Suharto be tried in court. Numerous protest actions focused on that issue, which were also supported by Amien Rais. The third issue, to reduce the prices of basic necessities, was supported by various campuses.

4.2.3.4 Surabaya

After Suharto fell, the frequency of actions decreased drastically as their issues diversified. Yet in June, over a million people participated in a big special prayer rally. The members of Nahdlatul Ulama (The Awakening of Islamic Scholars), the largest Muslim organization, prayed together and demanded for a special session of the Assembly to find new and legitimate government.

Nahdlatui Ulama’s branch in Surabaya and Airlangga University Students supported anti-Habibie protests and the new general election. The release of political prisoners and convicts was also an issue; the Illegal and opposition political party, PDI-P supported
that issue as well as protests against the governor, Basofi Sudiorman, who was accused of being an extension of the old regime. Students from various universities advocated for bringing Suharto to justice and forcing him to return his wealth and also reducing the prices of basic necessities and electricity and oil prices.

4.2.3.5 Semarang

After the fall of Suharto, protest actions decreased drastically. The issues shifted in various directions, including calls for the rejection of Habibie and a special session of the Assembly to elect a new president, which is supported by Diponegoro University and other university students. The student senates throughout Semarang wanted Suharto to be brought to court while joint actions of various university students and senior political activists demanded that Governor Soewardi resign. Hundreds of pedicab drivers supported Amien Rais as a presidential candidate.

4.3 The Political Entrepreneurs

As described above, various agents were involved in initiating, directing and expanding the protest events. These agents included academicians, student organizations, housewives, businessmen, artists, professionals, retired military officers, old politicians, political parties, labor unions and courageous individuals. However, few of them were political entrepreneurs. Here are the political entrepreneurs.

4.3.1 Amien Rais

As a political entrepreneur, Amien took political risks to initiate opposition against Suharto months before Suharto’s fall, while other leaders obeyed and feared Suharto. He introduced ideas of changing national leadership even before the era of economic crisis,
when that issue was rarely discussed. He courageously and publicly nominated himself as a presidential candidate opposing Suharto, in an era when Suharto was still strong and repressive. He mobilized and inspired protest movements in various campuses and in various cities by giving public speeches to students. He asked Suharto to resign while other leaders were ready to compromise. Finally, he continued to endorse political reform after the fall of Suharto.

Born in Solo on 26 April 1944, he received his undergraduate (S1) education at the Faculty of Social and Political Science of Gadjah Mada University in 1968 and Faculty of Tarbiyah of IAIN (Institut Agama Islam Ategen/State Institute for Islamic Studies) Kalijaga; in 1973, he finished his MA in Russian at the Catholic University of Notre Dame, United States. He was awarded a doctorate in political science from the University of Chicago, United States of America, in 1981 with a dissertation titled The Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, Its Rise, Demise and Resurgence. He became a professor at Gadjah Mada University in 1999, giving an inaugural lecture titled Power, the Powerless and the Democracy of Power. His organizational designation includes the terms as: President of Muhammadiyah from 1984-1999, member of the council of ICMI (Ikatan Cendikiawan Muslim Indonesia/Association of Muslim Intellectuals of Indonesia), President of PAN (Partai Amanat Nasional/National Mandate Party), and chairman of the People’s Consultative Assembly from 1999. Amien Rais was a reform figure long before President Suharto resigned on May 21, 1998.

A pioneer of early reform, Amien, in his capacity as a critical intellectual, often announced his opinions on the politics and power of the New Order officials. The political issues he dealt with
were often too sharp and contradicted the power interest of the New Order. For example, long before the era of reform, in 1993, Amien proposed the idea of succession to the national leadership in front of the second largest Muslim organization, Muhammadiyah, in its meeting in Surabaya. However, people were not enthusiastic, as this issue was too sensitive for Suharto’s New Order regime.

In mid-1997, when the monetary crisis struck Indonesia, Amien felt that the idea of succession was becoming more relevant and could be reintroduced. Amien called for succession at every possible opportunity in speeches held by Muhammadiyah, where he was the chairman, and before circles of intellectuals and students. Later, the political context grew more receptive to Amien’s idea. The stinging criticism of Amien Rais annoyed the circles of the government, as they could not accept an “attack” from Amien Rais, the chairman of the second biggest Islamic mass organization in Indonesia. His attitude resulted in a shift from lecturer of Gadjah Mada University and from chairman of the expert council of ICMI.

At the end of September 1997, in the seminar held by YLBHI (Yayasan Lembaga Bantuan Hukum Indonesia/Foundation of Legal Aid Institution of Indonesia), Amien stated that he was willing to be a presidential candidate, exhibiting a courage possessed by very few people in the era of Suharto. The courage of Amien Rais forced the regime to take seriously succession and reform issues. As a result of his statement declaring his readiness to be a presidential candidate, it was rumored that certain groups within the army would kidnap Amien Rais.

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9. Thanks to Muridhan. As my assistant, he helped me collect the secondary data about Amien Rais and write a report of his work.
The most important result of the mass media attention Amien received was that Indonesia’s presidential office was demythologized. At that time, the president was still considered “sacred,” and in the cultural and political context of the New Order, discussing succession, let alone declaring oneself a presidential candidate, was considered a subversive action. It was believed to be a “challenge” to Suharto. Amien Rais was one of the figures who dared to threaten the New Order openly, and to mobilize people power if the government could not take serious measures to solve the economic and political crisis. On 16 March 1998, in answering a question from a student at the Faculty of Engineering at the Muhammadyah University in Jakarta, he said: “If the economic crisis continues for the next six months, I am ready to lead people power without violence, as has happened in the Philippines and Iran” (Kompas, 17 March 1998). Amien’s statement dissolved the “political fear” which had been established by the New Order regime.

As a representative of a mass organization, Amien’s statements always lent support to the student movement. That movement had spread widely since early 1998. In early April 1998, Wiranto Arismanandar, an ex-university president known to be repressive toward students, became the Minister of Education and Culture, and prohibited students from practicing politics in campus. Amien soon criticized this prohibition; “Modestly, I want to advise Mr. Wiranto Arismanandar, who is now the most influential person in the education realm, to be cautious.” According to Amien Rais, such a prohibition was counter-productive. What had been done by the students, he believed, was for the good of the nation and should be considered a moral obligation. Arismanandar’s attitude, he stated, was also a compliment to the students’ influence, and should encourage students to continue their protests.
Amien toured throughout Indonesia, attending various open discussions and demonstrations held by students. He gave a speech at a student forum in Yogyakarta, and did the same in Jakarta, Solo, Ujung Pandang, and Medan, from the end of January until the fall of Suharto. During the occupation of the Assembly building, Amien came to offer his support. Although some student groups rejected his presence, this did not deter him from openly supporting the student movement as a path to reform in Indonesia.

Amien showed consistency in his beliefs and solidarity in his cooperation with students and various parties whose issues he supported. When Arifin Panigoro, a famous businessman opposing Suharto, was accused of conspiring to overthrow the incumbent government after attending a discussion held by Amien Rais in Gadjah Mada University, Amien said that he would be responsible and act as a witness for Arifin Panigoro. This politically noble attitude demonstrated Amien’s commitment, particularly when most other academicians would not have dared defy further the New Order.

In the second week of May 1998 at Callery Cafe in Central Jakarta, Amien Rais again took part in determining the course of Indonesia’s reform. Together with some academicians, national press, and non-governmental organizations, including famous journalist Albert Hasibuan, prominent economist Dr. Rizal Ramli, feminist Prof. Dr. Toeti Heraty, intellectual Dr. Daniel Sparingga, journalist and poet Goenawan Mohammad and businessman Arifin Panigoro, Amien formed MAR (Msjelis Amanat Rakyat/ Council for People’s Mandate). According to Amien, MAR was a power as well as a moral movement that would offer suggestions and positive criticism against an indifferent government that did not heed its people’s wishes (Kompas, 24 March 1998).
MAR did not compete with the government, as it was a moral movement rather than a practical political power. But MAR attracted figures from various profession and groups committed to fighting for democracy and justice. Fifty national figures were listed as supporters of MAR, including senior politician Ali Sadikin, ex-ministers Dr. Emil Salim, Frans Seda, and In Siswono Judohusodo, economist Dawam Rahardjo, political commentator Drs. Arbi Sanit, university president Sudjana Sapiie, bank expert Laksamana Sukardi, Muslim leader Adi Sasono, famous lawyers Dr. Adnan Buyung Nasution, A. Hakim Garuda Nusantara, and Hendardi, religious leaders and Theologians KH. Mustofa Bisri, Prof Dr. Franz Magnis Suseno, and Dr. Th. Sumartana, and journalist Fikri Jufri. Amien introduced the idea of establishing MAR in a speech he gave in front of the members of Muhammadiyah throughout Jakarta. With MAR, Amien wanted to establish an open organization that could facilitate the demands for and based on commitment to political reform.

When MAR declared its establishment, it also put forward three statements. First, it called for President Suharto to resign honorably for the sake of the nation, so that the whole process of reform for democracy could run well and peacefully. It also asked that security forces avoid any kinds of violence against the people and prevent worsening conditions. Finally, it asked students, the younger generation, and the people in general to support democracy.

Amien played a significant role in the days before the fall of Suharto. At that time, other Islamic leaders compromised with Suharto - they would still support Suharto leading the political reform, but no longer as president after the general election. Various Islamic leaders took a moderate position and offered Suharto the chance to just reshuffle his cabinet and form reform committees.
However, Amien showed his leadership and determination by refusing to compromise: Suharto must resign as soon as possible. He threatened to mobilize people if Suharto did not comply. His bold statement, along with widespread societal support, gave him tremendous power. Informally, he was the sole leader of the political reform against Suharto. Finally, Suharto resigned. Amien Rais supported allowing Vice-President Habibie to replace Suharto constitutionally.

After Suharto resigned, Amien together with several figures such as the young prominent political activist Faisal Basri, dissident A.M. Fatwa, Theologian Th. Sumartana and others, established PAN (Partai Amanat Nasional/National Mandate Party), where he held the position of chairman. He stated his readiness to participate in the General Election in 1999, demonstrating his critical attitude against the ruling ‘New Order or the ‘Transitional Order of Habibie’10. Amien more freely criticized the government, continuing to push for Suharto to be brought to court, and introducing new ideas concerning reform. His ideas concerned limiting the period of the presidency, local government autonomy, ending the military’s role in politics, to the issue of freeing East Timor. Long before Suharto resigned and before the establishment of MAR, Amien Rais had showed his democratic attitude toward East Timor. In a foreign magazine, Xanana Gusmao once said that his hope for the solution of East Timor issue depended on Amien Rais.11

Amien’s democratic attitude is clearly displayed through his current position as the chairman of the People’s Consultative Assembly for the period of 1999-2004. When the special session of October 1999 took place, student demonstrations were marked by a clash with security forces. To accommodate the students’
demands, Amien invited ten student representative to join in the special session of the Assembly. This attitude was not only intended to avoid violence of security force against students, but also to gauge students’ attitudes toward the procedures of the session, particularly related to Habibie’s accountability report.

4.3.2. ICMI (Ikatan Cendikiawan Muslim Indonesia/Association of Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals)

This organization can be considered a political entrepreneur because it was: 1) among the first of many powerful organizations that took political risks to oppose Suharto; 2) strategically changed its political position, from supporting Suharto to asking Suharto to resign months before his fall; and 3) as a powerful Islamic organization, influenced various segments of the Islamic community to become involved in political reform,

Habibie, who later became the third president of the Republic of Indonesia, chaired ICMI. Suharto had supported ICMI’s birth, supposedly to convince Islamic groups to be his new partners in his political coalition building. ICMI members successfully infiltrated the cabinet and parliament and assembly in the general election of 1992. From this achievement comes a name nijo royo-royo” (totally green), meaning that the green men (green is the color of Islam) from ICMI dominate the cabinet or legislature.

The background of ICMI members varies. They come from the circles of the largest Muslim organizations NU and Muhammadiyah,

10. President Habibie called his cabinet “Cabinet of Reform”. Students disagreed with this term and preferred “Transitional Government.”
the state bureaucracy, as well as various other Islamic social groups. This diverse membership continued in the post-Suharto era, when new parties emerge and the supporters of ICMI participated in either Islam-based or open parties. In its human resources development program, ICMI has tried to instigate organizational cooperation with other experts organizations like ISKA (Ikatan Sarjana KatoWc/Association of Catholic Intellectuals), PIKI (Persatuan Intelegensia Kristen Indonesia/ Association of Christian Intellectuals of Indonesia), FCHI (Forum Cendekiawan Hindu Indonesia/forum of Hindu Intellectuals of Indonesia), and KCBI (Keluarga Cendekiawan Buddhis Indonesia/'Family of Buddhist Intellectuals of Indonesia).

In late December 1997, ICMI held an informal meeting in Bogor. One of their internal programs was the improvement of mechanism of democracy, and the meeting stressed the importance of pioneering growth and the importance of peaceful elections and open appointments of national leaders, especially president and vice-president. The voice of the biggest expert organization in Indonesia offered new insight amid the economic and political anxiety resulting from the monetary crisis (Republika, 9 December 1997).

A statement of the Secretary General of ICMI, Adi Sasono, asserted that ICMI supported the issue of change of national leadership. Adi said: “We must be realistic; the next century is the century of change. Mr. Suharto is already old. Even his family wants him to take a rest (Republika, 9 December 1997).”

Adi Sasono’s next step was promotion of a national dialogue about the economic crisis and other national issues. Its think thank CIDES (Center for Information and Development Studies) would
follow up on issues arising from such discussion (Forum Keadilan, No.21. Year VI, 26 Jan. 1998 p.19). But ICMI was disappointed, and its political initiatives stranded, when some of its leading figures were not appointed to the new cabinet of March 1997.

The reaction of ICMI to the student and intellectual reform movement could be witnessed in the results of an important meeting throughout Indonesia on May 6, 1998. In this meeting, ICMI determined that it would support the process of reform holistically, as a way out of the crisis. ICMI also maintained its attitude against any form of violence by any group, believing that formal institutions should be protectors and patrons of the restless people due to the existing crisis.

After the meeting, Achmad Tirtosudiro, ICMI’s sitting chairman, stated, “It is wrong if we are always looking for the scapegoats triggering the crisis” Assisted by Adi Sasono, he continued to say that members of the new cabinet were involved in a network of corruption, collusion and nepotism. This defied the criterion of a good leader as stated by the Prophet Muhammad, which was: not to be hypocritical, not to lie, to keep promises, and, in gaining a mandate, to never betray or be cunning in any business.

When asked why ICMI did not propose for a special session of the Assembly in response to the student demands for reform, Tirtosudiro said: “Reform can only be carried out by those who really support reform.” Implicitly, he stated that the Assembly could not reform the government. Adi Sasono said that ICMI would continue supporting any constitutional efforts for the sake of the people. Concerning the Crisis, Tirtosudiro added: “It is impossible that this crisis is dealt with only by economic measures” (Media Indonesia, 7 May 1998, p.16).
In the above meeting Adi Sasono said that, at present, the Parliament has to grab any existing opportunity: “Now the protests events are widely spread, the Parliament has to follow the people’s aspiration.” The present condition differed from that in the 1980s because now every segment of the community supported reform. He implored that every party does not consider the idea of reshuffling the new cabinet, saying that all the ministers (members of the cabinet) were hypocrites against the demand that reformers should control the new cabinet.” (Suara Karya, 7 May 1998, p.1).

