

VARIOUS TOPICS IN COMPARATIVE POLITICS



Denny J.A.

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PREFACE

As observed by Rousseau, “The stronger is never strong enough to be always the master, unless he transforms strength into right and obedience into duty”. In the past, tradition, religion and divine right of kings provided the legitimacy for non-democratic systems. Obedience to divine kings became a duty and to be a king became right.

This mechanism was then swept away by the process of secularization and liberalization. The source of power shifted from heaven (religion) to the earth (people, dominant classes). To be a king was not right anymore and to obey the king was not a duty either. This system lost its power and the modern state (nationalism, democracy) took over.

In modern times, the sources of legitimacy for authoritarian regimes are economic development and/or ideologies (e.g. communism and nationalism). Why should the ruled rebel against the rule of parties or, indeed personal ruler if people think these types of political system are necessary? Why should the ruled rebel against personal dictatorship if they enjoy a very good living standards as the fruit of economic growth?

Unsatisfactory economic performance plays the key role in the decline of legitimacy among authoritarian regimes. Ideologies, such as communism, nationalism and whatever, easily lose their power then they fail to produce good economic performance. People in the Philippines under Marcos, for example, could not support the dictator stand for economic decline at the same time. Many East European countries envied their neighbors in West Europe for their economic development. East European love for ideology, i.e. communism, easily faded away when they were close to starvation.

At the time the ideas of democracy started to go global. New technology of communication spreads democratic ideology to many countries. People in authoritarian regimes easily make comparisons. Democratic capitalism in western countries provides freedom and bread, while authoritarianism and communism grant political fears and starvation. People wake up and realize that obedience to a non-democratic system is not a duty and that various types of regimes are not rights. The third wave of democratization spreads out.

However, the successors of authoritarian regimes are not necessarily democratic ones. As happened in Iran, the successor is the theological state under Islam. Transition to democracy needs something else.

The above description is quotation from one of the nine chapters compiled in this short book. All of the nine chapters are from my papers when I was at Ohio State University, USA, working for my Ph.D. degree in Comparative Politics (1196 – 1998).

Many thanks to all those who encouraged me into learn, to read, and to write.

Jakarta, August 2006

Denny J.A.

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1

THE RISE AND FALL OF DEMOCRACY: ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OR CHOICE OF LEADERS

In the 1950s and 1960s, political development theories were dominated by the modernization approach. This approach depicts the third world as traditional countries moving toward the western type of society. To be developed is to be modern, and to be modern is to be like the West. Progress is linear. the modernization approach gives explanation, prediction and recommendation, all at the same time, on how to develop in order to be like the western mode of society.

Two important articles from this era from Deutsh and Lipset (1950s). Deutsh argues the economic development leads to rise of demand for political participation. Exposure to mass media, literacy, urbanization, and education affects the political well being of people. They begin to have more say about their own political theory.

To use categorization from Almond and Verba, because of economic development, many citizens change from being

“subjects” to “participants”. “Subjects” are citizens obeying the government outcomes, while “participants” are active citizens involved in the political process. Participants are more active citizens than are subjects.

The new demand for political participation of various groups and individuals will break the old type of political system (non-democratic regime). The old system will not be able to continue to accommodate the new demand. As a result, there will be the re-structuring of political system toward democracy, since democracy accommodates plurality and civil rights. Economic development will lead to democratic political system in the third world.

The notion of progress from economic development toward democracy strengthened by the work of Lipset. Through empirical data and cases, Lipset shows a strong correlation between economic development and democracy. The higher the economic development enjoyed by a nation, as measured by, for example, level of education and mass media, the more probable it will be for democracy to thrive.

Huntington, in his book “The Third Wave”, explains more convincingly how economic development will lead a country to democratization. He maps the correlation between economic performance (GNP, per-capita income) and democracy. He suggests three levels of GNP: low income (around US \$130-500), middle income (around US \$500-600), and high income (around US \$6000 and above). He finds that almost all the low-income countries are non-democratic (except India and Sri Lanka). Almost all the high-income countries are democratic (except Singapore and oil-exporting countries). For middle-income countries, some of them are democratic and some not.

From the above picture, economic development seems to be very significant in endorsing democracy. This can be explained as follows:

a) Level of economic well-being certain attitudes in a society's citizen. Interpersonal trust and life satisfaction grow commensurately with the increase in economic security (wealth). These attitudes are compatible with democratic institutions.

b) Economic development increases the level of education within a society. Education is the critically important institution in bringing people toward technical competence and plurality. These values support democracy.

c) Economic development produces greater resources. Many more resources are available for distribution facilitates accommodation and compromise. Democracy is a system for accommodating many different kinds of groups. To survive, democracy needs to be built up on the common ground of these various groups. It means that the arts of compromise and accommodation are central to the stability of democracy.

d) Economic development endorses the opening of foreign trade, tourism, communication and exposure to an increasingly globalizing world. The involvement of non-government sectors of wealth and influence in the globalization process boosts the impact of democratic ideas flowing from industrial countries in the west.

e) Economic development gives birth to the rise of the middle class. Business people, professionals, and various groups in civil society grow commensurately with economic development and education. As argued by Barrington Moore, "No Bourgeois, No Democracy. Democracy is not led by the peasants or landlords, but by the middle class. The survival of the middle class is related to the survival of democracy since the political participation and fair competition for economic and political power they need are provided only by democracy.

However, in the 1960s, there were very shocking events. Democracy broke down in many places from Asia to Latin America. Economic development failed to deliver its promised democracy. On the contrary, economic development created political instability and, in the end, produced authoritarianism.

What was wrong with the modernization theory? Why there were so many democratic breakdowns? First, let's turn to the response from the "Rightists".

From the "Rightists", Huntington's book, "Political Order," answers the above confusion and offers new insight. The mistake of the above theory, according to Huntington, is to forget these important elements: political order and political institution. The modernization theorists did not pay attention to the institutionalization of politics to keep political order. As the result, there exists the big gap between the development of economy and the development of political institutions. The breakdown of democracy shows that political institutions were still too weak to support the dynamics brought economic development.

Huntington then makes an immense statement. For the third world, the most important thing in politics, according to Huntington, is not the form of government (e.g. democracy or authoritarianism) but the degree of government (the capability of government to govern). The government should first be able to govern people before it is governed by the people. Order can exist without liberty but liberty cannot exist without order. Authority should first be strong before it is limited.

Huntington defines institutionalization as the process in which an organization and procedures acquire values and stability. The degree of institutionalization can be measured through its scope and its element. Its scope refers to the support toward existing institutions. If the supporters are only among the elite

in the ruling government, institutionalization is still weak and limited. However, if the supporters of the existing institutions spread out to reach many different groups of people, institutionalization starts to mature.

The elements of institutions are flexibility (vs. rigidity), complexity (vs. simplicity), autonomy (vs. subordination) and coherence (vs. disunity). The more flexible, complex autonomous and coherent an institution is, the more mature that institution will be.

Political order is defined as the expression of political community and equated with the public interest. Political order is what ever strengthens government institutions. Since what important, according to Huntington, is both capability to govern and political order, not the type of government, Huntington is framed by others as defender of authoritarianism.

Now, let's turn to the response from the "Leftists". Leftists contend that Huntington, as with other modernists, ignores that the source of the problem is not domestic politics but world politics. The breakdown of democracy in the third world is only the epiphenomena of a larger problem that is the problem of dependent development. The source of this problem is the unequal exchange between the center of capitalism and the periphery.

The leftists inherit the principle of dependency from Lenin's theory of imperialism. Lenin is the bridge between Karl Marx and the School of Dependency. Marx argues that capitalism will dig its own grave since there is an internal contradiction in capitalism. However, capitalism still survives, and is even expanding and globalizing.

Lenin explains that capitalism survives because this system opens new markets and exploits new resources from the outside, through imperialism. Imperialism is the fresh blood that can

make capitalism survive much longer. Despite the survival, Lenin predicted that imperialism would be the last stage of capitalism.

From the theory of imperialism, the Dependency uncovers the nature of relations between the centers of capitalism and their peripheries. The nature of this relation is not genuine and mutually advantageous. The center exploits the periphery. Although the periphery develops, this development is dependent and exploited. The only way to get rid of this problem is not political institutionalization, as promoted by Huntington, but the de-linking (cutting of the relation) of the periphery from the center.

The breakdown of democracy, based on the leftist perspective, is a symptom of the problem of dependent development. Instead of democracy, authoritarianism will rise to exclude labor movements and to protect the economic interest of the multi-nationals.

THE RE-EMERGENCE OF THE THEORY OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT TO EXPLAIN DEMOCRACY

Debates about the connection between economic development and democracy have re-emerged in the 1990's: Why? Is economic development alone sufficient to explain the transition to the democracy?

According to Samuel Huntington (1991), since 1974, around 35 countries have navigated the transition from non-democratic to democratic political systems. Among them are many countries previously governed by military dictatorship, personal rulers, or authoritarian leaders in Asia, East Europe and Latin America. This significant event needs a new explanation and endorses the comeback of theories of democracy and economic development.

However, economic development alone cannot explain the transition to democracy sufficiently. Huntington lists some independent variables. Theoretically, there is nothing new in Huntington's explanation. He just creatively combines the arguments of his fellow theorists on democracy. Here are some independent variables, excluding economic development.

First, the non-democratic systems lost their legitimacy (political decay of authoritarian regimes). As observed by Rousseau, "The strongest is never strong enough to be always the master, unless he transforms strength into the right and obedience into duty". In the past, tradition, religion and the divine right of kings provided the legitimacy for non-democratic system. Obedience to divine kings became a duty and to be a king became a right.

This mechanism was then swept away by the process of secularization and liberalization. The source of power shifted from heaven (religion) to the earth (people, dominant classes). To be a king was not a right anymore and to obey the king was not a duty either. This system lost its power and the modern state (nationalism, democracy) took over.

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Second, since 1960's, there has been a new interpretation of religion (Catholicism). Huntington underscores that religions matter for democracy. Before the 1960's, most democratic countries were in Protestant-dominated regions. Different from other religions (e.g. old Catholicism), Protestantism encourages individual's conscience and also individual relationship to God without the intercession of a priest. This individualism has led to the respect for individual rights and plurality that are essential to democracy.

However, the Second Vatican Council in the 1960's opened a new chapter in Catholicism. This Council supports interpretations that are compatible with democracy. Some of those interpretations relate to the respect for individual rights

and plurality, legitimacy and need for social change, collegial action of bishops, and priesthood to help the poor.

Examples of Catholic-dominated countries in democratic transition are Spain and Portugal. Unfortunately, according to Huntington, Islam and Confucianism are not compatible with democracy. Confucianism prefers order to liberty, community to individualism, harmony to rights and loyalty to critical attitudes toward political authority. Those values are not in line with democracy, which praises liberty and individuality.

Islam is not compatible because of other reasons. In Islam, there is no separation between state and religion. The compulsion to apply Islamic law and Islamic holy books as the constitution is not compatible with the pluralistic nature of democracy.

Third, the choice and strategy of leaders are essential in the transition to democracy. Transition to democracy is not only a result of conditions but also the result of actions. Conditions (e.g. economic development and political decay of authoritarianism) only open the possibility for transition. It is the actions and the choice of leaders that can change and manipulate the system.

Huntington assesses three kinds of strategies in the transition to democracy: transformation, replacement and transplacement. Transformation is the transition led by reformers within an incumbent government (Brazil in the 1970's, led by President Geizel). Replacement is led by the opposition (the Philippines in the 1980's, led by Aquino). Transplacement is led by the government and opposition together (South Africa in the 1990's under De Klerk and Mandela).

The choice of leaders to apply democracy or not is really determining point. This is the reason why Singapore is not democratic yet, although her economic growth (GNP) is very high. In reverse, India which has very low GNP, is democratic. Democracy is not the choice of the most powerful actor in

Singapore, Lee Kwan Yew, but it was the choice of the most powerful actor in India in the 1950's (Nehru).

It is true that the overall environment, including economic development, gives constraints and incentives to political leaders. However, political leaders are autonomous, not the servants of the determination of the dominant classes, interest groups or the process of economic development. In short, economic development is not a machine that can produce democracy automatically.

* * *

2

POLITICAL CULTURE AND REGIME TYPE

Political theories in the field of comparative politics and political sciences in general, can be categorized in terms of their responses to natural sciences. Based on this categorization, there are two clusters of political theories: the law-like generalization theory and the cultural approach. The law-like generalization approach in political science follows the assumptions, philosophies and methodologies of the natural sciences, while the cultural approach is the reverse.

According to the law-like generalization approach, there is regularity and certainty in human behavior just as there is regularity and certainty in the natural world. The purpose of political theory is the same as that the natural sciences. Both of them seek the law behind that regularity and certainty. The discovery of the law behind human behavioral regularity and certainty is the only criterion for the achievement of a theory. Since the laws of social science were discovered, those theories have the power to explain and predict many social phenomena,

just as natural sciences have in regard to natural phenomena.

As in the natural sciences, the law-like generalization is empirical and positivist. The demarcation that separates scientific and non-scientific world is the ability of the former to be both verified (verification) and falsified (falsification). A scientific theory should be able to be tested empirically. The method of research for this approach can be inductive or deductive as long as its claim can be verified and falsified in the real world. Once the theory is formulated, the application of this theory is universal across the boundaries of regions, nation state and cultures. Since the human species is one and universal, so is the political theory of the human species. And the examples of this approach in social sciences are microeconomics and the rational choice in political science.

The political culture approach is the reverse. Contrary to natural sciences and the law-like generalization approach, the cultural approach assumes that there is ambiguity, uncertainty, mystery and vagueness in human behavior. Human being is an animal in a web of meanings and significance. Values, way of life and perception are central to human behavior. As the consequence, a theory in political science should be and must be different from that in the natural sciences. The theory of man is not the theory of the physical world.

The cultural approach is still empirical but not positivist. The cultural approach is interpretive. The role of interpretation in doing research in the social world is central. Since on the earth there are various cultures, ways of life and values, there will be no law-like generalization in political theories. Everything is culturally bounded.

One example of the cultural method of doing research is the work of Clifford Geertz. According to Geertz, one cannot understand human behavior just by observing his physical

world (thin description). To understand human behavior, one should observe something else behind the physical world (thick description). Since human behavior is full of symbols, meanings and values, one should observe that physical behavior in relation to symbols, values, and meanings.

In short, the political culture approach explores the values, ways of life, perceptions and beliefs of targeted objects (persons, communities, and organizations) to explain human behavior (e.g. economic performance, democracy).

RESEARCH

In this section, I will assess some examples of the researches using the the cultural approach to explain economic performance and political outcomes. In explaining economic performance, there is the research done by Max Weber and Peter Berger. In explaining political outcomes, there is Sydney and Verba, and Samuel Huntington.

Max Weber is very famous for his work Capitalism and Protestant Ethics. Prior to Weber, the rise of capitalism was explained by anything except culture. Karl Marx, for example, frames the rise of capitalism as the result of dialectic materialism. Changes in the material world (technology, mode of production) lead to a transition from feudalism to capitalism.

Weber argues the rival explanation for the rise and the spread of capitalism. Different from Karl Marx, Weber explores cultures, values, beliefs and ways of life. According to Weber, the rise of capitalism is caused by a certain belief (Protestant ethics), not other beliefs (Catholic, Islam, and Confucianism). Cultures matter.

The Calvinist in Europe believe that the purpose of life is to get God's salvation and to live eternally under God's protection

(in the hereafter). The works on the earth are the signs as to whether a person will get salvation or not. The protestant ethics, such as hard work, honesty, and prosperity are the indication of the chosen ones. By having protestant ethics, one is more certain of obtaining God's salvation.

These protestant ethics, according to Weber, are the driving forces of capitalism. Empirically, Weber finds that capitalism grows in regions dominated by Protestants (Calvinist), not by Catholic, Moslems or Confucians. There is kind of compatibility between economic growth and a certain religious belief.

Although Weber's work receives a lot of criticism, the cultural explanation for economic performance still continues as a school of thought.

Another work in this tradition is from Peter Berger, the Capitalist Revolution (1980's). Prior to Berger's book, there were momentous events in East Asia. Compared to other regions (e.g. Latin America and Africa), East Asian countries are growing much faster economically. While in other regions, the rates economic growth are bellow 45 annually, in East Asia, the average growth rate is above 4% and, in some years, in double digits. Some theorists explain this miracle by elaborating a certain type of state structure (the developmental state). Governments in this region intervene in the market in the right ways, according to this approach.

Berger develops a different explanation. As with Weber, Berger elaborates the cultural traits in this region. He finds that Confucianism helps economic growth. The work ethics of Confucianism such as hard work, orientation for worldly achievement, and willingness to cooperate (networking) are the driving forces of economic growth. No wonder those countries in East Asia dominated by Confucianism (Singapore, Hong Kong, Taiwan, and South Korea) are growing faster.

A different tradition in the cultural approach is developed by Sidney and Verba, *The Civic Culture* (1960s). In this case they don't use culture to explain economic performance but to illustrate the political outcomes (democracy).

Prior to Sidney and Verba's work, some theorists developed non-cultural approaches to explain the stability of democracy. Lipset, for example, correlates democracy with the level of economic development (exposure to mass media, literacy, and urbanization). The higher the level the economic development is, the more stable democracy will be.