In the later development, ICMI grew more and more radical and Tirtosudiro even stated assertively: “Reshuffling of the cabinet is not enough. We should change the national leader first, then talk about alternatives of reform.” This statement is similar to the demands of the students for Suharto’s resignation.

However, the courageous statement from ICMI against Suharto divided ICMI’s leaders. Habibie, the Vice-president and ICMI’s patron, got mad. He declared ICMI’s statement (asking Suharto to resign) to be just a personal opinion of the leaders of ICMI and not ICMI as an institution.

Nevertheless, Tirtosudiro, the acting chairman, courageously criticized Habibie, the vice-president, and ex-ICMI chairman. According to Tirtosudiro, Habibie, after holding the position of vice-president, did not have the authority over ICML Achmad again defended his statement concerning the special session and the reshuffling of the cabinet, saying there was nothing wrong with the statement he made with the Secretary General Adi Sasono (Jawa Pos, 12 May 1998 p.1).

Tirtosudiro emphasized that everyone, including the Parliament, should consider a special session of the Assembly. This statement
essentially asked the Assembly to fire Suharto. The special session could be held as long as it is constitutional but Tirtosudiro admitted that based on the composition of the Assembly people could not expect them to hold a special session. However, he continued, “I am sure that by continual pressure from the people, they can be affected and then consider it.” (Jayakarta, 7 May 1998).

ICMI responded to the many riots in Jakarta in mid-May 1998 in a statement signed by its Chairman/Daily Executive Chairman Achmad Tirtosudiro and Secretary General Adi Sasono. They expressed their concern and regret at the actions of violence, looting, and burning that occurred in the capital district and several other cities in Indonesia. This event was a great loss to all, especially the poor people who were devastated by the continual economic crisis. In its statement, ICMI welcomed the willingness of Suharto to resign, considering such a move to be the beginning of a holistic, peaceful, and constitutional national reform. ICMI understood the intention of Suharto to “lengser keprabon, madeg pandhito” (resign and become a wise man) and pushed the president to follow it up constitutionally. (Kompas] Republika, 15 May 1998, p.1).

In such a critical political situation, President Suharto held a meeting at the state palace on May 19, 1998 with nine figures from Islamic groups involved in the efforts to remove him from the presidency. Several of them were members of ICMI. Also present at the meeting were several senior military officers, including Commander General Wiranto. The meeting became a dialogue between Suharto and the Islamic figures.

The ICMI leader Tirtosudiro said that, the sooner President Suharto stated his resignation, the better. The daily executive chairman of ICMI added, “And it would be even better if it was
before 20 May 1998 that he announced his resignation.” Taking the lessons from the New Order government, he proposed that the new regime should be democratic.

4.3.3 Gen. Syarwan Hamid

Lt. Gen. Syarwan Hamid showed his political entrepreneurship by: 1) being among the first of the ruling military leaders to take the political risk of publicly supporting political reform months before the fall of Suharto; 2) changing his political position, together with other chairmen of the Assembly, from supporting Suharto to asking Suharto to resign, a statement which fundamentally changed the political climate of the country; 3) after the fall of Suharto, leading the campaign for political reform laws.

Syarwan Hamid, a key figure in the circles of the Assembly, had relatively great Influence in the process of the political decision-making process. As a figure with intelligence in sociopolitical matters, he represented the interest of the military group within the regime. Before the movement of reform began, he was considered to be a defender of the New Order led by Suharto, and was involved in the destruction of the Indonesian Democratic Party led by opposition leader Megawati Soekarnoputri.

Gradually Syarwan emerged as a reformer supporting the change of political system. Responding to the last few weeks of student protest events in various campuses from January to March 1998, Syarwan found that he, as vice-chairman of the Parliament/Assembly, could no longer consider the students movement to be sporadic, but a movement to which government and the Parliament had to pay attention. According to him, the Parliament was ready
to accept students’ wishes and even support reform demands to adopt antimonopoly and anti-corruption laws.

Responding to the possibility that the package of political laws would be revised, Syarwan said, “For now the change of the political laws has been the will of the people, I think it is not a problem to be discussed.” He said the laws had been already been revised several times; for example, a revision of the laws had lessened the number of military members of the Parliament from 100 to 75. He believed further revision was not yet necessary: “However, it [revision] is probably not significant yet, because the expectations of people are more” (Republika, 15 April 1998, p.1).

When asked about the people who were allegedly kidnapped by the military, he said publicly that those cases of missing persons violated the efforts of human rights enforcement in Indonesia and that the incumbent government should clarify the matter. He believed that missing persons would destroy Indonesia’s image in the international world. Pius, an activist kidnapped and then released, went to Holland to protest the incumbent regime, and Syarwan said that people cannot be prohibited from going to Holland as long as the documents are legal. Further, he said that the Parliament does not tolerate kidnapping, and that kidnapping is a crime that needs to be investigated thoroughly. He emphasized the need for clear and open investigation (Kompas, 30 April 1998, p.1).

Syarwan, in an interview with Forum Keadilan magazine, explained that a statement asking Suharto to resign had been discussed thoroughly with Harmoko, the speaker of the Assembly. According to Hamid, the vision of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia was to seek good government. Because of that, they
had dared to ask Suharto to resign: “This is an attitude we have to take so that the situation does not get worse” (Forum Keadiian, No.5 Year VII, 15 June 1998). Hamid added that he did not directly consult the armed force delegation before asking Suharto to resign. Yet he was convinced that Hari Sabarno, the leader of the military delegation, and the members of the military fraction could understand that the statement was for public interest.

Hamid insisted that the statement asking Suharto to resign was his personal responsibility, not as a member of the armed forces, but as the vice-chairman of the Parliament/Assembly: “So, if I was wrong, it would be the personal responsibility talking.” He considered his statement a down payment to students, proving government was concerned with their demands.

After Suharto fell, President Habibie chose Hamid to be the Minister of Home Affairs, and one of his working agenda was to revise the laws of the general election. The draft team for the new political laws was chaired by an expert on government affairs, Ryaas Rasyid, along with expert members of group of professional political scientists. “Now we are making new laws,” he said. These laws were meant for the long term, to bring Indonesia to democracy. According to Hamid, Indonesia now possessed the liberty to form new parties. The free general election that took place in other democratic countries could be implemented in Indonesia as well.

Syarwan attended the special national conference of the previous ruling party, Golkar Party in 1998. At this conference, he explained that, due to the application of the old political laws, and in his capacity as the Minister of Home Affairs, he had been appointed advisor to the bureaucratic wings of Golkar. In the framework of the new political taws, he said, Golkar Party was no longer a
part of the government bureaucracy. Golkar must be independent and KORPRI (Korps Pegawai Republik Indonesia/Corps of Civil Servants of the Republic of Indonesia) must be neutral politically, and not a part of any political party (Republika, 30 June 1998).

4.3. 4 Various Student Movement Groups

It was the student organizations that supplied the most participants for the serial protest events in Indonesia from 1997-1998. These organizations recruited more and more members and activists. Their numbers peaked on May 18, May 19, May 20 and May 21 in Jakarta, when more than a hundred thousand people participated each day.

Every major city had its own student movement but these three student organizations were famous: KAMMI (Komite Aksi Mahasiswa Muslim Indonesia/Action Committee of Indonesian Muslim Students), FKSMJ (Forum Komunikasi Senat Mahasiswa se-Jakarta/Communication Forum of Student Senates throughout Jakarta) and Forkot (Forum Kota/ Town Forum, a large militant student network). These three organizations covered the various political spectrums within the student community and society in general. If we simplify the political spectrum into right (Islam), leftists (secular-populist) and moderate (center), KAMMI is on the right, Forkot on the left and FKSMJ in the center.

These three organizations also differed in their protest strategies. KAMMI used non-violence or conventional strategy, Forkot used disruptive (threat) or even violent strategy, and FKSMJ was more flexible. In terms of organizational structure, KAMMI was

12. Thanks to Muridhan, my assistant, who supplied the information on various student groups
hierarchical, Forkot was leaderless, relying on collective leadership, and FKSMJ was somewhat in the middle,

Before the fall of Suharto, these three student organizations were unified under a single issue: the resignation of Suharto. However, after the fall of Suharto, they divided. Forkot opposed the new President Habibie. According to Forkot Suharto and Habibie were the same and should have resigned together. As a solution, Forkot recommended collective leadership of the people through a kind of presidium of various leaders. FKSMJ was in the same line with Forkot, although it lacked Forkots militancy. However, KAMMI supported Habibie for the sake of constitutional rule and because Habibie (from ICMI) came from the same Islamic base as their organization.

4.3.4.1 KAMMI (Komite Aksi Mahasiswa Muslim Indonesia/ Action Committee of Indonesian Muslim Students)

KAMMI’s roles as a political entrepreneur are as follows. First, it was among the first to network campuses in various cities in Java (e.g. Jakarta, Bandung, Yogyakarta, Surabaya, and Malang) to form opposition to the government and to create branches of KAMML This cross-city network proved effective in extending opposition and sharing information. Second, it created bases in leading and large universities; they had direct access to mobilizing thousands of students. In the reform movement, students are the dominant participants. Third, it used the sentiments and symbols of Islam to oppose the ruling government. This kind of symbols was crucial because Islam is the majority religion in Indonesia. KAMMI could use Islam to induce mass emotion. Moreover, the
existing government often used the symbol of Islam to strengthen its power.

KAMMI, according to Fahri Hamzah, its chairman, was inspired by the existence of KAMI (Komite Aksi Mahasiswa Indonesia/Indonesian Student Movements Union), a prominent student network in 1966. As KAMI was the main student power in overthrowing Sukarno, KAMMI was expected to overthrow Suharto.

As a group active at campus mosques, KAMMI tended to identify itself as a Muslim movement. The membership of KAMMI was individuals and majority of its members were recruited from the annual Islamic leadership training. In its action, it chose peaceful movement, non-violence, and focused on issues of people’s concern.

KAMMI mobilized hundreds and thousands of students for various political and economic issues. KAMMI conducted serial protest events day by day in various cities. In every city where they mobilized protest events, they used the same banner, the same pattern of issues against the President, the same strategy (non-violence), and the same ritual (using Islamic symbols). On 9 April 1998 for example, the activists of KAMMI in Yogyakarta demonstrated to demand price reduction, total reform, the resignation of Suharto, cabinet reshuffling, a special session, and the end to military violence. On 10, April 1998, the activists of KAMMI in Jakarta held a dialogue with the Commander of the Armed Forces Wiranto, together with thirty-two students at Al Azhar mosque, a famous mosque in Jakarta. On 13 April 1998, the activists of KAMMI in Surabaya held a protest action at Airlangga University to demand economic and political reform. On 14 April
1998, in a discussion at Brawijaya University, activists of KAMMI and student activists of Malang led the protest events asking Suharto to resign.

In the critical moments before the fall of Suharto, KAMMI, led by its chairman Hamzah Fachry, became a close political ally of Amien Rais. Together, they planned to bring a million of people to march around the Monas (Monumen Nasional/National Monument) in Central Jakarta, once again asking Suharto to resign on May 20, 1998. But the march was canceled because of the fear that the Tiananmen scenario, leading to the death of dozens of people in China, may occur in Jakarta. They heard rumors that a faction of the military planned to shoot the people at the monument. They changed the protest to another strategic place: the Parliament building. A day after this event, Suharto resigned.

4.3.4.2 FKSMJ (Forum Komunikasi Senat Mahasiswa se-Jakarta, Communication Forum of Student Senates throughout Jakarta)

This network is considered a political entrepreneur because it was: 1) among the first to network with formal student organizations (student senate) in various campuses led by Muslims as well as non-Muslims; 2) among the first to mobilize students off-campus (e.g. to occupy public buildings); 3) the first to help unify these four famous opposition leaders: Amien Rais, Megawati, Abdurrahman Wahid and the Sultan of Yogyakarta, against Suharto.

Formally, the membership of FKSMJ consisted of fifty-six campuses in Jakarta. However, only thirty-six campuses were active members, including student senates of Trisakti University, Ginadharma University, and Jayabaya University. Their post was in the campus of Dr. Moestopo Beragama University.
This organization occupied public buildings to publicly avow their issue. On January 1, 1998, FKSMJ joined with other students organizations in the Assembly building. Five hundred people protested the monetary crisis, the rise of the prices of basic necessities (nine basic necessities), and demanded economic and political reform. But the most significant protest events FKSMJ mobilized occurred in May. On May 18, 1998, in the Assembly building, thousands of people called for a special session of the Assembly and a revocation of the mandate given to the President by the previous Assembly. They threatened to spend the night in the Assembly building until a special session was held.

FKSMJ pioneered the dialogue between student activists and political figures. FKSMJ, together with a group from Bandung became executive facilitator of the national dialogue attended by four distinguished opposition leaders, Amien Rais, Megawati, Abdurrahman Wahid, and the Sultan of Yogyakarta. These four leaders issued a joint declaration to respond to the existing economic and political crisis.

Later, these four leaders played a very significant role in Indonesian politics. Abdurahman Wahid was elected president, Megawati vicepresident, Amien Rais speaker of the Assembly, and Sultan of Yogyakarta remains a respected informal leader.

Most of the student senates in campuses had previously been dominated by religion-based students organizations, such as HMI (Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam/Association of Muslim Students), PMII (Persatuan Mahasiswa Islam Indonesia/Indonesian Islamic Students Movement), or GMKI (Gerakan Mahasiswa Katolik Indonesia/Indonesian Catholic Student Movement). FKSMJ succeeded in building a student senate on a much broader base,
and because of that, other student movements from various social and religious backgrounds easily accepted them.

4.3.4.3) Forkot (Forum Kota/Town Forum, a large militant student network)

Forkot is considered to be a political entrepreneur because it: 1) was involved in various small private universities in the movement, which had not happened in any previous student movements; 2) used disruptive strategies, even violence, in the protest events, attracting the attention of the media; 3) was able to keep up its militancy and stamina for a long period.

Forkot was established on March 7, 1998. On April 15, 1998, Forkot exhibited its capability in protest events by simultaneously mobilizing mass of students from thirty campuses. Forkot linked students from forty-seven universities in Jakarta, Bogor, Tangerang, and Bekasi.

On numerous occasions, Forkot’s protest events turned violent. For example, on Wednesday, 29 April 1998, in Jakarta University’s campus, Forkot asked for Suharto’s resignation. However, the students and security forces later pushed each other and threw stones; as many as 17 students and 11 security forces were wounded.

On February 5, 1998, the protest events conducted by Forkot involving various campuses were participated by 3000 people. They tried to march towards Salemba, the University of Indonesia campus, but again, four students were wounded. Exactly three months later, May 5, Forkot mobilized thousands of people. The protesters asked Suharto to resign. When they tried to march down the street, a security guard shot a student with a rubber bullet. That
same day, Forkot led hundreds of students to occupy the Assembly building. The issue aimed to put pressure on the government to reduce the price of oil. But when protesters and police clashed, as many as eight students were wounded and dozens of security forces were victims of stone throwing. On Thursday, 5 July 1998, Forkot of the Faculty of Engineering of Jayabaya University mobilized thousands of people to march in Jakarta. But when students of Jayabaya University wanted to join Gunadharma University, four kilometers away, as many as fifty-two students were injured.