Sidney and Verba explore another independent variable to explain the stability of democracy; political culture. They did survey research across the countries to test their hypothesis. Five countries are chosen: the United States, Britain, Germany, Italy and Mexico. They develop three models of citizenship: participants (who take an active role in the political process), subjects (who are oriented to the output side of government; e.g. paying tax and obeying the law) and parochial (who largely ignore government). This categorization is more or less about good citizens (participants), average citizens (subjects) and bad citizens (parochial).

They fail to prove that democracy depends on the existence of the participant type of citizenship as a majority. However, their research has inspired the understanding that democracy also requires a certain type of culture, the civic culture. The attitude of modernization, trust in public institutions and acceptance of plurality are needed by democracy. Values and a certain type of behavior matter for democracy. Civic culture becomes a popular term in the literature of democracy.

Samuel Huntington continues this tradition in his famous book *The Third Wave* (1990s). According to Huntington, there has recently been a big wave transition to democracy, since as

many as 35 countries have changed from non-democratic to democratic political systems in Asia, Latin America and East Europe. How should this transition be explained? Huntington explores many independent variables. One of them is culture.

Said Huntington, there is a new interpretation of Catholicism, away from being supportive of or apathetic toward the status quo to being active promoting democracy. The Second Vatican Council (1960s) emphasizes the collegial action of bishops and the legitimacy of social change. No wonder, according to Huntington, the transition to democracy has happened in many Catholic-dominated countries (e.g. the Philippines, Portugal and Spain).

Religious beliefs matter for democracy. Huntington argues that Protestantism and the new Catholicism are compatible with democracy, while Islam and Confucianism are not. Different from Protestantism and the new Catholicism, Confucianism prefers order to liberty, communalism, to individualism, harmony to freedom and loyalty to rights.

In Islam, according to Huntington, there is no separation between state and religion. Islamic law (Shariah) is required to be implemented as a national law, and the Qur'an (Islamic holy book) as the national constitution. As a consequence, individual rights and social liberties as the foundation of liberal democracy are not protected in Islamic principles.

WEAKNESSES

What are the weaknesses of the political culture approach in explaining political outcomes (political regimes)? There is always heterogeneity in a culture. As a result, different researches may have a different understanding of the same culture. One can take Confucianism and Islam as an example.

What is Confucianism? Is this culture compatible with economic growth and democracy? Weber says that Confucianism is incompatible with economic growth, while Berger claims that Confucianism is the driving force for economic growth in East Asia. Lee Kwan Yew argues that Confucianism is not for supports liberal democracy while Kim Dae Jung claims that Confucianism supports liberal democracy. Do they observe the same Confucianism or different variances of Confucianism?

Cultures and religion, as the source of identity and way of life, are always growing able to be interpreted differently by their followers. There is always the liberal and orthodox interpretation. There is always the leftist, moderate and the rightist position. Huntington may pick the orthodox interpretation of Islam and claim that Islam is not compatible with democracy, while Fazlur Rahman picks the liberal interpretation and says that Islam is in line with democracy. Any claim about a certain culture and religion will have valid rival claims.

More than that, political outcomes, including the types of political regime, are influenced by many other variables. In chapter 1, I have explained other variables that determined democracy (and also authoritarianism). Some of them are economic development, the political leader's choice (viz. the mode of that politician's political struggles), political decay (in authoritarianism) or the weakness of political institutions (in the case of breakdown of democracy).

The culture approach, in explaining the type of regimes, is very weak since political leaders easily manipulate and make a claim on cultures to defend their own interests. Soeharto of Indonesia may claim that Indonesian culture is not in line with liberal democracy. While Mochtar Lubis of Indonesia claims the reverse, that Indonesian culture has democratic elements. Soeharto is against democracy, while Mochtar Lubis is defender

of democracy. Both of them can make different claims on the same Indonesian culture.

Toward a political culture approach I may have a bias, since I am not at all convinced by it. The contribution of political culture in understanding a political regime is not significant, in my opinion. However, although I have personal bias, my opinion on the political culture approach in general is shared by many theorists in comparative politics and in political science in general, political culture approach is only marginal.

No wonder the political culture approach has become pejorative term since it is only a residual theory. When a certain phenomenon or social event cannot be explained by any other theory, the political culture approach is used. In other words, to explain and predict a certain social outcome (political regimes, economic performance), one should explore other theories first. In case those theories do not work, only then may use political culture as the only theory left.

* * *

3

POLITICAL STABILITY AND VOLATILITY: THE CASE OF JAPAN

One of interesting phenomena in Japan's politics is the existence of a hegemonic party, the LDP (Liberal Democratic Party). For more than 35 years (1955 – 1993), LDP dominated the Diet (parliament) and the political system in Japan, and was never interrupted by other parties. This phenomena is obviously strange for western industrial countries.

Two question can be raised in understanding the above phenomena. Firstly, how de we explain this kind of stability? What are the sources of the hegemony of the LDP? Secondly, why did this hegemony end in 1993?

There are a number factors underpinning the stability of voting (and political system in general) in Japan. I am going to briefly and generally explain five of those factors. They are Electorate Culture, Social Contract, Triumvirate Coalition, Homogenous Culture, and the Mac Arthur constitution.

a) Electorate Culture

This term refers to the behavior, perceptions, habits and beliefs of voters. These cultures determine how the voters respond and react to political events, including voting in general elections. I will categorize two cultures in Japan since they are different from each other, namely “Village Culture” and “Urban Culture”. I am going to discuss only “Village Culture” in this paper since this “Village Culture” can represent the uniqueness and style of Japanese politics.

The rural areas of Japan consist of many hamlets or small communities. Within these hamlets, every family has close relations with each other. They share the same values such as harmony, order, obligation, cooperation and togetherness, which they inherit from their ancestors. They their own security system to protect their community, and irrigation system for supporting their economic life.

In these areas, to attract the voters, politicians do not only conduct a formal campaign, as politicians do in modern politics. What I mean by a formal campaign is a campaign that uses electronic, print and telecommunication media to influence voters around general election time.

For rural areas, informal campaigns are more influential than formal campaigns. Through informal campaigns, the politicians keep long-term relationship with the local community. They visit the voters, not only in the time around the general election but also on many other occasions. Sometimes, these politicians send gifts to the voters and their families on their wedding or birthdays. These politicians also go to funerals of members of families of the voters. From time to time, these politicians bring voters together and sponsor a trip to hot spring, and have dinner together.

Hence the relationship between the representatives (politicians) and their voters (constituents) are personal, emotional and long-lasting. Indeed, to run these “informal campaigns” it takes a lot of money. However, the informal campaign fits the rural culture, and is able to guarantee the stability of voting in those areas. The LDP has explored “the informal campaign” and “electorate culture” successfully in keeping its candidate in power.

b) Social Contract

A social contract is a political transaction between a government and interest groups. In this transaction the government offers protection and regulation for the advantages of interest groups. In return, interest groups give their support to the government. Because of this social contract, stability of the political system can be maintained.

Japan has many small businesses, companies that have less than 30 employees. In total small businesses contributes more than half of the private sector’s non-agricultural work force in 1986. This statistic alone can tell us how important small businesses are in stabilizing or destabilizing Japan’s political system.

Japan also has many organized labor union. As happened in many other countries, there are various political affiliations of organized labor. Some of them are linked to the left-wing party, the Socialist Democratic Party. Some of them have affiliations with the centrist party, the Democratic Socialist Party, and some to the right-wing party, LDP. Although these organized unions have various political affiliations, they have the same interest – welfare of their members.

The government “ruled by the LDP” keeps political stability by playing a social Contract’s Card. The government protects small businesses and gives welfare to labor. For small business,

for example, in the 1950s, the government secured low caps on local tax rates. gave low interest loans. In 1977, the Diet passed a bill giving trade associations o small businesses considerable powers, and restricted the expansion of big businesses (supermarkets and other large retailers). For organized labor, in the 1960s, the government established a minimum wage and guaranteed full employment.

In return, the government got support from both small businesses and organized labor. Since LDP ran the government, any support for the government automatically meant support for the LDP as well. This support would keep LDP in power and in hegemony.

c) Triumvirate Coalition

A triumvirate coalition is cooperation toward a common three groups. In Japanese politics this term refers to the cooperation between bureaucracy, LDP and big business in controlling Japan's public policy (Allison, 1990s). These three groups members are the most important source of the elite in the postwar era.

Bureaucracy has a long tradition in Japanese politics. In the prewar history (prior to 1945), under the supremacy of the emperor (in the Meiji constitution), bureaucracy had played significant role in the executive. As civil servants, bureaucrats had been used by the emperor to implement his policy. When the Allied powers (SCAP; Supreme Commander for Allied Power) occupied Japan, and when the emperor had been driven out from politics, the new government still needed bureaucracy. The elite who had experience in prewar bureaucracy still dominated politics in the postwar era since they were more prepared, skilled, ambitious and talented than others.

However, in the postwar era bureaucracy had to share and cooperate with the new group: specialist politicians from the

LDP. Many of the elite from the new generation of LDP had no experience in bureaucracy. They established their careers as elected politicians. Since they were elected many times for the Diet, they became senior politicians and accumulated power.

The politicians in the LDP needed a lot of money to keep them in power. As explained previously, the cost for campaigns (informal campaigns) is very high. Based on “folklore”, the politicians got money from big businessmen. In return, those politicians would make laws in favor of big businesses, such as protectionism, for instance.

By getting support from big businesses and the bureaucrats, LDP got support from the most powerful elites in Japan. This coalition, needless to say, strengthened the hegemony of LDP too.

d) Homogenous Culture

The stability of the political system created and enjoyed by the hegemonic party LDP was more or less supported by the homogenous culture of Japan. The more homogenous the culture is, the fewer the sources of conflict and instability are. Japan has no segmental cleavages. In Japan, there are no conflicts between races, black or white, as is the case of the USA, for example, because Japan has only one dominant race. There is no conflict of religions as well, such as that which occurred in India (Hindu versus Muslim), because Japan has no fanatical followers of various religions. There is no ethnic hostility such as that which has occurred in Bosnia, since Japan has no various ethnic groups.

The homogenous culture might level have helped the LDP to stay in power for a long time. If there had been sharp cleavages of primordialism, there would have been many conflicting views that could not have been represented by the LDP alone.

e) The Mac Arthur Constitution

It is impossible for the LDP to dominate the Diet if a part of the Diet (the house of peers) is nominated and appointed by the Emperor, since the Diet should be responsible to the emperor. It would be impossible for the LDP to keep Japan stable and prosperous if Japan was involved in many wars. If the emperor still held the supreme power and had a right to use war for his political ambitions, the LDP might never have been born.

For this reason, the Mac Arthur Constitution should be rewarded. This new constitution has changed the source of sovereignty from emperor to the people. Hence, all the members of the Diet are elected and there are no appointed noble families anymore. This new constitution outlaws the use of war as well. Hence, Japan concentrate on development. In the setting of the people's sovereignty, general election and in the condition of no war. LDP could dominate the Diet and stabilize the system.

THE BREAKDOWN (VOLATILITY)

However, in 1993s, for the first time, LDP was defeated. Why, therefore, is the hegemony of LDP over? What power has downgraded the LDP? Richardson gives three reasons. I add the fourth.

First, economic growth in Japan has created high rates of urbanization; the migration of people from rural to urban areas. In urban areas, migrants look for new jobs to improve their welfare. In big cities, those people face new problems, new challenges and new environment. As a result, they might adopt a new culture.

For example, some of them joined labor unions. In these organizations, they got new political doctrines from the leftists.

These doctrines, might give strong criticism against government policy. Gradually, they changed their vote from the LDP to the Socialist Democratic Party or any other party. This is cause of the collapse of the LDP in the 1970s in big cities.

Besides urbanization, the era of the 1970's was hard time for Japan. In this era, there was a big shock in the business of oil (oil crisis). Since Japan depends on on foreign oil heavily, the crisis of oil beats domestic industries. Indeed, since 1970's, Japan has never achieved economic growth as high as that prior to the 1970's. At the time, the problem of pollution was increasingly salient as well. Criticism of the government (and LDP) became greater. The LDP started loosing its popularity.

Second, the USA forced Japan decrease trade barriers and apply free markets for foreign goods. It meant that much protection enjoyed by small, medium and big businesses had to be modified. In free markets, these business companies might get loss of profit than before. The consequences of the loss of profit are immense and they might change the political affiliation of the losers.

Since many interest groups were disappointed with the new policies of the government (LDP) on the free market, they withdrew their votes from the LDP. They thought the LDP was not representative of their interest anymore. This situation explains the drop of LDP seats in the Diet in 1989.

Third, political scandals in LDP's elite were salient. Massive corruption occurred repeatedly and involved many important in the LDP, including factional leaders such as Tanaka. Informal campaigns needed a lot of money. To keep a faction within LDP solid (to buy the loyalties of members), took a lot of money too. From where does the LDP get its money? On of the possibilities was from big businesses through illegal procedures. Consequently, politicians within LDP betrayed public trust.

The LDP suffered and lost its credibility. Many politicians from the LDP withdrew from this party and built new ones. These politicians, then, ran for election under new parties. 1993 was the first time the LDP lost its majority status in Diet. It was the first time that the Prime Minister was not from the LDP.

I add the fourth reason. The decline of a dominant party is unavoidable in a pluralistic society. The interests within pluralistic society are too various to be represented by only one hegemonic party. In business, for example, there are small, medium and big companies that have their own differences, possibly in conflict with each other. Within the small business community, as well as between the medium and large companies, there are also conflicting interests. In politics, there are various visions too.

High modernization changed Japan into a more pluralistic society. Indeed, there are no segmental cleavages of primordialism, such as religion, ethnicity and race. However, the source of a pluralistic society is not necessarily from primordialism. The various interests in business and the conflicting visions in a politics are the source of a pluralistic society too. Modernization has transformed Japan into a society having more conflicting interests and visions. A pluralistic society kills the existence of a dominant party.

SOME COMPARISON OF MODELS OF STABILITY

There are two types of political stability: the democratic and non-democratic models. According to the “stages of organizations” from Max Weber, the democratic model is based on the power of bureaucracy, while the non-democratic model is based on the effectiveness of patrimonial politics (pre-bureaucratic). Examples of the democratic model are the western countries, such as Indonesia prior to 1999 and Iraq.

Stability in the democratic model is caused by some elements of bureaucracy. The most important elements are the supremacy of impersonal order, efficiency, internal improvement and public control. Impersonal order puts the supremacy of laws as the basis of obedience, not strong men. Efficiency requires a clean government (low level of corruption) and workable economic system (market mechanism). Internal improvement prepares the system to be open for gradual change of policy, to adapt itself toward a new environment and new political demands. Public control requires civic liberties in order for people to be able to compete for public office and to control them.

In this model, a political system is stable because this model gives equal opportunities to all interest groups in order to maximize their interests. Two reasons may explain why this model is stable.

First, as explained by Przeworsky, the democratic model is organized uncertainty in which the losers accept their defeat. Instead of destroying democracy, the losers just wait until the next election because they still have a chance to win. More than that, in the democratic model, their political safety is guaranteed. Based on calculations of self-interest, the losers still prefer to stay in democracy, not to rebel against democracy. Obviously, the winner prefers to stay in democracy as well, since it is this system that brought them to power.

Second, as explained by the literature of democratic consolidation, in this model democracy is the only game in town. Although plural, the interest groups never think of other political systems but democracy. Their future interests are bound up in the survival of the democratic system.

The stability of the non- democratic model is caused by elements of patrimonial politics: the effectiveness of personal rulers, the patrimonial distribution of wealth among powerful

groups, the exclusion of popular movements from politics (labor, student, and religion movements), and the repression of opposition. In this model, many powerful groups prefer to defend stability as long as their interests are still protected. The popular movements and opposition prefer not to rebel because of the weakness of their political position (no chance to win) and the effectiveness of the machines of repression.

The stability of Japan's model does not fit either of these models. Different from the democratic model from the west, until 1993, the stability of Japan was not based on bureaucratic elements alone, but also on electorate culture, triumvirate coalition and other factors explained previously. Different from the non-democratic model, the stability in Japan not based on patrimonial elements either.

* * *

4

TYPOLOGY OF POLITICAL PARTIES: BEYOND THE WESTERN WORLD

For students in the field of comparative politics, the study of political parties is on the main menu. Nowadays, it is difficult to imagine a modern state without the existence of political parties. Political parties play roles not only as channels of political aspirations of various groups of people and as vehicles to articulate political demands on the political system as a whole, but also as that only organizations competing to form government cabinets in modern states. No political party, no modern state.

Maurice Duverger (1963), in his cerebral and short article “A Caucus and Branch, Cadre Parties and Mass Parties”, contributes good insight into understanding the structure of political parties. His article helps us to simplify and compare the archaic types of political parties before, and at the beginning of, universal suffrage when the masses began to vote and to participate in public politics.

This short review will restate the main concept of Duverger's typology of the structure and ideology of political parties, and then criticize his typology. The main objective of this review is to put Duverger's analysis in a historical context in order to show the limitations of the application of Duverger's typology. By elaborating on the bias and the weaknesses of Duverger's analysis, one may develop a more complete perspective to frame the reality of political parties beyond the western world, such as those prevailing in third world countries.