After the fall of Suharto, while many other student movements cut down their protest events, Forkot remained spirited and conducted its protest events with the same level of militancy.

There was a drastic change in the wave of protest events from the first stage to the second stage. In the first stage, the issue is still unfocused on economic-related issue. However, in the second stage, the issue was more and more focused to the change of national leadership. In the first stage, the frequency and the participants of protest were still few. However, in the second stage, the frequencies and participants exploded to 400% and 1900%. In the first stage, the main actors were non-students. However, in the second stage, the main actors were students.

How one should explain this drastic change? The economic conditions of the first and second stage of protest were more or less the same. High unemployment and inflation occurred more or less the same in both stages. The political resources available were more or less the same in both stages. The percentage of students, TV stations, other media and telephones in the second stage didn’t differ with those in the period of the first stage.
This chapter describes that the difference between the second and the first stage of protest events was caused by the political actions of protest event’s agents. Some of them have quality as political entrepreneurs. These courageous organizations and individuals took political risk to mobilize, expand, direct the issues/build network, recruit new participants, influence public opinions, and challenge the national leader.

The economic crisis and political resources are only the resources available for anybody to be used or not. However, it is the action of the real actors that change the condition. It is the courage, choice, skill, leadership, and for some degree, fortune of the human agents, of the political entrepreneurs that manipulated the resources to unify political power. They are the “man behind the gun” of the wave of protest events and the heroes of regime change.

The next chapter will describe how these political entrepreneurs got more political opportunity because of bad policies of the incumbent government and the shifting of the influential elites, from supporting the incumbent government, to supporting the opposition.
Public support for protesters cannot be separated from the actions of personal ruler. If Suharto had made the right policy adjustments, the crisis might have been overcome. The final ingredient, therefore, is the political success or failure of the national leadership. The powerful authoritarian ruler could not have been forced to resign, at least not so quickly, if he had been able to adjust policy to restore public legitimacy. In other words, the ruler must have miscalculated or exercised bad judgment that led to the growth of the movement against him. A personal ruler is autonomous and strong and analysis of the reasons for his fall can't ignore his actions during the crisis.

The first part of this chapter describes the bad policies made by Suharto in the era of crisis leading to his fall. At the end of that description, I give a general explanation of why Suharto, previously regarded as a skillful politician, made those mistakes. In
the second part of this chapter, I elaborate on the ruling elite’s role in influencing the political outcomes of protest events. Although non-elite actors Initiated the protest events, the dynamic of the elite also significantly contributed to the final political outcome of the protest events.

5.1 Bad Policies of the Incumbent Government in the Era of Crisis

The bad judgment and policies of Suharto in the era of crisis accelerated his fall. This chapter describes the policies that intensified the crisis, including 1) inconsistency toward the IMF’s Plan for Economic Recovery; 2) the appointment of unpopular ministers; 3) the rise in the price of fuel oil; 4) the slowness in responding to reform; and 5) the violence against the protesters (Trisakti tragedy).

5.1.1 The Inconsistent Behavior toward the Program of the IMF

The years 1997 and 1998 were the most pathetic, as well as most critical, years in the history of the New Order government under Suharto. In July 1997, the exchange rate of rupiah was approximately Rp. 2,450 per US dollar. However, closer to the fall of Suharto’s power in May 1998, it decreased to the extent that it reached the ever lowest rate of Rp. 15,000 per US dollar. On January 26, it was recorded at Rp.16, 000 per US dollar (Aritonang 1999: 20-63).

President Suharto himself admitted that the GNP had decreased. The inflation rate during the fiscal years 1997/1998 was 28.273%, an explosive increase from the 5.29% inflation rate in the budget years of 1996/1997. Until the end of March, the exchange rate
of rupiah was Rp.10,000 per US dollar, or twice as much as the exchange rate stated in the revised draft national budget of 1998/1999. The first quarterly inflation of 1998 reached 25.13% (January 8%, February 12.76%, and March 5.49%). Indonesia became a poor country, with a GNP per capita of around US$ 300-600, depending on the exchange rate.

The national socio-economic crisis attracted international attention from countries like the USA, Germany, Japan, and Australia. Through the IMF, the international community showed its sympathy toward Indonesia’s socio-economic crisis. A team under Hubert Neiss, the Director of Asia and Pacific of the IMF, had made an agreement three times with Suharto to try to help solve the socio-economic crisis. The recovery program, which valued as much as US$ 43 billion, required Suharto to reform financial institutions and industry as well as liberalize the economic system. However, Suharto himself violated these requirements (Aritonang 1999; 32-41).

Suharto’s inconsistency can be illustrated through several instances. In the agreement with the IMF, signed by Suharto, the monopoly of clove marketing controlled by Suharto’s son, Tommy, was to be abolished. But Suharto insisted the clove board was not a monopoly and was actually helping small-scale businesses to maintain price stability. The IMF also called for the abolishment

13, The events in this sub-chapter were quoted in almost all newspapers and magazines in Indonesia since they were shocking phenomena. Aritonang (1999) documented the chronology of those events, in 1997 and 1998, from various medias in his book: Runtuhnya Rezim Daripada Suharto (324 pages), I quoted his book many times in various paragraphs in this sub-chapter,
of the national car project, which they considered a monopoly. However, Suharto claimed that there was nothing wrong with the national car project, which his son Tommy also owned.

Suharto also promised the IMF that he would let the market determine the exchange rate of local currency. Yet he seriously considered shifting to the currency board system; a system, which would set a fixed rate for the exchange of rupiah to the US dollar. The IMF was against the currency board idea and believed it would only hurt the ailing Indonesian economy. The executive director of the IMF, Michel Camdessus, said, “Do not kill the patient with such medicine,” warning that the plan could place Indonesia in a greater jeopardy (Aritonang 1999: 32-41).

Camdessus and the ministers of finance of Europe warned that the currency board was not the best solution to recover the Indonesian economy, as Indonesia lacks the necessary strong infrastructure. The IMF recommended a conventional program: radical change in the banking system as the solution for private national debts, and total reduction or abolishment of cartel practices and monopoly. Suharto’s intention to oppose the IMF and implement a currency board had negative political consequences. The public considered his plan to be self-serving, as it would create opportunities for Suharto’s family and allies to buy up US dollar and send Indonesia into serious foreign debt.

Suharto also displayed his inconsistency by appointing the company P.T. Goro Batara Sakti to be the sole distributor of non-basic necessities such as soap and toothpaste for the whole of Indonesia. According to The Jakarta Post (April 8, 1998), the Minister of Cooperatives and Small-Scale Business, Subiakto Tjakrawerdaya, appointed RT, Goro Batara Sakti to help various
cooperatives develop small-scale businesses. Some of the shares of PT. Goro Batara Sakto belonged to the small-scale businesses. However, the public knew that Tommy Suharto owned as much as 40% of PT. Goro Batara Sakto’s shares. This appointment, in the era of economic crisis, weakened public trust in the incumbent government; the public knew the policy would not benefit the national economy but Suharto’s family.

However, the administration under Suharto tried to justify these policies at all costs. The Minister of Industry and Commerce, Mohammad Bob Hasan, claimed that monopoly did not matter as long as it served people’s interests. In another shocking statement, he talked about the export of crude palm oil (CPO), saying that Suharto would still allow CPO export because the domestic supply was not stable. This policy deviated from Suharto’s agreement with the IMF. In the agreement, he said he would prohibit CPO export. When asked why the administration violated the IMF agreement, Hasan said: “This country is not the Republic of IMF. This is the Republic of Indonesia. Therefore, do not take the IMF into consideration too much” (Aritonang, 1999:32-41).

The inconsistency of Suharto garnered strong reaction from the US and its allies in the G-7, as well as Australia. In the second week of February 1998, US President Bill Clinton and German Chancellor Helmut Kohl called Suharto, hoping to convince him to follow up the economic reform policy and take measures indicating his commitment to reform. Suharto, who signed the economic reform policy under the IMF’s supervision, later opposed the policy.

Because Suharto violated the agreements, the IMF delayed the extension of available loan funds as much as US$ 3 billion from the
total US $ 43 billion until April 1998. The IMF believed Indonesia was not serious in abolishing monopolies to solve the economic crisis. The IMF had these evidences to support their belief that Suharto was not serious about reform:

The cartel of Indonesian plywood association continued to operate under the supervision of Suharto’s cronies. Projects considered not yet operable were implemented, such as a giant road-building project, contracted to a business belonging to Siti Hardijanti Rukmana, Suharto’s daughter

3. Special facilities for the national car, owned by Tommy Suharto, continued.

4. Several bad business practices were eliminated, but recurred in the same companies, which had only changed names, not practices. An example is the clove monopoly dominated by Suharto’s son. This company changed its name secretly but continued its unethical business dealings (Aritonang 1999: 41-54).

Suharto’s inconsistencies cost Indonesia both socially and economically, and increased political uncertainty and crisis. The monetary and economic crises drastically increased. People’s trust to Suharto weakened, particularly the trust of economic experts, private circles and political groups; Suharto was deemed to be not serious about saving the country’s economy. This situation contributed to various causes, including mass panic and the fragile exchange rate of the rupiah.

The fluctuation of the rupiah’s exchange rate against the US dollar in February 1998 easily rose and fell. On February 2, the rupiah was at the rate of Rp. 10,900; on February 3 it crawled
to the rate of Rp. 10,200; on February 4 it rose to Rp. 8,900; on February 5, it decreased again to Rp. 9,500; and on February 6 it fell to Rp. 9,700. Closer to the second week, February 9-10, the rupiah was positioned at Rp. 9,750; on February 11 it increased drastically to Rp. 7,300; on February 12 - 13 it changed to Rp. 7,450. During the third week, on February 16, the rupiah fell to Rp. 9,900; on the 19th, it strengthened itself to Rp. 8,900, and on February 20, it decreased again to Rp. 9,100, Approaching the last week in February, the rupiah fell again to Rp. 10,200 then moved up gradually to Rp. 9,450, Rp. 9,955, Rp. 9,940, Rp. 9,000 and remained at Rp. 8,950 until the end of this month (Aritonang 1999: 54-63).

Finally, the economic crisis and uncertainty contributed to public anger of the lower class and university students. Their anger incited social unrest in the form of looting of basic necessities and riots in, among other places, Pamanukan, West Java and Medan, North Sumatra.

5.1.2 The Appointment of Unpopular Ministers

In response to the protest events, Suharto formed a new cabinet, which concerned some troubled ministers. In March 1998, in the era of acute economic crisis, President Suharto appointed his cabinet and named it “Development Cabinet VII.” In terms of credibility and competency, this cabinet may have been the most controversial cabinet in 32 years, since the birth of the New Order regime (Aritonang, 1999:135-155).

The public placed great expectations on the cabinet’s shoulders, as they hoped this new cabinet would lead Indonesia out of economic crisis. But the cabinet figures Suharto selected gave
rise to controversy and accusations that the new cabinet was not competent, not pro-reform, and the result of nepotism. Many ministers were the object of criticism, such as Siti Hardijanti Rukmana (Suharto’s daughter), Mohammad Hasan alias Bob Hasan, “the closest crony to Suharto’s family” and Dr. Ir. Wiranto Arismunandar, the anti-student minister of education.

The presence of Siti Hardijanti Rukmana, called Tutut, as a minister was seen as evidence of nepotism. Tutut realized that the public suspected nepotism played a part in her appointment as a minister, and admitted that being a minister was not her own will, but an order from her father. Suharto told her that the economic crisis had an impact on social problems. Therefore, she was ordered to help deal with the social problems. However, said Tutut, she didn’t think that she was more competent than anyone else to cope with the crisis. According to her, Suharto may also have chosen her because of their closeness and her loyalty to him (Aritonang, 1999: 135-155).

Prof. Dr Ir. Wiranto Arismunandar, Minister of Education and Culture, was to directly handle the student movement. When he became the president of the Bandung Institute of Technology (ITB) for two periods from 1989-1997, Arismunandar was not reluctant to punish and expel students. Many ITB students were punished and expelled because they held protest events during his administration. The students of ITB demanded his resignation. After the president appointed Arismunandar as Minister of Education and Culture, students became anxious that the new minister would show little mercy toward the student movements.

However, the most shocking appointment was that of Bob Hasan; a businessman who was close to Suharto and who was
against IMF policy reform. As the new Minister of Industry and Commerce, he was in a strategic position to combat economic crisis. He could solve the crisis or make it worse. Many circles doubted his ability to solve the crisis, particularly since his monopolistic practices and corruption were considered causes of the crisis. Bob Hasan, Suharto’s golf partner, had shares in dozens of companies, including P.T Kalimas Plywood, P.T. Pasopati Holding Company, P.T. Hutan Nusantara, and P.T. Karana Shipping Lines. Due to his many businesses, people wondered if he could separate his business interests from the national interest. As a businessman, he was accused of destroying many Indonesian forests. The presence of Bob Hasan in the cabinet strengthened public opinion that Suharto still practiced nepotism and collusion and was not serious about solving the economic crisis.

Bob Hasan also had to face criticism from domestic and foreign mass media that had written negatively about him and his plywood industry. Dr. Amien Rais, the prominent opposition leader, was the first to comment on Hasan being a minister, saying he was “the wrong man in the right place “

The appointment of these unpopular ministers added fuel to the fire of those opposed to Suharto’s rule. His governance was considered heedless to public opinion and lacking a sense of severity to the crisis. Public’s disappointment and anger about Suharto’s choice of ministers grew widely, and became the focus of protest actions in various cities.
Another policy that heated the public rage was the rise in fuel oil and electricity prices, which occurred at the peak of the economic crisis. Without consulting the Parliament, the government officially announced the rise of fuel oil and electricity prices. The Minister of Mining and Energy, Kuntoro Mangkusubroto, stated that based on the decision of the President No. 69/1998 in May 1998, fuel oil was increased by 25% to 71% (Aritonang 1999; 179:217).

In the decision of the President No.79/1998, it was said that the increase of the basic price of electricity would be implemented in three stages. At each stage, in May, August and November 1998, the basic electric tariff would increase by 20%. Mangkusubroto said that to lessen people’s burden, the percentage of its increase would not be the same for all kinds of fuel oil. The lowest income families would be protected the most from the price increase.

According to the government, the increase in the fuel oil prices was not the best solution but they saw no other option. The weakening exchange rate of the rupiah caused the rise in oil prices. This situation increased production costs, as well as the price of government-subsidized fuel. The community had to be ready to face this problem, as the cost of living would automatically increase.

Many members of the Parliament rejected this government policy. The decision was considered partial and to have violated the function and role of the Parliament. Kompas (5 May 1998 p.1) reported the opinion of several Parliament members concerning the decision, such as Budi Hardjono, Ekki Syachrudin, and Hamzah Haz. These public figures asserted that the rise in the prices of fuel oil and basic electricity tariff had to be discussed
with the Parliament first, i.e. through a meeting of commission of the Parliament or plenary session of the Parliament since the policy was strongly related to people’s lives and also to the law on the national budget for 1998/1999. Furthermore, Hamzah said that the decision of the government was too daring since the economic crisis had already burdened the people economically and psychologically (Aritonang 1999: 179-217).