DUVERGER'S TYPOLOGY

According to Duverger, a party is not a community but a collection of communities; political parties consist of many small groups that spread throughout the country (caucus, branches, local associations). All of these communities are, then, linked by a coordinated institution.

Duverger differentiates two types of political parties, not only by the structure of organization but also by political goal and ideology. One is the caucus (a cadre party) and the other is the branch (mass party).

A caucus is another name for a committee, clique or coterie. The structure of a caucus is decentralized. This type of organization seeks no expansion of membership and has only a small number of members. There is no propaganda to recruit members. This organization, even, does not admit membership and is a closed group. The activists of this type of organization are recruited by co-optation and formal nomination, not by open registration for all.

Although the members are few, this organization is quite powerful. A caucus gets its power not from the quantity of its members but from the quality. It is a group of notables. The activists of this organization are chosen because of their influence.

The limited membership is the result of the era when universal suffrage was still in its infancy. The people who had private property, not the masses. Hence, the locus of power was in the hands of the elite, not in the masses.

According to Duverger, there are two kinds of cadre parties. One is conservative. This party consists of aristocrats, industrial magnates, bankers and influential churchmen. The other is liberal. This party gets support from trade people, lesser industrialists, civil servants, lawyers, journalists and writers. However, after the rise of universal suffrage that gave the masses the right to vote, the cadre party started to decline.

The other type of party is a branch (mass) party. Duverger explains that the branch is less decentralized than the caucus. Unlike caucus, the branch intentionally seeks members. This is a mass party. What is important for a mass party is not quality but the quantity of members. Recruitment of members is not through co-optation but is wide open to all people. The mass party appeals to the masses not to the notables of the elite. This mass party is the invention of socialism and has, as a function, political education for the masses, the working class.

Duverger argues that the distinction between the cadre and mass party is not the size of the membership but the structure of the party's organization. For the mass party, the recruitment of members is the fundamental activity. From that political standpoint, the quantity of members is important for the education of the masses. The more members a party has, the more people can be influenced by this political education. Besides, the financial support for the party is generated from the masses, not from the elite. The mass party replaces the capitalist financing of electioneering by democratic financing. The subscription on the party is paid by the members.

However, according to Duverger, this distinction is only clear in the theory but not in practice. After the coming of universal

suffrage, the cadre party also sometimes admits members as practiced by the mass party. The Turkish Democratic Party claims that it has four million members whereas this party is a cadre party. On the other hand, the labor Party, as a mass party founded in 1990, has no personal members. Indeed, the election costs of the Labor Party by the trade unions. Nevertheless, the membership is collective, not individual. There is no personal pledge to the party.

From the spectrum of ideology, the cadre party and mass party represent different philosophies. The cadre party supports the rightist ideologies of Conservatism and Liberalism, while the mass party stands behind the leftist one of Socialism. Comparison and contrast of a cadre and mass party are clear and sharp.

CRITICISM

One cannot apply Duverger's typology to many countries in the third world. Duverger's typology of political parties contains very much bias from the experience of West European history. The structure of Caucus and Branch, Cadre and Mass Party, and the party ideologies of conservatism, Liberalism and Socialism, all are the brainchild of the history of Western Europe in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Many third world countries are not a part of this history.

At the time, Western Europe was in transition from feudalism to industrialization. This transition brought revolution in terms of restructuring of the classes within the society and introducing of new ideas. The birth of political parties as cadre and mass parties is a part of the conflict of interests and ideas among the classes within the society.

Before the coming industrialization, Western Europe was dominated by feudalism. In the era of feudalism, the system

was still dominated by the agrarian mode of production in which the main capital is the land. Hence, the main power came from the possession of land. No wonder, the dominant class at this time was the land owner and his family. The amount of power they had depended on the amount of land they owned and the number of people who worked on their land.

However, the land owners were not the only dominant class in the era of feudalism. The land owners also needed security from the threat of external power the rebellion of their own people. Kingdoms guaranteed security for the land owners. In return, the kingdom received money (tax) from the land owners. The king, queen and their family (nobility) shared the power with the land owners.

Another powerful group in feudalism was the religious leaders. Historically, until the middle ages, Western Europe had been dominated by the Holy Roman Empire. Public policy at that time was very much guided by the bible. Religious leaders had the capability to interpret God's commands in the bible. Since the bible is automatically powerful too.

The locus of power in feudalism is in the hands of the coalition between the land owners, kingdoms and religious leaders. These three groups produced the ideology of conservatism and the cadre party to maintain their domination. The ideology of conservatism supported traditional values and resisted revolutionary changes. This ideology, obviously, gave advantages to the status quo in which the land owners, kingdoms (nobility) and religious leaders held the power.

The political vehicle for them to maintain power in the new era of industrialization was the political party. However, the political party they needed was not the mass party that intentionally seeks power from the masses. At that time, the masses were still powerless. The party the status quo built was

the cadre party, the party of the elite, the party of nobility, and the party of few influential people.

The coming of the industrialization challenged the structure of feudalism. Industrialization introduced a new mode of production. Land was not the only important source of capital anymore. Technology as the result of science, factories geared toward mass production, and money as the medium for exchange of goods and services also became important capital. A new power was rising from this new capital. Scientist, writers, traders, educated people and bankers were beginning to gain power. This class was called the middle class, in opposition to the upper class (land owners, monarchy and religious leaders).

This new middle class produced its own ideology to challenge the domination of the upper class. Liberalism, as a new ideology, is very much a bias of interests of this new middle class. Liberalism supports equal opportunity, meritocracy and freedom of thought. Equal opportunity challenged the privileges of the noble families of the upper class. Careers based on merit rejected the domination of nobility which got its power, not through quality of work, but simple because of heredity. Freedom of thought questioned the authority of the bible as the only source of truth. By challenging the bible, indirectly, liberalism downgraded the domination of religious leaders.

Liberalism was born for the first time by supporting the new elite in the era of industrialization. The locus of power in the era of industrialization is the middle class. No wonder, the middle class stands behind the ideology of liberalism.

To struggle against the status quo (upper class, feudalism), the new middle class also drove the new political party. They needed an organization and national network to bring about change, a revolutionary change from feudalism to industrialization, from Conservatism to Liberalism. However, it was not the mass party

that they needed since they did not ask the masses to support them. What they needed was still the cadre party, the same type of party as that owned by the upper class. The difference between the cadre party of the middle class and that of the upper class is only that of ideology.

However, industrialization not only brought the new middle class with it. The intensive mass production of many factories also gave birth to another new class that had not existed before: the working class. It was the working class that supported the existence of the new industrialization by selling their cheap labor. There would be no industrialization without the existence of the working class.

The working class also has been an interesting holding power, even in taking over power, not only from the upper class but also from the new middle class. Hence, the working class, helped by the philosopher Karl Marx, developed its own ideology: Socialism, as the challenge to conservatism and liberalism. Conservatism defends the interests of the upper class, liberalism of the middle class, and socialism of the working class.

Socialism believes that the history of human being is the history of class struggle between the dominant class and the oppressed class. The main cause of social sufferings, according to socialism, is the exploitation of the oppressed class by the dominant class. This exploitation is possible because the dominant class owns the capital and the oppressed class works for them. Economic dependency, in turn, brings about psychological dependency, suffering and exploitation. The only solution to this exploitation is the rebellion of the oppressed class against the dominant class by taking over the ownership and changing private property into public property.

According to socialism, the oppressed class in the era of industrialization is the working class. Hence, the burden of

history to change the structure of society is in the hands of the working class. As a consequence, the working class should have a political vehicle for this historical duty. That vehicle is a political party.

However, differing from the political parties of the upper and middle class, a new structure was invented by the working class. The upper and middle classes have the cadre party but the working class developed the mass party. The locus of power in socialism is not in the hands of the elite but on the shoulders of the masses. The working class needs a political party, not only to struggle against the dominant class but also for political education for the members of the working class. The mass party is from the masses to the masses.

From the above explanation it is clear that Duverger's typology of political party such as caucus and branch, cadre and mass party, conservatism, liberalism and socialism, is based on the experience of West European history. This typology is correct for the western phenomen, but not for the other regions, such as third world countries. The typology of parties from Duverger does not fit the reality of parties in many third world countries, since not all parts of the world have experienced the same history as that of Western nations.

EXCEPTION

Giovanni Sartori (1966) did a comparative study on political parties in more than one hundred states. He finds so many varied party arrangements. Based on the number of parties, distribution of power and the ideological distances, Sartori comes up with seven classes of party system: one-party system, hegemonic system, pre-dominant system: two-party system, limited pluralism, extreme pluralism and atomized system.