The sudden announcement of the government shocked people. Fuel oil price would rise in May and the rise of premium gasoline from Rp. 700 to Rp. 1,200 incited panic. In May, vehicles, including Mercedes and BMWs, waited in long lines to buy gasoline. Traffic jammed everywhere, especially in major cities.

People became more anxious. Even the local legislature in the Special District of Yogyakarta planned to hold protest events. The Islamic political party, PPP, announced that it would lead a strike from May 12-18, 1998. The public responded emotionally to the rise in oil prices and the electricity tariff. In Jakarta, protest events were held. The students from various universities clashed with security officers who shot students with rubber bullets. In retaliation, the students threw stones at the officers. At a clash in one place, twenty-seven students were wounded; nine of them shot with rubber bullets, and five security officers were also injured. At a clash in another place, seven students wounded; one of them was shot with a rubber bullet. In a joint rally mobilized by various universities, students tried to leave campuses blocked by security. Riots ensued. Stones flew, tires burned, and firecrackers exploded, leaving sixteen students wounded.

In Bogor, a city close to Jakarta, students from various universities conducted a joint action under the Forum Komunikasi
Mahasiswa Bogor (Communication Forum of the Students of Bogor). They also clashed with security forces during a protest event. In Bandung, the capital city of West Java, in a clash between students and security officers, sixteen students were injured and two arrested. The impact of clashes radicalized protest events. Thousands of students from various universities in Medan, the capital city of North Sumatera, continued to hold protest events, and, gradually, the students won support from various societal segments. Mass of non-students was inspired to join in the protest events. But such masses only increased the protest events’ volatility. Riots, when shops were burned and looted, seemed unstoppable. In these acts, dozens of students were injured.

A clash between security forces and students also took place in Yogyakarta, when the security officers violently blocked the students trying to march along the streets. After the protest event, as many as fifty students were missing, fifty-nine arrested, and four hospitalized. In Jember, in addition to the strike held by public transportation drivers, students of the Islamic Institute conducted protest events. But the events were blocked by security forces, resulting in another dispute. Thousands of students in Ujung Pandang held a join protest. At this event, students destroyed the local Parliament building and were wounded by the security officers.

These mass riots caused damage to several banks and hundreds of shopping centers. Also, motor vehicles were destroyed, and shops looted. West Sumatera, specifically Padang, also witnessed riots. Rioters destroyed the office of the State Electrical Company.
After the discussion on the policy of fuel oil and the basic tariff of electricity between the executive branch and the Parliament, students openly rejected the policy. The speaker of the Parliament held a meeting to insist that the government reassess the price of fuel oil. The speaker of the Parliament, Harmoko, stated: “the prices need to be reassessed. The people could not afford any more.” This decision would be extended to the joint meeting of Commissions V and VII of the Parliament with the Minister of Mining and Energy Kuntoro Mangkusubroto and Minister of Finance Fuad Bawazier (Aritonang, 1999: 179-217).

Several days later, the government revoked this policy and created a new policy and created a new policy to change the price oil and the electricity tariff. For example, oil premium decreased from Rp. 1,200 to Rp. 1,000 per liter. Kerosene was returned to its previous price of Rp. 200 per liter. However, the masses are still at rage.

5.4.4. The Slowness in Responding to the Reform Demand

Suharto did not accommodate students’ demands for political reform, Through the Minister of Home Affairs, R. hartono, Suharto said, “If you aren’t satisfied with the guideline, and insist on having more political reform, please prepare it after 2003.” The Minister of Home Affairs added, “If reform disturbs stability, we are obliged to repress it for the sake of the nation.” This statement was broadcast openly via TV and radio (Aritonang 1999: 108-113)

On the day, Amien Rais, a prominent opposition leader, expressed his concern at the fact that the government did not adequately respond to the political reform proposed by the student
movements. In his interview with Republika (2 May 1998) Rais said, “Because the political reform being promised isn’t until 2003, psychology public anger will rise. Let me make a parable. One would choose to get one million now instead of getting the promised fifty million five years from now. Therefore, instead of waiting for the indefinite promises of reform in the next five years, we want the political reform now.” He continued, “That’s why I call for government leaders to be more cautious, wise, and humble in having an attitude against the demands of the students. Those political reformers are also the voices of the people. They are our children too, who will hold the succession of the leadership in the future. Students are our fresh and blood; therefore we have to listen to them, respect them, and appreciate them. We cannot stay away from the demands of the students. In this case, to respond to the student’s political demands, indeed, we need goodwill, willingness, honesty, and wisdom.

Seeing the government’s statements as a refusal to adopt political reform, student protest grew more serious. In Yogyakarta, student actions took place in various campuses. The senior and junior high school students, who were united under the Association of Junior High School Students joined in holding a demonstration in the Special District of Yogyakarta. They demanded that the government carry out political reform now, saying there would be little reason to do it after 2003.

Similarly, in the Jakarta protest events, conducted in a state university, University of Indonesia (UI), thousands of students, laborers, graduates, and high school students waved banners reading: “The people are demanding political reform now, Harto! Acts of protest against Suharto’s statement concerning the reform of 2003 also took place in various private universities.
A day after Suharto issued that statement about reform, two ministers held a press conference to correct the statement. Suharto had called the ministers for a meeting, and press conference recounted the discussion from that meeting. According to Minister Alwi Dahlan, Suharto had intended for his statement to open the door for political reform now, and his subordinates had just misinterpreted the president’s will (Aritonang 1999:108-113).

However, the correction arrived too late. The anger toward Suharto had increased. The community of Yogyakarta’s Gadjah Mada University, fifteen thousand lecturers and students, held protest actions to ask for two possible actions, namely Suharto had to reshuffle the cabinet or resign.

5.1.5 Violence Resulting from the Trisakti Tragedy

The most negative consequence of Suharto’s regime in the era of crisis was the shooting of Trisakti University students. This violence fueled the student movement and the determination to remove Suharto from office.

In May 1998, as the student movement opposing Suharto grew more powerful and spreading throughout Indonesia, security forces began to use violence to suppress the movement. The tragedy of May 12, 1998 at Trisakti University was the most violent example of such force. The security forces not only used batons, tear gas, and rubber bullets, they also used real bullets. They killed four students, wounded dozens of others, and left dozens missing.

Although the Trisakti tragedy was considered the bloodiest and the most tragic protest event, in other cities, two students were also
killed. Mozes Gatot Kaca, a forty year old computer technician from Yogyakarta, died after being beaten by a security guard on May 8, 1998. The other victim, Gilang, a young street musician who had just graduated from high school in Surakarta, was found dead in Sarangan, East Java. However, the Trisakti tragedy caused the greatest outcry (Aritonang 1999, 113-129).

The Trisakti tragedy happened on May 12, 1998. At 10 a.m., 5,000 students, lecturers, workers, and graduates of Trisakti held a protest action to demand political, economic, and legal reform. The protest action, held in a parking lot, was colored by speeches from lecturers (including some professors), students, and workers. The protest action continued peacefully. At 1 p.m. students began to march down to S.Parman Street in front of their campus toward the Parliament building. Peaceful and orderly, they attempted the long march but a blockade of security forces stopped them outside the office of the Mayor of West Jakarta. At 3.30 p.m. students began to return to their campus, and most students had arrived at their campus by 5 p.m. Hours later came the security force's act of brutal violence. Under attack, the protest participants ran and hid in the nearest building. Some of the students fought back by throwing hard objects at the security forces.

Of the four students of Trisakti killed by the security force's shots, three were wounded in vital body parts: Elang Mulia Lesmana was shot in his left chest, (the bullet went through his back); Hafidhin Royan was shot in the right temple (the bullet shot through the back of his head); and Herry Hartanto was shot in the back (the bullet shot through his chest). Hendriawan Sie had one bullet shot through his neck and upper waist (the bullet went through the stomach) (Aritonang 1999: 113-129).
On May 13, pro-democracy students in various campuses mourned. A memorial service was held at the Trisakti University, attended by prominent political figures such as: Amien Rais, Emil Salim, Lieutenant General (Retired) Ali Sadikin, Megawati, Buyung Nasution, Kwick Kian Gie and Hariman Siregar. They condemned security forces’ actions and Amien Rais spoke to motivate the thousands of students who attended the ceremony.

On that very day, Elang Mulia Lesmana and Herry Hartanto were buried side by side in the public cemetery of Tanah Kusir, South Jakarta; Hendriawan Sie was buried in the Alkamal cemetery, Kebon Jeruk, West Jakarta; and Hafidhin Royan was buried in a public cemetery complex, 200 meters from his house in Jl.Sirnagalih, Bandung. Dozen thousands of people from various social circles attended the burial ceremony, and offered flowers and condolences. For several days after the burial, Indonesia mourned.

After the Trisakti tragedy, the sympathy of the United States, Britain, Germany, France, Italy, Canada, and Australia toward the student movement rose. The United States’ Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian Affairs, Stanley Roth, suggested that Indonesia should not control students with violence, as students had their right to speak out their opinions peacefully. Soon after the Trisakti incident, the leaders of eight industrial countries (the United States, Britain, Germany, France, Italy, Russia, Canada, and Japan) on the KIT Birmingham (Britain) made an official public statement condemning the shooting of students. They urged security forces to refrain from using deadly weapons and respect individual rights. Furthermore, they asked the Indonesian government to immediately open a dialogue to listen to the demands of the
Indonesian people and introduce necessary reforms. US President Clinton also pushed Indonesia to carry out political reform as soon as possible, and give the people an opportunity to state their political requests (Aritonang 1999: 113-129).

Foreign parties’ sympathy toward the students’ political acts continued to increase. The sole superpower lent its support through a statement by US Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright in Washington: “It is time for Indonesia to stop violent action since students are holding peaceful demonstrations.” Then the British, on behalf of the European Community, said they regretted the violent action and asked the Indonesian government not to rely on violence. France, Holland, Germany, Italy, Japan, Australia, Singapore, Malaysia, and the Philippines also pushed the Indonesia government to make political reforms. After the Trisakti tragedy, the students’ demands not only for political reform, but specifically for Suharto’s resignation, won international, as well as national, support. On May 20, one day before the fall of Suharto, Secretary of State Albright asked President Suharto to act like a statesman in responding to the public demand. She implicitly supported Suharto’s resignation. According to Albright, Suharto needed to pave the way for a transition to democracy. Similarly, the Foreign Minister of Australia, Alexander Downer, urged a political transition in Indonesia before the country became unstable (Aritonang 1999: 217-228).

In Jakarta, the Trisakti tragedy triggered mass social unrest. On May 13, tens of thousands of people gathered outside the Trisakti campus to condemn the security forces. The burning and destruction of buildings and shops continued and security could not stop the people.
Riots spread throughout Jakarta. The social unrest in Jakarta reached a critical level the next day. The New Order had never witnessed riots like the ones destroying and looting shopping centers and burning buildings. The government explained that the mass riot cost Rp. 2.5 trillion (US$ 3 billion, 1 US dollar = Rp 8,000). This data was jointly presented by the Coordinating Minister of Economy, Finance and Industry Ginandjar Kartasasmita, Minister of Industry and Commerce Bob Hasan, Minister of Communication Giri Suseno, Minister of Mining and Energy Kuntoro Mangkusubroto, head of the Logistic Affairs Board Beddu Amang, Minister of Defense and Security/Commander of the Armed Forces General Wiranto, Governor of the Bank of Indonesia Sjahril Sabirin, and Governor of Jakarta Sutiyoso. This problem was discussed at President Suharto’s house in Cendana Street (Aritonang 1999: 217-228).

According to the Jakarta Governor, this riot destroyed 2,479 house cum shops, 1,604 shops, 1,119 residential houses and churches, 383 private offices, 65 banks, 45 workshops, 40 malls/plazas, 24 restaurants, 13 markets, 12 hotels, 11 police stations, 9 gasoline stations, 8 city buses and metro minibuses and 2 sub-district offices. Meanwhile, 288 people were killed and 101 wounded. The Head of the Logistic Affairs Board also detailed the losses as: 500 tons of rice amounting to Rp. 600 million, and 1,800 tons of sugar amounting to Rp. 3.24 billion and cooperative stores amounting to Rp. 400 million. The total of the above material losses was Rp. 4.24 billion (Suara Pembaruan, 28 July 1998).

Social unrest rose in other cities. In the elite housing area of Solo Baru, the masses burned the luxurious house of the speaker of the Parliament and the Assembly, Harmoko. This event was
the continuation of the destruction and burning of shops and movie houses. A group of protesters threw Molotov cocktails into Harmoko’s 1,500 square meters house, estimated to be worth Rp. 2 billion. As it burned, the mob cheered.

The students of Semarang came to the government-owned radio station to broadcast their demands to the government. But the station would not broadcast their demands live, only record them to be broadcast an hour later. The students of Semarang demanded for a special session of the Assembly and asked Suharto to resign.

After the students of Semarang occupied the government radio station, Surabaya students occupied government radio station in Surabaya. After a 2:00 p.m. news program, students broadcasted their demands for political reform of the New Order, reading ”Ten People’s Demands.” Among the demands detailed were: the need for change in national leadership, a radical moral revolution, the return of the military to the barracks, and the abolition of corruption, collusion, and nepotism (Aritonang 1999: 179-216).

Expatriates and foreign workers, as well as people of Sino-Indonesian descent, crowded the Sukarno-Hatta Airport. Worried about the condition of Indonesia, especially in Jakarta, people tried to leave the country. The Trisakti tragedy and the unrest in Jakarta showed that their security was not guaranteed. The exodus of the Sino-Indonesians had an economic impact, as they mostly managed existing centers of trade. The money they took abroad worsened the social economic situation by disturbing business affairs.
5.2 General Explanation

Why did Suharto make bad policies and mistakes in the era of crisis? Why was he inconsistent toward the IMF plan for economic recovery? In 1970s, the public mood was populist, nationalist and socialist. However, Suharto had the courage to rely for his economic policy on the free market oriented economist, the so-called Berkeley Mafia. He had chosen these liberal economists although he faced political pressure because the free market principle was not popular. The Indonesian economy, then, grew very fast, partly caused by the right free market policies. Why wasn’t he able to rely on those kinds of liberal policies (the IMF’s plan) once again to solve the economic crisis?

Liddle (1999) suggests that Suharto’s reasoning was personal. Suharto in the late 1990s was different from Suharto in the 1970s and 1980s. In the late 1990s, Suharto was 76 years old and could no longer distinguish between the interest of the nation and the interest of his families and cronies. Forced to choose between the two, Suharto tended to choose the interests of his family and cronies at the expense of national interests.

The businesses of Suharto’s family and cronies grew more successful and they ranked among the richest men in the country. The free market oriented policy of the IMF plan would require him to abolish all privileges, including monopoly, of his family and friends. Torn between the interests of his family and friends and his nation, Suharto would not fully comply with the IMF.

I only partially agree with Liddle’s explanation. Getting older could make a leader less sensitive. However, getting older could make a leader wiser as well. Getting older is not a strong explanation.
My own explanation of the failure of Suharto relies on law of Lord Acton that “power tends to corrupt.” Suharto, in power for 32 years, always won his political struggles. The circles surrounding him were less and less critical over the years, and tended to be “yes-men.” His political repression caused both his circles and the public to fear him.