Duverger's typology does not fit all of the above seven systems. The application of Duverger's typology is too limited to understand and to frame political parties from all over the world. Duverger's typology could fit any party's arrangement in West European countries, such as in the two-party system, limited pluralism, extreme pluralism and atomized system. However, we cannot apply Duverger's typology to understand, for example, the structure of political parties of the hegemonic system as described by Sartori. Many countries in the third world embrace the hegemonic system.

I would just like to raise one case study of the hegemonic system in Indonesia, to show how the structure of political parties is very different from the structure of a cadre and mass party as explained by Duverger. Prior to 1998 Indonesia had two types of political parties: a hegemonic party and two satellite parties. The former is hegemonic because this party was chosen by the government to dominate the political system. Indeed, there were still general elections. However, the general elections were set in a certain way "unclean and unfair" to ensure the hegemonic party won the election as a single majority. The latter are satellite parties because these parties were allowed to exist but were given no chance to win the election, or even to block the hegemonic party's advance toward a single majority status.

The hegemonic party in Indonesia had a unique structure. It was neither a cadre party, nor a mass party. This hegemonic party, unlike a cadre party or mass party from the western world, was not built by groups or classes within Indonesian society. This hegemonic party was built by government.

Obviously, this hegemonic party owned the masses support and their votes in the election, as happens to a mass party. This party also had members from the influential elite, as in a cadre party. However, unlike a cadre party or mass party,

within the structure of the hegemonic party of Indonesia, there were factions of government officials. There was a faction within the party from the military. There was also a faction from bureaucracy. The military and bureaucracy together, within the structure of the party, functioned as the politburo to control the policies of the party. Formally, the decision maker in the party was the party chairman. However, in practice the important decisions of the party were in the hands of the president of Indonesia who was not the chairman of that party.

Historical and sociological conditions in Indonesia are different from that of the western world. As a consequence, the different environment ends up with a different typology of political parties. Indonesia has a different conception about the role of the state. In western countries, as in the pluralist tradition, the state is referee and medium for the interest groups of people to compete with each other. The state has no goals or ideology of its own.

In western world, every group of people has the right to establish a political party. They can choose their own political and economic program. Through general elections, by using political parties, every group of people competes to get support from the voters. Any group which wins the general elections gets a mandate from the country as a whole to operate their own program.

However, in Indonesia the state is not referee. The state has its own program, goal and ideology. To operate this program the state, then, establishes a political party and gives this political party full support to win elections. This political party is nothing but a vehicle of the state apparatus. Since the general election is crucial for a modern state, the state also creates or helps create other parties. Nevertheless, other parties are allowed to exist for the sake of competing in the general election, but not to challenge the single majority status of the hegemonic party.

The state has an interest in building up the infrastructure of politics and economy in the country. It takes a long time to establish this infrastructure. Without a hegemonic party, the state is afraid that an alternation of power may change the political and economic programs. To prevent the above alternation the hegemonic party then received a holy mandate.

It is not without reason that Indonesia has chosen the hegemonic party system. In the 1950's, Indonesia tried to practice the multi-party system as practiced in the western world. In the conditions of low economic growth and a fragmented society (because of religious and ideological conflicts), the multi-party system ended up with instability. The government elected thru the general election was always a weak government, since it was the result of an uneasy coalition among the many parties. Six months after the election, some parties easily withdrew from the coalition and broke down the cabinet. A new cabinet was then formed, but this new cabinet faced the same problem. The multi-party system did not work out.

Another reason is that, in Indonesia, the locus of power was not in society but in the government. In the western world, the locus of power is in the classes in the society: the upper class, the middle class and the working class. These classes existed before the establishment of the nation state. Hence, these classes are stronger and older than the government of nation states.

The case of Indonesia is similar to that many other third world countries. Indonesia experienced colonialism. In the west, with the coming of industrialization, nation states were established as a result of nationalism. However, in countries such as Indonesia, it was not industrialization that gave birth to the government of a nation state, as happened in the western world. On the country, the government of a nation state plays the role as the main agent of industrialization. As a consequence,

the government is very strong and transcends all the classes within such as a society.

This is the real argument as to why the pluralist tradition of a state could not be applied to Indonesia. The state could not be neutral as a referee and let the political groups compete with each other. The state, in Indonesia, is the center of power. No wonder, the state establishes its own party and creates the hegemonic system that is alien to the western tradition.

The second difference is about the ideology of the party. The structures of the elite (cadre) and mass parties in the western world are very much result of the ideologies of conservatism, liberalism and socialism. The stratification of society is vertical, based on classes: elite and masses, bourgeois and working class. Each of the classes, then, develops their own ideology to defend their own interests. The result of this condition is the structure of political parties. Some of them are based on the elite (cadre), and others are based on the masses.

However, it is not the case in many third world countries, including Indonesia. The ideologies of people are not divided into Conservatism, Liberalism and Socialism. The influential value system that deeply people, as described by Clifford Geertz, is primordialism: the values of religion, race, kinship and ethnicity. The stratification of society is not vertically based on class, as is the case with West European countries, but horizontally based on culture.

The stratification of society affects the structure of political parties too. The parties are not divided vertically: cadre mass parties, but horizontally. All the parties in Indonesia in the 1950's had elements of both cadre and mass parties. The elite and the masses were unified, the division happened along the lines of culture. For the example, the elite and the masses of Islam were unified and had their own party together. The elite

and the masses of Christianity had their own party too. The elite and the masses of Chinese established parties for their own community as well.

The above conditions show us once again that the typology from Duverger, about the cadre and mass parties, has limited application for the world outside the western world, such as in Indonesia. In other words, Duverger's typology is quite accurate and strong for the study of political parties in the western world. However, for students who work on comparative politics beyond the western world, a different framework is needed.

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5

THE RISE AND FALL OF EAST ASIA

The rise of high economic development in East Asia stimulates many scholarly debates. One of them is about the politics of economic growth. In this debate, many scholars build a model to explain the correlation between economic growth and the structure of the states. They elaborate whether a certain structure of state (developmental state, predatory state, democratic state) is significant in promoting economic growth.

More sophisticated than this, Adam Przeworsky and Limonggi elaborate whether economic development is faster in democratic or authoritarian regimes. They conducted an empirical survey.

Economic development, according to Evans, is significantly influenced by the state's structure. Evans classifies three types of state structure. The first type is found in the states of western countries (minimal states, liberal states, democratic states). The second type is found in many East Asian countries (developmental

states). The third type of state exists in many African countries (predatory states).

First, the democratic state (liberal, minimal) is a state dominated by neo-classical economic policies. These types of politics are pro-market mechanism. The role of in the economy is minimal and restricted. The type of regime in this model is democratic. The government is controlled by various mechanisms, from congress to the press and interest groups. The economic growth of this model is stable, neither high nor low. However, these are the wealthiest nations in the world today.

Second, the developmental state is an authoritarian regime. Some experts (e.g. Haggard) frame the developmental state as an authoritarian regime, but apply neo-classical economic policies. The economic policies are more or less the same as those of western countries (pro-market economy). The difference between this system and those of western countries is only in the type of regime (authoritarian versus democratic).

However, prevailing literature on the developmental state argues that the dominant economic policies in this region are interventionist, and are protected authoritarian regimes. States are different from those of western countries, not only in their type of regime but also in economic policy.

Although authoritarian, the developmental state is competent and capable. These authoritarian regimes are able to promote very high economic growth. Economic growth in East Asia has been the highest (before 1990s), higher not only than those in Latin America and Africa but also than those in western countries themselves.

Third, the predatory state is an incompetent state. The economic policies of these states vary from pro-market to interventionist (staticism). The regime is authoritarian. Much corruption, nepotism and incompetent bureaucracy intervene in

economic policies. No wonder the growth of the economies in this model is very low or negative.

The above description illustrates that the predatory type of state is not conducive for economic development. On the country, this type of state structure will damage the economy. However, both democratic states and developmental states (authoritarian regimes) are able to provide economic growth, as proven by much empirical evidence. Which one is better: Democracy or Authoritarianism?

Przeworsky and Limonggi, then, explore much literature on the correlation between economic development and regime types. Among researches themselves, however, there is a great disagreement. Some claim that authoritarianism is better. Some say democracy is better. I will summarize those two claims.

a) Against Democracy

This claim underscores some weaknesses of democracy in supporting economic development, especially in the third world setting. However, this approach recognizes the strength of democracy in promoting clean government. Since public control, accountability and transparency are central to democracy, the predatory behavior of government can be reduced. Compared to authoritarianism, democracy is more likely to promote clean government.