As a result, he lost touch with reality and became less and less sensitive to public interest. In many cases, he seems to have misunderstood the problems in part because he wasn’t paying enough attention. Intellectuals often labeled him as “having no sense of crisis.” Being both out of touch with reality and insensitive to the public interest made it easy for him to create policies that are detrimental to Indonesia. His responses to both economic crisis and recommended economic policies as described by the above five cases has shown his insensitivity. The five above poor governmental policies in the critical era created a worse political climate. This climate inspired the birth and the expansion if protest events, which were almost evenly spread throughout Indonesia. Through these policies, Suharto dug his own grave.

5.3 The Shifting of the Elite

The huge and long protest events leading to Suharto’s fall left Indonesia in political uncertainty. As explained by various theories of democratic transition, the fall of an authoritarian ruler doesn’t automatically bring the said country to democracy. Political uncertainty may also bring the said country to another type of an authoritarian regime.

After the fall of Suharto, how did Indonesia transit to democracy, and now be in the process of becoming the third largest
democratic country in the world? Since Islam is the dominant religion in Indonesia, why didn’t Indonesia change to an Islamic state, as occurred in Iran, after the fall of a personal ruler? Since the military was strong and heavily involved in politics, why didn’t Indonesia change to military rule? Why was there no military coup in those uncertain times?

These questions should be explained by emphasizing the role and dynamic of elites in an era of crisis. In this analysis, the elite refers to the definition proposed by Higley and Gunther (1992, p.8) “persons who are able, by virtue of their strategic positions in powerful organizations, to affect national political outcomes regularly and substantially.” Further, they define elite as “the decision makers in the largest or most resource-rich political, governmental, economic, military, professional, communications and cultural organizations and movements in a society.” By using this definition, few elite live in a country. In their judgment, for example, the elite in the United States and Soviet Union was upward of ten thousand people. In smaller countries, their number may be less than a thousand.

5.3.1 Political Outcomes and Political Choices

Protest events may result in various political outcomes and choices. In the protest events in Indonesia, 1997-1998, from the rise of political events to the post-Suharto era, there existed four stages of political outcomes and choices, as shown in Table 5.1 below.

The first stage was the start of the protest events. Suharto remained in power in this stage’s political outcome. However, the protests forced Suharto to make one of these two choices: 1) political reform or 2) no political reform. If Suharto could control
the protests, he didn’t need to conduct political reform. In the past, he had never executed significant political reform.

However, since Suharto couldn’t adequately repress the protest events, stage two occurred. In this stage, the outcome was political reform. In this stage, Suharto could again make one of these two choices: 1) stay in power, or 2) resign. If Suharto was still in full control, he could conduct political reform while still in the presidential office.

However, since the political unrest continued, and Suharto couldn’t control the growing opposition, the protest events moved to stage three, where the political outcome was Suharto’s resignation. In this stage, there were two political options: 1) Suharto resigns in a constitutional way, or 2) Suharto resigns in a non-constitutional ways (e.g. coup).

Suharto’s choice to resign constitutionally brought Indonesia to the fourth stage, the post-Suharto era. The political outcomes of this stage could vary, based on these three political choices possible in Indonesia’s condition: 1) military rule; 2) Islamic State; or 3) transition to democracy.

Why did the protest events in Indonesia go from stage one to stage two and then stage four? Why didn’t the protest events stop in stage one? When the protest events went to stage four, why was the final outcome a transition to democracy? Why not military rule or an Islamic State? The protest events by the non-elite cannot solely explain such an outcome. In this sub-chapter, I argue that the choice, bargaining and skill of the elite significantly contributed to the final political outcome.
I will describe the role of the ruling elite in every stage of political outcome. The first question is this: why didn’t the protest events stop in stage one and allow Suharto to remain in power. Suharto saw himself as a rational political figure, able to stay in power without relenting to demand for political reform. He enjoyed his 32 year position as Indonesia’s sole personal ruler, and the fact that the family’s business was growing. All politically powerful people obeyed him. He could not have better conditions in which to rule.

When the protest events, which demand political reform, began, he didn’t give much attention to the students, or the events. He also showed little attention to the IMF plan he had signed, as he didn’t want to abolish the monopolistic power of companies owned by his family and friends. In previous political battles, he had won the political struggle, remained in power, and did not conduct significant change in his regime. Suharto ordered his ministers to explain that if people wanted political reform, they had to wait until after 2003. He clearly stated what he believed to be a reasonable political choice.

Suharto would only implement political reform if he could no longer handle the political pressure against him. The unprecedented serial protest events in 1997-1998 proved to be more than what Suharto could handle. Thousands of people, particularly students, asked for reform, as did many political leaders from the growing opposition. The national economy was in crisis. After strong political and economic pressure from both domestic (protest events) and foreign (IMF and the public statement of international leaders) factions, Suharto was forced to conduct political reform.
In this stage, the ruling elite did nothing. The ruling elite from the military, the Parliament, business and political parties were still united under Suharto’s control, mostly unaware of the political situation. They believed the protest events were “politics as usual” and that they could be controlled through government repression and the jailing of protest leaders. No ruling elite member took an important role in encouraging the protest events or opposition against Suharto.

However, in the second stage, the situation changed. With Suharto willing to initiate political reform, the political demands from the protest events increased. They asked Suharto to resign, declaring political reform impossible with him in power. This extraordinary turn of events was fueled by the Trisakti tragedy. Various societal segments, from a wide political spectrum, supported the protest events and put pressure not only on Suharto, but also the ruling elite.

In this stage, significant development occurred in the ruling elite. For the first time in the 32 year history of the New Order, the ruling elite started to divide into the so-called “soft-liners” and “hardliners.” Soft-liners refer to the ruling elite supporting the protest events for political reform, while hardliners are the ruling elite defending Suharto’s power at all cost.

However, I prefer labeling the Indonesia elite as the “Suharto loyalists” and “Suharto traitors.” The terms soft-liners and hardliners imitate the ideas of O’Donnell and Schmitter. In O’Donnell’s framework, soft-liners initiate the transition, since the division of the elite is the key to beginning a political transition. In Indonesia, as stated repeatedly, the division of elite did not start the transition, as the elite division comes later. For this reason, the term “Suharto
traitors,” rather than soft-liners, better fits Indonesia’s elite.

Suharto traitors refer to the ruling elite who withdrew their support for Suharto, and then made political maneuvers against him. Although they were few, the Suharto traitors played an important role in changing the political climate. Among the first Suharto traitors were the Parliament speakers, Harmoko, Syarwan Hamid and others. After strong public pressure, they made a shocking public statement, asking Suharto to resign. They drastically shifted their political positions from Suharto loyalists to Suharto traitors. Also among Suharto traitors were the fourteen ministers of his cabinet. While Suharto tried to consolidate his power by reshuffling the cabinet, those fourteen ministers from economic ministries united in their refusal to join the new cabinet. They wrote a letter to Suharto, implicitly stating that Indonesia would not recover from the economic crisis if Suharto remained in power. The letter made it clear that Suharto should resign.
Three former vice-presidents provided the final impetus for Suharto’s resignation. They came to see Suharto to insist that the country needed Suharto to resign. However, these three former vice-presidents cannot be labeled as Suharto traitors since they remained loyal to him. They made their request as an act of statesmanship for the sake of the nation. The political efforts of the ruling elite forced Suharto out of office.

Then the protest events moved to the third stage. It was clear that Suharto would resign. But would he resign constitutionally?

Suharto still had the choice to defend himself at all costs through military support and other political and economic resources. He was still in power and could have brought the country to civil war. After such a war, he might still be in power, as happened in Burma, although Indonesia might have plummeted into a worse crisis. But Suharto chooses to resign constitutionally. General Wiranto, as chief of the military, played a crucial role in this stage. In the uncertain conditions, Wiranto rejected the idea of a military coup or asking Suharto to hand over the power of the executive to him. Legally, Suharto could transfer power to Wiranto. A decision of the People’s Consultative Assembly allows such a transfer of power in an emergency situation.

Suharto had achieved his own power through that same kind of transfer Sukarno was forced to deliver power to Suharto, as chief of the military. Suharto, who managed the political situation successfully, then became president by isolating Sukarno and Sukarno’s followers. Suharto consolidated his power even though he didn’t gain power through constitutional means.
Wiranto repeatedly insisted that such a power transfer should not occur, that they obey the constitution, which states that the vice-president takes control if the president resigns. According to Wiranto, he would be loyal to any president whose power was authorized by the constitution. If there was a constitutional power shift, Wiranto was also guaranteed his position as the chief of the military. Wiranto’s reluctance also helped determine that Suharto would not resign through non-constitutional means.

Habibie, as vice-president, also played a significant role in determining that Suharto resigns constitutionally. A day before Suharto decided to resign, he was concerned about whether Habibie, his constitutional replacement, could cope with the crisis. According to Suharto’s speech in front of Islamic leaders, the crisis was so complex that he feared his resignation would worsen the country’s situation.

After hearing that statement, Habibie, as reported by several media, was angered. With strong words, he told Suharto that he had been loyal to him for more than twenty years. Even in the last days, when many ruling elite members betrayed Suharto, Habibie still stood behind him. He had done everything he could to defend Suharto, and asked Suharto why he doubted his ability to be the next president. He told Suharto that he was capable of leading Indonesia (Aritonang 1999: 217-228).

Reportedly, after that meeting, Suharto decided to constitutionally resign. Suharto then asked some experts to prepare the text for his resignation so it would be legal. Suharto agreed that Vice-president Habibie would replace him. In the third stage, the dynamic of the ruling elite’s politics, especially Wiranto’s reluctance and Habibie’s determination, greatly influenced the political outcome,
The politics after Suharto were uncertain. A year after Suharto’s resignation, Indonesia was still undergoing the transition to democracy. The answer to why Indonesia turned to democracy, rather than a military rule or Islamic state, is complicated. Two variables determined these political outcomes. The first is the political demands of the massive protest events. The second is the role and the nature of the elite, not only the ruling elite in the incumbent government, but also the elite within the civil society.

The political demands of the protest events were clearly stated. People wanted political reform to lead to democracy, not military rule not an Islamic State. Any new political players who wanted to rule Indonesia had to abide by the demands made in the protest events.

The nature of the elite in 1997-1998 also supported the transition to democracy. The ruling military elite under Wiranto had no interest in conducting a military coup or establishing military rule. Wiranto was strongly committed to the framework of the constitution and made public statements declaring the military’s loyalty to the constitution. Although Wiranto was not the sole power in the military, no strong military factions fought for military rule. Those factions differed only on the degree of military involvement in politics and how fast the military should go out from politics. Even the Suharto loyalists did not push military rule, as they were busy defending themselves in various trial on the courts against them. The nature of the ruling military elite explains why Indonesia did not choose military rule after Suharto’s resignation.

The nature of the elite within society also explains why an Islamic state was not chosen. Based on the number of members, Indonesia
is home to these two of the world’s largest Islamic organizations: Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadyah. But the moderate leaders of both organizations had no interest to building an Islamic state. In some degree, they even disagreed with the concept of an Islamic State. NU is presently under the influence of Abdurrahman Wahid, the current Indonesian president, who is famous for his commitment to democracy and pluralism. Muhammadyah is under Amien Rais’ influence, although Amien’s power in Muhammadyah is not as strong as Wahid’s power in NU, Amien Rais, a prominent figure of political reform against Suharto in 1997-1998, advocates democracy. On many occasions, Amien argued that an Islamic state is not the obligation for Muhammadyah. What was important, according to Amien, is the application of Islamic values, not an Islamic state. Under democracy, he has stated, Islamic values can be applied and Islamic values are in line with the principles of democracy.

In addition to the two largest Islamic organizations, a second layer of Islamic associations exists in Indonesia. The important ones are the Paramadina, an Islamic intellectuals foundation, ICMI (Ikatan Cendikiawan Muslim Indonesia/Indonesian Association of Islamic Intellectuals), KISDI (Komite Islam untuk Solidaritas Dunia Islam/Islamic Committee for Islamic Community), FPI (Front Pembela Islam/Islamic Defenders Front) and others. In this second layer, political leanings vary. Paramadina influences the middle class in major Indonesian cities and is the leading organization for the pluralism of Indonesia. The members of ICMI are politically diverse but their leaders, especially Habibie, the former Indonesian president, support democracy,
The fundamentalist Islamic organizations are KISDI and FPI, and these two organizations often make public statements about their commitment to Islamic interests. The public labels them as the organizations fighting for an Islamic state. However, these fundamentalist organizations lack the power of the pro-democracy Islamic organizations. These fundamentalist organizations attract only a few members and they are not from the middle class. The nature of the elite in the Islamic community explains why Indonesia did not become an Islamic state after the fall of Suharto.

All the above description leads to a clear point. The protest events led by the non-elite actors indeed initiated the fall of Suharto and the transition to democracy. However, the dynamic of the elite, including the poor policies of the incumbent government and the political choices of the ruling elite, also significantly contributed to the final outcome of those protest events.
In the era of economic crisis and in the condition of a divided society, Indonesia’s transition to democracy is complicated by the role of non-elite actors. In terms of democratic principles and values such as civil liberties, civilian supremacy and pluralism, protest events in Indonesia had contradictory aspects. On one hand, protest events contributed significantly to the division of the ruling elite, the fall of authoritarianism and the transition to democracy. The extended and massive protest events transformed the political regime. Political competition, political participation, civil liberties and civilian supremacy were introduced into Indonesia.

On the other hand, the protest events substantially contributed, directly and indirectly, to the rise of cultural, ethnic and religious hatred. Serial riots and bloody conflicts based on religious hatred and sentiment, is in Muslims versus Christians, or ethnic hatred and sentiment, as in the Sino-Indonesian versus Malay, or migrants
versus natives in particular cities, spread from western to eastern Indonesia. These violent events threatened the institutionalization of democracy, as they endangered pluralism and peaceful negotiation.

The table below statistically shows two contradictory aspects of protest events. Protest events carried the issue of political reform but they also gave rise to religious and ethnic hatred. Although the issues of religious and ethnic hatred were minor in comparison to other issues, they had a harmful impact on the society. They caused the decline of social trust and togetherness of people who tried to cross the cultural boundaries. Although these protest events promoted democracy, they also destroyed democracy.

Issues of political reform (e.g., asking Suharto to step down and asking the government to liberalize the political system) were, for the most part, the focus of peaceful protests. Issues of religious and ethnic hatred took the form of violent actions, riots and bloody “civil war.”

This chapter consists of three parts. The first is a general description of the divided Indonesian society, and how society
As many Muslims live in Indonesia as in the entire Middle East/North Africa regions. Indonesia is a large country in terms of its population size, its cultural variety and its territories. Indonesian society is divided into various cultural backgrounds. In terms of religion, Indonesian society includes groups as diverse as Muslims, Protestants, Catholics, Buddhists, Hindus and Confucians.

Indonesia consists of 17,000 islands, which extend over 3,000 miles from east to west, and occupies a strategic location connecting the Arabian Sea and the Indian Ocean to East Asia. The Indonesian population is the fourth largest in the world, about 210 million people.

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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Peaceful</th>
<th>Violent</th>
<th>Total</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Political</td>
<td>930</td>
<td>237</td>
<td>1167(100%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reform</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Cultural</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>53 (78%)</td>
<td>68 (100%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hatred</td>
<td>294(62)</td>
<td>183</td>
<td>477 (100%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td></td>
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Table 6.2: Violence in Two Issues
Comparison in Number and Percentage

As many Muslims live in Indonesia as in the entire Middle East/North Africa regions. Indonesia is a large country in terms of its population size, its cultural variety and its territories.

Indonesian society is divided into various cultural backgrounds. In terms of religion, Indonesian society includes groups as diverse as Muslims, Protestants, Catholics, Buddhists, Hindus and Confucians.
However, Muslims constitute 85% of the Indonesian population, while Christians, i.e., Protestants and Catholics, only constitute 8-10%. Although a minority, Christians are disproportionately represented in upper educational, economic, and social groups. Many of them are part of the middle class in major cities, and they control influential newspapers and businesses.

Muslims and Christians have a long history of conflict. Before the rise of protest events in 1997-1998, there were several occasions of horizontal conflict between the two. A number of churches in Java were burned. In the 1980s, when Suharto was at his peak, Islamic politics was repressed. Muslims accused the Christian politicians of causing the repression. Even before the accusation, tension existed between Christian politicians and Muslims, as Muslims believed Christians were over represented in public offices.

In terms of race and descent, Indonesians have varied backgrounds. However, 70-90% of them are of Malay racial stock, while a few descend from Arabs, Indians, Africans and Sino-Indonesians. The Sino-Indonesians, who are only 3-4% of the total population, dominate 70-85% of the private Indonesian economy. As many as 85% of the 20 wealthiest businessmen in Indonesia are Sino-Indonesians.

The conflicts between Malay Indonesians and Sino-Indonesians are deeply rooted in Indonesian history. In the era of colonialism, riots against the Sino-Indonesians occurred several times. The Sino-Indonesian community has continued to be the target of public anger even in the modern era after the 1960s. In 1974, for example, many Sino-Indonesian shopping centers were burned as the extension of events protesting the government.
People of many different ethnicities, as well as races, populate Indonesia, the majority of whom (55%), however, are Javanese and Sudanese. However, outside of Java Island, various minor ethnicities are spread out in many islands, such as Papuans in Irian Jaya, Acehnese in North Sumatra, Dayak in Kalimantan, Madurese on the island of Madura, Ambonese in Maluku, and Buginese in South Sulawesi. In a nation as large as Indonesia, immigration from one area to another is inevitable. A part of the government’s immigration project is to reduce population in Java, by sending people to other islands. Another factor in migration is that people spontaneously move to search for a better living standard.

Many Javanese, Madurese and Buginese live on other islands as immigrants or newcomers. Sometimes they concentrate in certain locations, and end up isolated from the local people. As the newcomers’ economic status and standard of living grew higher than those of local people, the problem intensified. If the newcomers and the local people (indigenous people) differed in terms of their religions, they were more likely to clash.

The divided Indonesian society was vulnerable to the rise of societal conflicts. During the era of the New Order, Suharto introduced the “magic word” SARA. This term stands for Suku, Agama, Ras, dan Antar Golongan (Ethnic, Religious, Racial and Inter-descendent groups). Suharto forbade the public to discuss the problem of SARA since this issue easily ignites societal conflict. The repressive control of the authoritarian government managed the latent conflicts among and between cultural communities. In the era of economic crisis, many things changed. The rise of protest events, the division of the elite, the end of the authoritarian rule, and the transition to democracy all forced the central power and
authority to loose its repressive control toward various cultural
groups. The protest events and the division of the elite have
spawned cultural hatred and conflict both directly and indirectly.

Directly, the masses purposely took the issues of cultural hatred
to their protest events, burning churches or mosques, or even killing people. Some of the divided ruling elite were accused of masterminding various riots. Suharto loyalists, who were ousted from power by the political reform, angry at the trials against them and who had lost their regime, were accused of wanting to destabilize the new leadership. These elite members used the protest events and riots as political resources.

Indirectly, protest events decreased the national and local government’s authority to use repressive control to manage the potent cultural conflicts. With the loss of such control, the hidden hatred between some Muslims and Christians, Sino-Indonesians and indigenous Indonesians, and immigrants and indigenous people, surfaced. Resulting battles led cultural groups into a bloody civil war.

6.2 The cases

The following section highlights some important protest events focusing on cultural hatred issues. I chose these three cases of cultural hatred: 1) ethnic conflict/rage; 2) religious conflict/rage; and 3) conflict between groups of immigrants and local or indigenous people.

14. Thanks to Tohir Effendi. As my assistant, he helped me collect the secondary data and report his work on the cases of horizontal conflicts.
6.2.1. Ethnic Conflict/Rage

Case: The Riots of May in Jakarta and Solo against Sino-Indonesians At about 10:00 a.m. on 13 May 1998, a mass riot erupted at Pasar Rumput, Manggarai, Jakarta. Approximately 500 people looted and destroyed the Pasar Raya Manggarai supermarket. In the afternoon the concentrated mass around Grogol moved to K.H. Hasyim Asyhari Street, Roxy Complex, Kyai Mas Mansur Street, Bendungan Hilir Street, while others moved to Daan Mogot Street and the housing complexes of Pluit and Pantai Indah Kapuk. Along the street the mobs damaged, burned, and looted marketplaces and automobile showrooms, especially those belonging to Sino-Indonesians (Suara Karya and Bisnis Indonesia, 14 May 1998).

Mobs looted, burned and destroyed the luxurious housing of Pantai Indah Kapuk, which is mostly inhabited by Sino-Indonesians. One of the victims was the eldest daughter, Yasmin, of Christianto Wibisono, a famous Sino-Indonesian intellectual. Even now, she has not returned, choosing to seek refuge in the United States. A rumor suggested she was traumatized because of sexual assault during the riot.

Late in the afternoon, race-related riots occurred in the suburban areas of Jembatan Angke, Jembatan Dua, Jembatan Lima, and around Jembatan Besi in West Jakarta. At the same time, chaos began to erupt in the area of Rawa Buaya, the border of West and North Jakarta. It was here that the Volunteer Team for Humanity found rape victims. In Glodok, an area densely populated by Sino-Indonesians, the riots began at 7 p.m., with the burning of Perniagaan Market and Glodok Bridge,
The following day, 14 May 1998, unrest began to erupt at the Pusat Perkulakan Goro, and then moved to Robinson supermarket and Tetap Segar shopping centre. All the three buildings were burned, as well as the shopping centre in Pasar Minggu Centre complex and Bank Central of Asia, owned by the Sino-Indonesian conglomerate Bank Mashill and state owned Bank Rakyat Indonesia.

At Ciputat Market, rioters began to loot and destroy, sometimes by setting fire to the shopping areas. Central Jakarta witnessed riots in: Cempaka Putih, Salemba, Cideng Barat, Gunung Sahari, and along Hayam Wuruk Street. Among the targets of rioting mob were: Malioboro Discotheque, Wisma Niaga, Radisson Hotel, and Wisma Hayam Wuruk. In Angkasa Street, Central Jakarta, rioters set fire to the house of Liem SioeLiong, a Sino-Indonesian conglomerate boss and crony of Suharto, reputed to be Indonesia’s richest businessman (Bisnis Indonesia, 15 May 1998).

The second day of riots spread to the outskirts of Jakarta such as in Depok, Bekasi, and Tangerang. The area of Bekasi suffered the most devastation, with the looting of new houses as well as shopping centers. Meanwhile, in Depok, the masses looted and burned two supermarkets, Ramanda and Super Ekonomi Matahari Group, as well as vandalizing a shopping centre along A. Rahman Hakiem Street Depok I and Proklamasi Depok II,

In Solo, the tragedy took place a few days earlier, from May 14 to 16, 1998. The rioting mobs in this area, according to the report of some mass media, were first seen in the area of Simpang Tiga, Colomadu and Kartosuro (Suara Merdeka, Surabaya Post and Kedaulatan Rakyat, 17 May 1998). The moving mass from Kartosuro destroyed, looted, and burned shops, banks, shops cum
houses, and dealers of motor vehicles located along Slamet Riyadi Street, Urip Sumohardjo Street and the surrounding areas. At about 3 p.m. on May 14, protesters set fire to Luwes supermarket.

In the elite area, Solo Baru, the riot spread. The mob almost ruined the entire area through looting, destroying and burning existing shops, banks, and cinemas. The house of Harmoko, the speaker of the Parliament and the Assembly, located in Rambutan Street, Solo Baru, was also burned down. The following day, 15 May 1998, a big fire swept through Beteng Gladag. Besides Beteng Plaza, the wholesale centre of Matahari and Lippo Bank, the mass also burned and looted the settlements and businesses belonging to the Sino-Indonesians in the area.

The riots of May 1998 in Jakarta and Solo not only damaged physical property, material goods, buildings, and vehicles, but also caused great personal suffering to the victims. These horrific riots left the questions: What really happened? Was this all due to spontaneous acts of the mobs? Were there organized groups behind those riots?

TGPF (Team Gabungan Pencari Fakta/Joint Fact-Finding Team), a voluntary association for investigating the cause of riots, and policemen succeeded in identifying some of the rioters. However, the identified rioters were actors directly involved in the riot, and were discovered either based on the team’s witness of events or information provided by other witnesses. But who were the masterminds? How could riots escalate on such a massive scale almost simultaneously in several places, exhibiting the same patterns? Authorities have not yet answered these questions.

In their final report on 3 November 1998, the feet-finding team only recommended that the government investigate the meeting
in the Commando Headquarters of the Army Strategic Command on May 14, 1998. However, almost all present in the meeting, the intellectuals and political activists, denied that it was in the meeting that the riots were engineered. According to them, the fact-finding team should find out what really happened by confirming directly to Lt. Gen. Subianto Prabowo in his capacity as a Commander of the Army Strategic Command (Tajuk, Tempo, DR, 8 November 1998).

The then Minister of Defense and Security/Commander of the Armed Forces Gen. Wiranto also denied that the meeting of May 14, 1998 was a preparation for conspiracy or crime. He said: “Before the fact-finding team gave their input on such a meeting, there has only been an investigation and no serious findings. Those who came to the meeting only wanted to find information...” (Suara Karya, 5 November 1998).

Many people suspected, and even believed, that a military faction allowed the riots to escalate for certain political purposes. The people specifically suspected that Lt. Gen. Prabowo Subianto “agreed on” or at least knew the operation plan of such riots, just as they believed he played a role in the kidnapping of student activists and the sniper shootings of the Trisakti students. The fact-finding team possessed the testimony of many people who saw, at the riots, several provocateurs seemingly well trained in riot initiation. When masses in a certain area became significantly agitated and chaotic, they moved on to do the same thing elsewhere. Some witnesses believed certain political interests organized those provocateurs,

The riots of May 1998 had a serious impact on Indonesia. News of the riots spread throughout the world, especially the sexual assault and rape of the Sino-Indonesian people. In major international
cities like Melbourne, Australia and San Francisco, United States, Sino-Indonesian immigrants held mass demonstrations outside the Indonesian Embassy or Consulate General of the Republic of Indonesia.

The international Sino-Indonesian community’s public anger toward Indonesia, particularly in Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore, aggravated the situation. Many traveling Indonesians were rejected by hotels. In Taiwan demonstrators beat the local staff of the Indonesian Embassy. No survey measured the exact losses of the riots. However, material loss was estimated to be two trillion rupiah (US$ 3 billion, 1 US$ = 7000 rupiah). In comparison, the total budget of the municipality of Surakarta 1997/1998 was only seventy three billion rupiah, while the locally derived portion of budget was 16.4 billion rupiah. Forty thousand people were reportedly left unemployed because rioters burned their businesses.

6.2.2 Religious Conflict/Rage
6.2.2.1 Case: Ketapang in Jakarta

According to the daily Repubiika and Suara Karya (November 24, 1998), a simple event spurred the bloody religious conflicts in Ketapang, Jakarta. On Saturday, 21 November 1998, at about 10 p.m., a young man named Irfan quarreled with an Ambonese hoodlum who often hung around and guarded an amusement center, where people play basketball. The building was the place of gambling. They fought in the parking lot of the building, and then the Ambonese hoodlum stabbed Irfan with a clurit (Madurese knife). Irfan’s father, Zainuddin, a member of the local civil defense, who tried to save his son, was beaten and slashed on his shoulder by several young Ambonese.
At about 2 a.m., a group of Ambonese hoodlums came to a residence in Pembangunan Street. Other hoodlums with knives followed suit, knocking on other people’s doors, and slashing one man (Republika, 22 November 1998). They stopped after a warning shot from a security force. However, hours later, the group of Ambonese returned and attacked, breaking some glass windows in the small mosque of Amirul Biqro in the area (Suara Karya, 24 November 1998). The people patrolling ran away frightened.

These events only began the story. People exaggerated the incident: “the mosque had been burned by non-Muslim, Ambonese hoodlums!”

This news fueled Islamic sentiment against the Ambonese and the people in those areas became outraged and uncontrollable. The following morning, Sunday, 22 November 1998, thousands of people gathered. The news broadcast on a private TV network showed the mass carrying knives and pointed bamboos and posters condemning the destruction of a religious place. Yells of jihad (holy war) shouted by those claiming to be the Islamic Defenders Front (FPI) heated the atmosphere.

Late in the afternoon, they besieged the amusement center, beating and burning anyone exiting the building. From that building, the mass moved on, burning Christian and Catholic churches located in Ketapang Street and Petojo Church of Christ, a Pentecostal Church, the Batak Protestant Church. Then some of the people moved to Grogol, others to Samanhudi Street, Taman Sari, Bandengan, Kemakmuran; while others went to Pasar Baru with the intention of destroying and burning the Catholic cathedral. The masses crowded around to burn the Convent of Ursula, classrooms,
and the counseling room located near the church as an act in the “civil war of Muslims against Christians.”

The police then arrested 185 Ambonese hoodlums who used to guard amusement places. They had to be protected because they were physically easy to identify and mobs threatened them. As many as 65 were still being investigated while the rest were released.

The riots took the lives of fifteen people, eight of them found in burned buildings. Mobs burned and destroyed fifteen churches. According to the report of the fifteen church administrators to the Jakarta local government (Suara Pembaruan, November 1998), the loss of the five churches was estimated to be nine billion rupiah. Furthermore, twelve houses belonging to non-Muslims were burned; three shops belonging to Sino-Indonesian families were destroyed and looted, as well a bank, seven ATMs; fourteen cars, one truck, and four pinball machines were burned; two hotels, two discotheques, and one restaurant were destroyed.

The emergence of the Ketapang riots raises a suspicion. Who mobilized hundreds of Ambonese hoodlums (according to Republika, 24 November 1998, they totaled to 400 people) to attack the residence in Ketapang? Who exaggerated the reports that a mosque was burnt and destroyed? How could this news spread so quickly and mobilize thousands of people? According to the results of an investigation by Kontras, a non-governmental organization investigating political victims, most of the masses involved in the riots of Ketapang were from another city, Banten. They had been in Jakarta for several days, brought there by Banten fighters who had relationships with strategic key elites in Jakarta. Some of them were supposedly acting as informal policemen.
In a seminar in Jakarta, both Islamic and Catholic experts suspected the presence of provocateurs in the Ketapang riots. Those provocateurs mobilized and manipulated religious symbols to agitate the masses (Bisnis Indonesia and Suara Karya, 27 September 1998).