However, democratic government is not autonomous from societal pressure. To be re-elected, a politician may adopt bad, but most popular, economic policies, such as distributing welfare programs. The consumption of government revenues may consequently be inefficient, since welfare programs have little to do with economic growth. And welfare programs may consume a substantial amount of government expenditure.

Democratic government is not free from the pressure of interest groups. Strong business people many have strong lobbies in the congress of executive branches. Politicians may adopt certain economic policies, not because those policies are good economically, but because they are needed by those strong interest groups. Gradually, these mechanism can reduce economic growth.

For the third world, democratic regimes are even more easily immobilized. In some third world countries, cleavage and ideological polarization are very wide. Democratic regime may not be strong enough to unify and accommodate the many various and competing ideas and interests. As a result, a democratic government becomes the arena for those conflicting groups, and thus produces inconsistent policies.

b) Against Authoritarianism

This claim underscores some weaknesses of authoritarian regimes to support economic growth continuously. However, this claim recognizes the ability of an authoritarian regime to be autonomous. This autonomy is important in countering, or even eliminating, societal pressures. Government policy is not distorted by interest groups or immediate pressure from the masses.

This claim also recognizes the ability of an authoritarian regime to maintain political stability. The sharp ideological polarization within a society can be repressed by this type of regime. Economic programs can be launched without inefficient negotiations ad interruptions by social pressure.

However, an authoritarian regime can easily turn to predatory behavior. Since this type of government is strong (too strong) and public control is weak (too weak), predatory behavior may spread and becomes uncontrollable. The process of decision making is not transparent and not improved through

public debates. Nepotism, corruption and moral hazard are encouraged.

The crisis of Asia economies nowadays is believed to be attributed of this moral hazard among business people and governments. The absence of public control and transparency, being the very attributes of authoritarianism, has inevitably produced predatory behavior. Economic growth is at risk and declining.

Based on the above descriptions, there are two competing theories explaining the miracle of Asia. In economic policy, the debate is between the supporters of the Free Market and those of the Governed Market. In political regimes, the debate is between democracy and authoritarianism.

However, the democratic approach is still not applicable to East Asian countries, since democracy in this region is still not yet consolidated. There are, however, three explanations for East Asia's Success. These are the Free Market, the Governed Market, and the role of the Authoritarian Approach.

The supporters of the Free Market claim that the miracle of Asia is caused by the widening role of the market mechanism, while the supporters of the Governed Market argue that this miracle is caused by the right intervention of the government in the economy.

The supporters of authoritarianism claim that authoritarianism work to promote economic growth since a political regime can keep political stability (by excluding popular movements and all oppositions) needed for economic growth, and by being free from interest groups pressure.

THE MELTDOWN

In 1997, there was a meltdown in Asia. Many East Asian countries, especially South Korea, Thailand and Indonesia experienced massive economic crises. States with previously high growth rates face hard times nowadays. Why did it happen? What made high economic growth reverse into an economic crisis?

The theories explaining the Miracle of Asia cannot explain these phenomena. One may assume that the role of that market now produce an economic crisis? What is wrong with the role of the market? The same question can be asked of the other explanations, such as the governed market, authoritarianism and the democratic approach.

The reality of what is happening in Asia is still under debate. Even a prominent economist such as Paul Rugman confesses that he does not know what is happening. He just makes some speculations based on economic theories. Gradually, through deep research, social science will discover the real causes of this crisis.

In this paper, I would just like to highlight one important variable worth considering. Since I am not trained as an economist, my speculation about this crisis is still based on political theory (public policy).

One important variable ignored by these three approaches (the Free Market, the Governed Market and Authoritarianism) is policy implementation. The Free Market and the Governed Market approaches concern themselves too much with policy agenda (policy ideology). In this debate they simply concentrate on whether the role of government in the economy is too much or too little. They forget that bad policy implementation can make a good policy agenda bad, and a bad policy agenda worse.

Economic policy agenda alone (free market or governed market) is never sufficient to endorse economic growth. A good economic policy agenda needs good policy implementation. However, bad policy implementation alone is sufficient to create an economic crisis.

Changes in the equality of policy implementation, in my opinion, has caused the changed condition of some East Asian countries from high economic growth to crisis. Policy implementation refers to bureaucratic competence and clean government.

What causes changes in the equality of policy implementation? The answer is authoritarianism! There develops a deepening of predatory behavior since public control of government and big business is weak. In referring to the principle of Lord Acton that "Power tends to corrupt", we can see that without strong public control, the flow of big capital is distorted by the moral hazards of big business and the predatory behavior of high government officials. Bad policy implementation destroys the economy and the spirit of entrepreneurship.

Obviously, my speculation is still tentative and hypothetical. I need to conduct empirical research in order to prove or disprove it.

However, the East Asian will continue to grow on one condition. Governments there, helped by international organization (IMF, Human Right Watch), should make serious political and economical reforms in order to prevent such as predatory behavior and moral hazards. The success or failure of the renewed growth of the continued stagnation of East Asian countries depends on the success or the failure of those economic and political reforms.

The big debates between the free market and governed market and between the developmental state and the liberal

state (minimal state) should give more attention to policy implementation.

6

DEALING WITH PRIMORDIAL SENTIMENT

In Southeast Asia, from Vietnam to Indonesia, from Burma to Malaysia, one finds many ethnic groups. There are Vietnamese in Vietnam, Burmese in Burma, Malays and India in Malaysia, Japanese and Timorese in Indonesia, Thai in Thailand, and Chinese in Singapore.

As an ethnic group, each of them has its own culture, religion, region and blood ties. Within this ethnic group, members share common interest from generation to generation since hundreds of years ago. The membership of a certain ethnic, may be functioning as a wall to separate our world from their world. The ethnic groups are potential to be emotionally driven communities and the basis of bloody conflicts.

However, since the beginning of the twentieth century, peoples in Southeast Asia have become familiar with the new type of grouping, nationalism. As an ideology, nationalism is quite new. The western world was driven by national interest

not longer than 300 years ago, around eighteenth century, as a reaction to the universality and hegemony of the church.

Through western education, many leaders in Southeast Asia became familiar with the rhetoric of nationalism. They, then, were driven by the dream of national independence. After the Second World War, not longer than fifty years ago, many new states were established as a reaction to colonialism. The people in Southeast Asia have been encountered with the nationalism for less than one hundred years.

A new chapter of history in Southeast Asia has been written. Colonialism has been gone but new problem have arisen. People in these areas should learn how to live with two identities at once. They are members of ethnic groups and at the same time they are the citizens of the new states also. They are expected to have the national sentiment as the aura of their new identity, while the emotional ties to their ethnic groups are still there.

Gradually, the national sentiment, then, ask them to sacrifice and subordinate their loyalty over ethnic groups to the sentiment of the greater communities: the new nation states. In these new nation states, they, even, should take people from different ethnic groups as members and brothers of the same nations. People of Malay, Chinese and India are expected to put their citizenship of Malaysia higher than their loyalty to their own ethnics.

No wonder national integration becomes a long and difficult project. If their citizens are coming from many ethnic groups, divided emotionally, the new nation states will be in deep troubles. People there can be involved in social jealousy to each other and end up with social riots. The problems will deteriorate if an ethnic is forced to join a new state as a result of political struggles, as is the case of East Timor in Indonesia.

This short essay raises the problems of national integration in Southeast Asia. I will elaborate how the countries in these areas deal with the divided society, minority group, and build a national culture. The emphasis is given to two countries, Indonesia and Malaysia. The perspective I use to frame this problem is "Island-Mainland" pattern as presented by William Liddle. At the end, I will give some notes to this perspective.

PERSPECTIVE

Indeed, ethnicity is not the only cultural element that divides society. Geertz, for example, introduce the wider concept of primordialism. This term refers to all the cultural elements got by anyone since he or she is born. The cultural elements, such as kinship, race, language, region, religion and custom constitute the identity of member of a cultural group and usually never change.

The division between one and another person will culturally be deeper if both of them are different in many elements such as race, religion, and language. The difference between the Chinese and Malay is big since they are different in terms of ethnicity, religion and language. However, the difference between the Javanese and Sundanese in Indonesia is not deep since they share the same religion: Islam.

How serious is the primordial sentiment for the project of national integration in the plural society? Deutsh (in McAllister, 1973) argues that primordial sentiment is only psychological and will fade away over time. Modernity through social mobilization such as economic development, modern education, and exposure to mass media, will give them a new identity. In short, modernity will transform these people to sharing similar attitudes and emotions as the western men. As long as the government keeps the development in the right track (follow

the guidelines of modernization), primordialism will not be a problem for national integration.

However, Clifford Geertz argues in reverse. According to him, the primordial sentiment is deeper than what the outsiders think. Modernity may change many material worlds but not primordial ties. Primordial ties are the product of tradition from hundreds of years ago while modernity is quite new. The breakdown of many communist regimes and the revival of many new nations based on ethnic and religion in 1990s make the argument of Geertz more salient.