The Ketapang riots not only damaged Indonesia’s image in the international world, they also strengthened sentiments among religious believers. On December 30, 1998, after the church burning in Ketapang, the mobs took revenge by burning 10 mosques and one mushoila (small mosque) in the area. A few days later, on the day of IdulFitri, as Islamic great day, the riot in Ambon erupted, causing the worst civil war between Muslims and Christians in Indonesia’s history.

6.2.2.2 The Case of Ambon

The conflict in Ambon (South Maluku), according to various mass media, was also initiated by a trivial incident; the physical attack of a Christian public transportation driver on 19 January 1999 in Batumerah Mardika Market. The area is predominantly populated by Muslim newcomers from Bugis, Buton, and Makassar. In East Indonesia these three groups are often called “BBM”.

The news of the incident on the great day in Islamic tradition, Idul Fitri 1419, quickly spread: “Muslims attack Christians!!!” Therefore, in a relatively short time, conflicts based on religious sentiments occurred in these places in Ambon: Waiheru, Native Besar, Dusun Kemiri, Benteng Karang, Telaga Kodok (January 20, 1999); Hila, Saumuluki, Seram Barat, Sanana (January 21, 1999); the municipality of Ambon, Mangga Dua, Airmata Cina (January 23, 1999); Kaleng Asaude, Tomalehu Timur (January 25, 1999); and various other locations.
The quick escalation of the incident, according to sociofogist Tamrin Tamagola, was the result of the domino effect of the Ketapang (Central Jakarta) events. Two factors triggered the social conflict in Ambon: (1) the replacement of several Christian officials by Muslim ones, including the key post of regional secretary, and (2) the social jealousy in the circles of Ambonese Christians as the result of Bugis, Buton, and Makassar newcomers. The newcomers prospered economically, and were more successful in running businesses in Ambon than the local people.

However, many experts believe a military faction engineered the incident in Ambon. Laode Ida, who investigated military involvement in the social conflict in Sambas (West Kalimantan) and Ambon, theorized that: “what happens now in Ambon is an inseparable part of the change and reduction of the military functions in the Indonesian politics. Religious issues were only objects being mobilized” (Kompas, 10 January 2000).

In addition to the conflicts impact in Ambon, a competition within the local political elite exacerbated the social conflict in North Maluku. The Ternate elite and people, under the leadership of Sultan Mudaffar, wanted Ternate to be the capital city of the province. On the other hand, Djafar Dano Junus, Sultan of Tidore, intended Dan Sofifi (Central Halmahera) to be the capital city of the province of North Maluku.

On 24 October 1999, competition among the elite began to mobilize the masses in their conflict. In the first conflict, the Kao people, supported by the Sultan of Ternate, attacked and destroyed 16 villages in Malifut. The Malifut, armed with the support of the people and the traditional council of Tidore, took revenge
nine days later. This conflict created 10,000 refugees (Kompas, 15 January 2000).

A leader of Tidore brought Muslim refugees to Ternate. In Ternate, they attacked the non-Muslim community in November 1999. On December 26, 1999, the Christians counterattacked. The sultan and the traditional troops of Ternate supported the Christians. The attack, one day after Christmas, shocked the Muslim community. They thought that masses had gathered only to celebrate Christmas. The Muslims were not ready for the Christians’ sudden attack. Many Muslims were killed. This tragedy incited Muslims throughout Indonesia to hold a great sermon, an act of concern and solidarity for the Muslim Ambonese.

From the conflict in North Maluku, it could be seen that the local Christian groups, as well as indigenous people from South Maluku had close relations with the sultan of Ternate. On the other hand, local Muslim groups, and the Muslim newcomers from Bugis, Buton and Makasar obtained support from the sultan of Tidore, and the high officials of the local government of North Maluku.

In Ambon, the pattern of social groupings in this conflict identified themselves through two colors, “Red” (the Christians, known as the Sunday Group) and “White” (the Islam or the Friday Group). The Red group was based in Kudamatri, Batui and Kampung Genemo, where the indigenous Ambonese dominated. The White group, consisting of the Muslim Ambonese and the Muslim newcomers, was based in Batumerah (Mardika), Halong, Liang and Waiheru. According to Kontras, the Red group possessed
a well-structured chain of commands, much like military territorial commandos, and worked through a systematic division of labor. The top chain of the Red group may have been connected to other security forces, either civilian or the military in Maluku.

North Maluku Governor Surasmin reported to Vice-President Megawati, who visited North Maluku on 26 January 2000, on the social cost of the above “civil war” up to 9 January 2000. In terms of human toll, 1,655 people were killed; 1,219 were badly injured and 2,315 were reported missing. Material losses totaled to: 6,497 destroyed/burned houses; 46 destroyed/burned churches; 51 destroyed/burned mosques; 66 burned shops; one burned community health centre, and 15 burned vehicles (Kompas, 27 January 2000). The South Maluku Governor, Saleh Latuconsina, said property loss resulting from Ambon’s social conflict was estimated at 1.5 trillion rupiah (about US$ 2 billion, 1US$ = 7000 rupiah).

On 29 January 1999, the government created the so-called “reconciliation team” with six people: two representatives from each religion plus an expert. The team’s job was to help the government, security apparatus and religious leaders to accelerate peace and conflict resolution (Suara Pembaharuan, January 29, 1999).

The accomplishments of the team (Antara, February 5 - July 1999) include: establishment of an institution named “Centre for Social Recovery”; holding nine rallies and dialogues in mosques and churches (February 17-26, 1999); opening discussion and analysis of the main issue of the riots; recommending the formation of 173 security posts in areas with great potential for violence; conducting six town meetings in 47 villages; holding semi-workshops and conducting a Torch of Peace (May 7-12, 1999) activity, an Inter-
faith Dialogue (July 19-20) and the Workshop of Pela Gandong, the Ambonese tradition to resolving conflicts.

However, the team’s program failed. On 20 February 1999, the cabinet meeting of politics and security decided to form a new team. Nineteen senior officers from Ambon made up the team, which was led by Maj. Gen. Suadi Marasabessy (at the time he was the territorial military commander of Sulawesi). The job of this team was to find a solution to the conflict. The team then recommended the formation of military district commands (Kompas, 21 February 1999).

The security approach of this new team also failed. The establishment of new military command did not end conflict, and the conflict actually escalated throughout Indonesia. In October and November 1999, the Armed Forces and police headquarters sent more soldiers to protect the most volatile locations (Media Indonesia, 10 November 1999),

But that increased security did not stop the massacre of thousands of Muslims in Tobelo, North Maluku. The armed forces commander, a navy admiral, took extensive preventive action; war ships besieged the islands of Maluku, not allowing incoming Muslims and weapons to enter Maluku for the “holy war.”

Tamagoia, as the coordinator of LERAI, an organization investigating the social conflicts in Maluku, said that he strongly suspected the involvement of security forces in the conflict. Tamagoia asserted that a military faction at least allowed the conflict to happen, hoping such strife would reflect negatively on the leadership of President Abdurahman Wahid and Vice-President Megawati Soekarnoputri in the process towards Indonesian democratization (Republika, January 8, 2000).
6.2.2.3 The Case of Mataram

The Ambon tragedy affected other provinces such as Mataram. Riots began on Monday afternoon of January 17, 2000 and lasted for three consecutive days. The outbreak of the riot began soon after the prayers, when approximately 7000 people were leaving the location of the great sermon with the theme “the solidarity of the Ambonese Muslim Community.” Participants in these protest events threw stones at the Immanuel Protestant Church of West Indonesia, the Catholic Church of Maria Immacuiata and Christian schools (Kompas, Media Indonesia, 18 January 2000).

Late in the afternoon, the rioters destroyed houses of Christians and shops belonging to the Sino-Indonesians in the municipality of Mataram. Among the religious buildings destroyed were: the church of Bethlehem, the church of Sion, and the church of Pentecost in Tanji Tilaar Negara Street (Suara Pembaruan, 18 January 2000). On Tuesday, January 2000, burning spread to Ampenan, followed with looting of shops and people’s houses belonging to non-Muslims (Media Indonesia, January 2000).

According to the information service of the Mataram district police, 1,300 refugees had been In the local headquarters of the district police until Tuesday afternoon. Most of them asked security to guide them to the seaport toward Bali and Java. One hundred twenty-seven refugees waited in the Mataram Navy Headquarters (Kompas, 19 January 2000).

By the last day of the riot, Wednesday January 19, according to police records, twelve churches had been destroyed and the total loss was estimated at 6.5 billion rupiah. Police arrested as many as 264 people (Kompas, 22 January 2000),
On 22 January 2000, the Police identified eighteen suspects to the Mataram riots. Seven of the suspects were believed to be the riot leaders who mobilized the mob, and included four local provocateurs, one of whom was a dean in the faculty of law of the University of Mataram, who, according to the latest news was officially imprisoned. The other three were leaders from Jakarta.

6.3.3.3 Conflict Between Immigrants and the Indigenous: The Case of Sambas

In the second week of March 1999, two hundred people from the immigrant Madurese community attacked the local people, the indigenous Malays of West Kalimantan, in the village of Parit Setia. Four people reportedly died. In return, according to Kompas (March 22, 1999), the Dayaks swept through the Madurese population in the villages of Rambaian, Sempadian, Sagarau, and Paritbaru in the sub-districts of Tebas and Sawai. After killing Madurese, the Dayaks paraded around the city carrying the heads of the three Madurese they killed. The local Indigenous Malays supported the Dayak’s actions. The incident, once broadcast widely by an international television network, shocked the international community.

The Dayaks used motor boats to cross the Sambas River, armed with knives and guns, to the settlements of the Madurese newcomers. They burned thousands of people and caused hundreds of deaths in this attack. The municipality of Sambas then had no business activity except in several places where people bought knives and headbands. Shops closed and people stayed inside. Only a few public and private vehicles passed in the streets.
Early in the morning of 29 March 1999, after the conflict in Sambas began to subside, the situation in Sambas haunted the local people of Pontianak. It was rumored that the Madurese immigrants would counterattack. Thousands of people evacuated by pilot ships in the Natuna Sea headed toward Pontianak. The local naval commander offered two warships and a Nomad patrol plane to help the refugees. The refugees arriving in Pontianak were evacuated to seven locations, including the Pangsuma stadium and the Hajj Dormitory.

Kompas (March 23, 1999) recorded the total number of victims and material losses in the Sambas’ riots as: 165 killed; 38 wounded, and 9 slightly injured; 2,142 houses burned, 153 houses destroyed; 1,500 shops burned/destroyed; 10 cars burned; 27 cars destroyed; and 5 motorcycles burned and 23 others destroyed. The riots left 15,206 people as refugees. Of those refugees, 7,625 evacuated to Pontianak. The evacuation had to be stopped because Pontianak had no more room to accommodate them.

One day after the riot, the united forces of the Army and the Police conducted an operation of weapons and guns. To help the security in Sambas, two units with the capacity of 100 soldiers each from the local 612/Modang Air Force infantry battalion and the mobile brigade from the district police of East Kalimantan, were sent from Balikpapan to Pontianak.

In Jakarta, the (then) Minister of Defense and Security/Commander of the Armed Forces Wiranto ordered one battalion of mobile brigade (800 personnel) and other forces to Sambas. The Governor of East Java, Imam Utomo, asked the Madurese in East Java not to join in counterattack but to let the security forces and the local government handle the conflict.
The local chair of a Madurese family association, Ali Badri, together with the national chairman from Jakarta, flew to Sambas to find ways to hold a meeting between the two ethnicities. On 25 March 1999, Commander Wiranto visited Sambas. Accompanied by the local commander, Wiranto opened a dialogue with the leading figures of Malay, Dayak and Madurese community. In the said meeting, the Dayak Adrianto Aleo stated that this problem can only be solved by the Madurese people leaving Sambas. The Dayak, Malay, and Sino-Indonesian cannot live with the Madurese due to their different cultural backgrounds.

NB Under the new administration of a democratic government, national and local government lost their control to manage societal conflicts. Trust to security apparatus (police and military) was very low due to the repressive actions of their past. The security apparatus seemed not only technically unable to handle the societal conflict, but also lacked the morale to do so, as they were the target of much criticism. The immobility of government gave the latent and hidden conflict among social groups in the society the opportunity to surface.

6.3 Two Faces of Protest Events

The divided society in the era of democratic transition, especially in the condition of economic crisis, faced two kinds of conflicts. First was the vertical conflict, which referred to society’s political demand on the incumbent government. The society needed new rules of the game, and asked the incumbent government to introduce civil liberty, political competition, political participation and civilian supremacy.

However, because of society’s division, a second type of conflict, horizontal conflict, existed. The conflicts referred to the dispute
within various societal organizations based on cultural lines (e.g. ethnicity, religion, and race). On many occasions, horizontal conflicts are deeper and more brutal than vertical conflicts. While in a vertical conflict, the dominant issues are political reform, in a horizontal conflict, the dominant issue is usually cultural hatred. Vertical conflicts are usually positive for democracy, but horizontal conflicts are negative for democracy.

In the experience of a divided society, as Indonesia was in the late 1990s, protest events acted both as supporters and opponents of democracy. While the supporters of democracy in vertical conflicts mobilized protest events to express their political aspirations and pressure, the opponents of democracy in horizontal conflicts mobilized protest events to spread religious and ethnic hatred.

The protest events reflected two kinds of civil society in Indonesia in the late 1990s. Dominated by students and westernized intellectuals, various associations actively supported liberty and pluralism. The members of these associations varied in their religious and ethnic backgrounds, and their commitments to pluralism led them to support the concept of a nation for all, regardless of religions and ethnicities. However, sectarian associations that fought against the concept of equality of rights and opportunity for all also existed. These groups were involved in various bloody conflicts, initiating protest events that asked privilege for a certain religious or ethnic groups,

Indonesia still has a long journey before democracy is solidified. The country is still transitioning from authoritarian rule. Some principles of democracy, such as civil liberty, political participation and political competition have been introduced. However, not all strong and strategic civil associations rely on democracy as the
way to compete for public office or political ideas. In Indonesia’s current condition, protest events are powerful political resources. Any group can mobilize these political resources. The supporters of democracy will use them to install democracy. The bigots and opponents of liberal democracy will use them to destroy democratic values.

In a society divided as Indonesia, in an era of economic crisis and non-liberal culture, mass mobilization is risky. In the divided society, people can easily unite on a religious or ethnic basis, further dividing the political community. Cultural symbols and sentiment can easily manipulate the masses. These cultural sentiments can be mobilized for much significant political impact, either in supporting or opposing democracy.
Historians can turn to protest events in Indonesia in 1997-1998 as a prime example of widespread and long-term protest. The sheer number of protests and the number of people involved turned the period into an extended protest event, one that eventually succeeded in overthrowing one of Asia’s strongest and enduring leaders. More than 10 million people participated in an estimated 1,702 protest events between 1997 and 1998, And although these protest events helped turn Indonesia into the third largest democratic country in the world, they also generated religious and ethnic unrest and violence.

Three major lessons can be drawn from the events leading up to, and following Indonesia’s transformation into, a democratic nation. These lessons serve to correct the elite theory in the literature of transition, demand a more comprehensive explanation of protest events, and highlight two contradictory aspects of protest events in the divided society.
7.1. Correct the elite theory in the literature of transition

The shift from authoritarian to democratic rule in Indonesia is a case that defies the conventional theory of transition supported by Guillermo O’Donnell and his supporters. According to O’Donnell and Philippe Schmitter (1986), this kind of transition usually begins with political struggle by hardliners and soft-liners within the incumbent and opposition parties fighting to bring down authoritarian rulers. According to this claim, the push toward democracy starts with the politics of the elite.

However, O’Donnell bases his argument on cases in Latin America and Southern Europe. The events in Indonesia, which began among ordinary citizens and not the political elite, don’t support the elite theory of transition. The Indonesian political elite only responded to the push for democracy after the masses had mobilized their own efforts.

The main difference between the case of Indonesia and those discussed by O’Donnell and Schmitter is in the type of regime involved (Bratton and DeWalle 94). Depending on the type of regime in power before transition, political change will have different outcomes, since the regime type will influence how the masses and different government factions will interact with each other during the transition, and determine the level of political opportunity and constraint.

Although Indonesia and other countries in Southern Europe and Latin America all had authoritarian rulers, Bratton and DeWalle (1994) have established that authoritarian rule can be broken down into these two classifications: corporatist (bureaucratic) and neo-patrimonial regimes.
Under corporatist authoritarian rule, leaders use corporatist bureaucratic networks to control the nation. This brand of authoritarian control is common in Southern Europe and Latin America. However, neo-patrimonial regimes like the one in Indonesia take a different approach, using personal patronage to gain and hold power. This form of authoritarian rule tends to meld personal and public sphere.

The two types of authoritarian rule also have different hierarchy systems. The corporatist regime includes several elite factions within a second layer of power, which often leads to the establishment of hard and soft-line groups and opposition within the elite.

In the case of patrimonial government, unrest and change rarely start with opposition among the elite. Personal patronage practiced under this regime tends to unite the elite and keeps the structure of the patrimonial government more unified. Thus, the O’Donnell theory of transition does not apply to cases like Indonesia, where a patrimonial government was in power before the shift to democracy.

Instead of power struggles among the elite, social protest usually triggers transition in patrimonial regimes. The protests generally follow a period of economic crisis and community dissatisfaction with a decreased standard of living. Regular citizens aren’t the only ones to engage in acts of protest at these times. Although citizens usually start mass acts of protest, other groups gradually join in. These groups include government opposition and other government-related personnel who join forces with protestors in the streets or outside major government buildings to demonstrate their dissatisfaction.
As the protests grow to involve more groups and more political elements, they become too big for the authoritarian government to overcome. As a country’s economic crisis grows worse, there is less money to keep the patronage system going. Without the money to buy political loyalty, the patrimonial regime cannot maintain political stability through patronage networking and material rewards any longer. The situation only gets worse when the local government loses control of the military or the police.

In situations like these, O’Donnell’s theory clearly does not apply. Political transition here stems from mass politics, rather than the political elite, Indonesia’s experience also differs from O’Donnell’s claim that transition always includes a power struggle within the ruling regime’s elite political circle. Transition occurred in Indonesia outside the elite circle, and in the hands of the opposition and the non-elite.

That is not to say that there is no room for elite factionalism, as O’Donnell asserts. In the case of Indonesia, factions outside the ruling government emerge as a “contra-elite.” This contra-elite rises out of a mass movement and not out of hard and soft-line struggle within the ruling government

O’Donnell also argues that the transition includes the formation of political pacts. These pacts arise when no one party involved in the transition is dominant, and the various elite groups create pacts in order to determine rules. In contrast, neo-patrimonial regimes tend to follow a “winner takes all” approach. In these regimes, the level of political polarization during the transition doesn’t a low for negotiations (Bratton and DeWalle, 94).
Neo-patrimonial regimes also differ from corporatist regimes in terms of representation. The elite can represent a wide group of constituents, and there is often more room for compromise among the different political constituents in a corporatist regime. But elite groups aren’t positioned to network and negotiate in neo-patrimonial regimes, and tend to represent a few small groups rather than varied constituents. Ultimately, there is little room for widespread negotiation or consensus.

But as Chapter 5 describes, the elite do play a role in transition, and in the ultimate protest results. This was seen in Indonesia, where the elite did not trigger the start of transition from authoritarian rule, but their later involvement helped shape and determine the final outcome of the political struggle.

7.2 Demand a more comprehensive explanation of protest events

The Indonesian protests in 1997 and 1998 do not fit easily into a single theory, such as the deprivation theory, the resource mobilization theory and the political opportunity structure. However, a combination of the three theories can apply to the complex Indonesian situation.

This combined framework takes these several elements into account: (1) the state of crisis in Indonesia, which led to the protests; (2) the role of political entrepreneurs in spreading the protest movement; (3) division within the elite power base, which destabilized Suharto’s rule; and (4) Suharto’s own errors. Each of these elements was equally important in shifting the balance of power in Indonesia, and each is interdependent on the other.
Indonesia’s economic crisis of 1997-1998 was a crucial factor in the emergence of a widespread social movement and the downfall of Suharto. Such a crisis often provides the foundation of major change in repressed societies, and prompts formerly powerless people into action. Indonesia’s decline from an “Asian miracle” into an “Asian meltdown” set up two crucial situations. First, it created a sense of widespread dissatisfaction among the people. Second, it prompted people to question the authority of the authoritarian rule, which had taken the responsibility over the earlier economic growth in the country. Once the economic situation began to slide downward, so did Suharto’s image, which quickly changed from “father of development” to “father of economic bankruptcy.”

The effects of the economic crisis tend to follow the deprivation theory, which argues that protest events follow the social breakdown that often comes with economic trouble, or other disasters. Although scholars who back this theoretical tradition acknowledge that protest events are a means for citizens to express their discontent, they also describe these events as rare and reactive (McAdam and Snow, 1997).

Various studies identify economic hardship as a central factor in social movements and revolution. While some include economic deprivation as one of many variables, others isolate it in case study analyses of the emergence and growth of social movements (Piven and Cloward, 1977).

However, economic deprivation isn’t the only factor behind protest events. While deprivation often spurs initial protest, other factors, such as student activity, mass media and word-of-mouth all play a role in spreading the protest movement. While economic crisis offers the conditions to generate protest, it takes action in the
form of networking, leadership and mobilization to realize protest goals - opportunity then gives way to action.

According to the resource mobilization theory, action plays an equally important role in protest events as community discontent. McCarthy and Zald (1977) identify a new breed of movement agents, known as the new social movement organizations (the new SMOs). Unlike older social movements aimed at representing the underprivileged, the new SMOs operate on a more organized and professional level, paying their primary staff members or leaders.

The new SMO method of mobilizing various student, labor, mass media and funding resources became the primary form of social movement in the 1960s and 1970s, McCarthy and Zald maintain. But while they argue that the new SMOs have played a vital role in mobilizing protest movements, it is important to point out that protest events in the U.S. civil rights movement between 1953 and 1980 weren’t the work of the new SMOs, but of the old SMOs: the students and church-based groups (Jenkins and Eickert, 1986). It is necessary to recognize McCarthy and Zald’s arguments, and the role of the new SMOs, but it is also necessary to recognize that a movement’s agents aren’t always professional organizations. The courageous individuals can play the role as effective political entrepreneurs mobilizing the protest events as well.

However, political entrepreneurs cannot succeed on their own. They must use all available resources to bolster their actions. In Indonesia, agents turned to students and mass media to help their cause. However, even with other resources at hand, the movement agents and political entrepreneurs need one more intangible resource: since government power in an authoritarian regime is controlled by an elite group, the social movement must work at
shifting support of the elite away from authoritarian rule and toward the opposition.

The political opportunity structure theory supports this notion, as does Jenkins’ theory of public support. If the deprivation theory examines widespread discontent and the resource mobilization theory focuses on the resources being mobilized and the political entrepreneurs, the political opportunity structure theory studies the role of incentives for protest in the political environment (Tarrow, 1998 p.77).

The political opportunity structure theory comes in several forms, which depend on the elite divisions, institutional structure, power structure, level of repression and degree of polity openness. McAdam (1996) examines the various forms of the theory against other studies by Tarrow, Brockett, Kriesi and Rucht. A variant of the theory - in its many forms - figures strongly in research by Jenkins and Perrow (1977). They argue that shifts in the political environment played a larger role in the success of the farm worker’s insurgent movement than the movement’s social base or its internal structure and characteristics. According to Jenkins and Tarrow, the political environment provides external support, and includes elite support and that of other liberal organizations.

Other literature on democratic transition examines the elite support factor closely. O’Donnell and Schmitter (1991, p.19) maintain that “there is no transition whose beginning is not the consequence - direct or indirect - of important divisions within the authoritarian regime itself, principally along the fluctuating cleavage between the hard-liners and soft-liners.” Those who believe in the authoritarian rule are classified as hardliners, while soft-liners include factions that support a shift from authoritarian
rule to democracy, or a more liberal form of rule. Division between hard and soft-liners often creates the conditions for change, and the opportunity for the breakdown of the authoritarian rule.

The elite can be categorized into three ways, according to Burton and Higley (1987). Their elite structures fall under: (1) ideologically unified; (2) disunited; and (3) consensually unified. Those in the first category appear to be unified under an authoritarian rule, since the elite factions support the same policies and follow the same ideologies. The disunited factions tend to be violent, intra-elite and distrustful of each other, while those that follow a pattern of elite competition under predetermined procedures are considered consensually unified. Burton and Higley maintain that “divided or disunited elites operate unstable regimes in which coup, uprisings, revolutions, and other forcible seizures of government power occur frequently and are widely expected” (p.296-297).

However, in applying this theory to Indonesia, one finds that the elite becomes disunified after protest events among the masses gather strength, and not beforehand. Later, the elite factions in Indonesia did help the non-elite actors to expand their protest efforts, and their support aided in creating a more powerful movement.

While the latter sections of Chapter 5 examine the schism in the Indonesian elite following the emergence of protest events, earlier sections of the chapter examine the political environment that fuelled the protests at the outset. Although the division among the elite and support for the protest movement by certain elite factions played a role, it is important to recognize the role of the environment created by Suharto’s policy decisions. In such an era of crisis, Suharto’s administration could have made very different
policy choices, and the situation could have had a very different outcome. Therefore, success or failure of national leadership becomes the final factor. Certain policy decisions could have swayed public opinion, and perhaps delayed or stopped the transition. While all the other factors played vital roles, the personal actions of a leader cannot be ignored.

Third world politicians like Suharto are autonomous, and possess the power to adopt policies against structural forces such as culture or interest groups, argues William Liddle (1996). In his book, Liddle points out that these personal rulers can often strengthen their own position as leader and the economic position of the country through such liberal economic policies.

Liddle examines Suharto as a good leader adopting the right policies from 1960s to 1980s. As a good leader, Suharto defeated several pressures against his liberal policies and continuously made good decisions. However, the situation in 1997 and 1998 was a different situation, and saw the same leader make poor decisions that drove down the country and his own grip on power at the same time. Both situations support Liddle’s theory that a leader’s personal actions will ultimately determine political outcomes.

A combined framework of all these theories, i.e., economic crisis as trigger, the role of political entrepreneurs, resource mobilization, the political shift of the elite, and the personal ruler’s own errors, fully explains how a fragmented and powerless society can become a unified political force.
7.3 Highlight two contradictory aspects of protest events in the divided society

Indonesia’s shift from authoritarian to democratic society between 1997 and 1998 highlights several gains and losses. The extended protest events of the period led to the fall of authoritarianism and the rise of democratic principles such as civil liberties, civilian supremacy.

Yet, the protests also served to divide the country on ethnic and religious lines, pitting Sino-Indonesians against Malay-Indonesians, immigrants against locals and Muslims against Christians in all parts of the country. This conflict posed a stumbling block to the establishment of social trust and peaceful democracy.

How did the protests produce two very different outcomes? One can look to Indonesia’s divided society for an answer. A society in transition faces both vertical and horizontal conflicts. The society’s political demands on the incumbent government constitute vertical conflict, with society demanding new civil liberties, civilian supremacy, political competition and participation and smaller role for the government.

The second conflict, horizontal conflict, arises when different groups within a society are at odds. These conflicts often occur along racial, religious or ethnic lines, and can be more deep-rooted and dangerous than vertical conflict. Vertical conflicts, which stem from political reform, often have positive results, while the cultural hatred behind horizontal conflicts often have negative results.

The protest events in Indonesia between 1997 and 1998 stem from two civil societies: one made up of students and westernized
intellectuals who supported liberty for all, and one made up of sectarian groups that wanted privilege for certain religious or ethnic groups only.

Could Indonesia’s reform have been different if it had been led by the elite, rather than by the masses? Given that the prominent elite groups in Indonesia tend to be moderate and supportive of reform, the answer is partially yes, and partially no.

It is partially yes because unlike the students and non-elite actors among the masses, the elite can negotiate on a common ground, and are more likely to avoid violence or additional conflict. Based on this condition, Indonesia’s transition would be smoother and less conflicted if it is led by the elite, and not by the masses.

Transitional periods are often times of uncertainty. Pragmatic and skilled negotiation can only offer stability through accommodation and compromise. Such agreements and pacts can only come from the elite,

A society like Indonesia, wracked by economic crisis, religious and ethnic division and a weak government, is better off in the hands of the elite, who can ensure democracy and bridge cultural divisions. And while the masses, the non-elite, played a vital role in bringing down authoritarian rule in Indonesia and introducing democracy in the nation, the elite factions are even more vital in maintaining political changes and consolidating democracy. Without such a unifying force, the divisions in Indonesia could overpower the country’s democratic gains, and serve to splinter a united Indonesia into smaller, warring nations.
It is partially no, because the elite in Indonesia in the 1990s, as well as the non-elite, were so long repressed under the corrupt and authoritarian government. New Order in the era of Suharto and the Old Order in the era of Sukarno had repressed them for than 40 years. The elite members didn’t have the tradition to practice democratic politics and clean government.

It was no wonder that in the first democratically-elected government after the fall of Suharto, the elite members didn’t seriously reform politics. The administration under the first democratically-elected president Abdurrahman Wahid can’t get rid of corruption. At the same time, the elite members don’t have “the art of living together” that crosses cultural and political boundaries. Many times, the elite member conflict with each other create serious constraints on economic recovery.

Elite members in Indonesia probably need more than a decade to detach themselves from the previous corrupted and authoritarian regime, and to have moral control for installing and crafting a clean and democratic government. In short, compared to the mobs, the elite members are much better in installing democracy peacefully and establishing a clean government. However, the elite members who had been suppressed very long under the authoritarian and corrupted regime need sufficient time to transform themselves from the influences of their own past.
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The transition from authoritarian rule in Indonesia is not initiated by a division within the elite (hardliners versus softliners). In Indonesia, the elite did not initiate the reform; they only responded later. The masses, the non-elite actors, initiated the reform. Economic crisis (deprivation theory) is “necessary but not sufficient” to explain them. Availability of resources and the role of political entrepreneurs (resource mobilization theory) also played a critical role in mobilizing the protest events. Support of influential elites and the negative policies of the incumbent government at the time of the crisis (political opportunity structure theory) contributed to the magnitude and the power of those protest events. However, protest events not only accelerated political reform, they also spread hatred and bloody societal conflict based on religion, race and ethnicity.

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