The perspective of Island and Mainland is basically the modification of the analysis of primordial sentiment. This perspective puts an emphasis on the composition of primordial groups in a certain nation. The term Mainland is for the countries that are located in the mainland. The mainland countries are commonly dominated by only one single ethnicity of more than 75%. The term Islands is for the countries that are located in Island. The Island countries usually have many ethnic groups. The social consequences of the composition of ethnic groups are far and crucial.

APPLICATION

Let us apply the above perspective to the world of Southeast Asia. Located in the mainland, Vietnam, for example, is dominated by Vietnamese. Around 90% of Vietnam's people are the "ethnic" Vietnamese. Burma is also dominated overwhelmingly by the Burmese. Up to 75% of the citizens of Burma are Burmese.

Located in the Island, such countries as Indonesia, the Philippines and Malaysia have plural ethnicity and no single ethnic group dominates population by more than 75%. Malaysia and the Philippines, for example, have the ethnicity

of Malay, Chinese and India. In Malaysia, the Malays make up only 50%, Chinese 35% and India 15% of the total population. In Indonesia, the Javanese, as the dominant ethnic group, make less than 60%. Indeed, in Indonesia the Muslim population is very huge, around 90%. However, this Muslim community is divided into many ethnic groups and tens local languages.

The distinction between mainland and island countries is very important for some reasons. We formulate this importance by outlining the advantage and disadvantage of being mainland and island countries.

1. Mainland Countries

For the mainland countries, the identity of a nation state and the identity of ethnic groups are almost identical since these nation states are dominated overwhelmingly only by a single ethnic group. They do not need to build a new platform for a national culture and national sentiment. However, this is not the case for the island countries should try to build a national platform for all.

The national culture of Burma, for example, could only be a slight modification of the Burmese culture. However, the national culture of Indonesia ought to combine many ethnic cultures. To have in a sentiment of patriotism of Burma, the Burmese did not have to make a great effort. However, to have the sentiment of being Indonesians, the Javanese or the Sundanese should transcend their own local ethnicity and transform themselves to the national culture.

The mainland countries do not have many problems with national unity. They lack conflicts of ethnics and religion that are usually very deep, bloody, and emotional, such as those occurred in Bosnia. The primordial hostility may divide a society and needs a very long time for recovery. The divided society

may even break a country into many parts as well, as is the case of the former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia.

The minority within mainland countries is usually treated as the second class citizens. It is almost impossible for the minority to get the highest position in the public office since it would raise social jealousy of the majority. Non-Thai people in Thailand, non-Burmese in Burma or non-Vietnamese in Vietnam are expected to accept the unequal social opportunity.

If they are lucky and their countries are democratic, they may ask affirmative actions, such as those taken by Muslims in India, or black people in USA. Through affirmative action, the minority is protected to get a certain quota in education and work place proportional to their percentage out of the total population. However, not all minorities have that privilege. The non-Muslims in Pakistan are the still the second class citizens.

Compared to the island countries, the mainland countries get more difficulties in transforming themselves to modernity since they are more shadowed by their past characteristics. As the almost single ethnic community, they already have their own coherent culture. They have lived in this culture for hundreds of years, while modernity has its own values, such as the culture of competition, people sovereignty and equal position of men (no privilege for noble family and the king). These modern cultures are relatively in contradiction with the old cultures of Southeast Asia.

To be modern, the above countries have to adopt new values. To adopt new values, those countries have to leave behind a part of their old customs that may not be compatible. The more coherent the old culture is, the more difficult it is for a people to adopt new values.

If the people are lucky, they will have a positive mixed culture. Japan is the successful example of this mixed culture.

While adopting the new culture of democracy, Japan is still dominated by its old culture. The result of this cultural mix is unique. Japan has its own style of democracy. Instead of competitive party, for example, Japan has a dominant party, LDP that dominated Japanese political system for more than 35 years (1955-1993). Instead of market capitalism, Japan has state-led capitalism in which the bureaucracy and paternalism play significant roles.

Another disadvantage of mainland countries is the ethnic chauvinism. A single and coherent ethnic, which governs a national state, could have the idea of ethnic superiority. The problems are coming when this idea of superiority drives that country to conquer other countries by wars. The mongoloid race chauvinism in Japan contributed to the outbreak of the Second World War and so did that of the Arians in Germany under Hitler.

2. Island Countries

The disadvantages of island countries are the opposite of those of the mainland countries. Since the island countries are plural in ethnicity, conflicts and riot caused by ethnicity are common. Malaysia experienced a big, bloody and emotional riot in 1969 as a result of conflict between the Malay and the Chinese. A riot caused by the sentiment of anti-Chinese happens many times in Indonesia; and until now, the sentiment remains an unsolved problem. Different from mainland countries, the island countries are trying very hard to establish national unity.

In the island countries, the national cultures are also always in question. These countries were established as a construction of the former colonial rulers. Indeed, every ethnic group within the island countries has its own local culture. However, the national culture is not only a sum up of all the ethnic cultures. To

grow naturally, a national culture needs togetherness and the long common experience of people from many different ethnic backgrounds. Modernity needs quite a long time to be rooted in people's minds.

Since the national culture of many countries is still growing and has not emotionally unified the whole population, while, at the same time, loyalty to ethnic communities is still strong the threat of separatism remains significant. The Philippines, Malaysia, and Indonesia face this threat. The Muslim Moro in the Philippines are still struggling to build their own state. Aceh, in Indonesia, is often wracked by separatist movements too.

Nevertheless, compared to mainland countries, in island countries, the minority receives better treatment in Indonesia; there are no legal discriminations against the minority. As a dominant ethnic, Javanese people have no privilege of a certain quota in civil servants, government loan or education. The Palembangnese, Sundanese, and Mollucans among the minority groups, receive equal opportunities in public life. There is no discrimination on religious basis either. The Hindu, Buddhist, or Christians have the same chance as the Muslims.

3. Pretending

However, the perspective of Mainland-Island cannot explain the reality in Malaysia and Singapore. Based on location and composition of their ethnic group, Malaysia should behave as an island country, and Singapore should behave as mainland country.

Malaysia is located in island and no single ethnic group dominates its population by more than 75%. In this country, the Malays make only about 50%. However, the ethnic Malays have special rights that are guaranteed by the constitution under Article 153. Different from other ethnic groups, the

Malays have the reservation of quotas for employment in the federal public service, armed forces, business permits or licenses and forbidden to be questioned (The Economist Intelligence Unit, 1995). Based on the pattern of Mainland-Island, only a mainland country should treat minorities that way, not an Island country such as Malaysia.

On the other hand, Singapore has a dominant ethnic group. In that country the Chinese make up about 75% of the population, Malay 5% and India about 10%. However, Singapore, as a Mainland-Island, only a mainland country should treat the minority equally. There is no discrimination against the minority. Based on the distinction of Mainland-Island, the nice treatment to the minority is practiced by an island country, not a mainland country such as Singapore.

However, do we explain the above incompatibility between theory and reality? Does our perspective (Mainland-Island) fail to fit the reality? It is told that Malaysia is an island country, while Singapore is a mainland country that pretends to be an island country. The addition of pretention in the above explanation is to save the perspective of Mainland-Island to fit the reality. By adding the word pretending, this theory survives. The addition of pretention is a kind of an intellectual maneuver, the politics to save a theory.

SUCCESS STORY

Indonesia and Malaysia are example of the success stories of national integration in the condition of a divided society (multi-ethnics). Two criteria of success are political stability and economic growth. Political stability is important as a criterion since this concept indicates no serious riots and disintegration for a long period of a time. Economic growth is also important since this concept shows how far these plural societies can work

productively together under the roof of a nation state.

Indonesia, since 1974, has been absent of serious riots. Indeed, there have been separatist movements in Aceh and riots against the Chinese. However, these riots could be solved without shaking national politics. Since, 1969, Malaysia has been also very stable politically. In terms of economic growth, Indonesia and Malaysia are wonderful. World Bank gave good words for these two countries and listed them as part of the miracles from East Asia.

To get this success, Indonesia and Malaysia adopt different policies: two different roads to Rome. In politics, Malaysia establishes the grand coalition. Barisan Nasional as the ruling party is the coalition of party of Malay (UMNO), party of Chinese (MCA) and party of India. With the establishment of the grand coalition, all important ethnic groups are expected to have the sense of belonging to the ruling party, government and national policies.

However, Indonesia to get the same result, chose a different strategy prior to 1998. Indonesia gradually excluded all the primordial sentiments from politics. Through this strategy, public sphere was expected to be free from primordial conflicts. The number of parties was limited to three. The only ideology for these was the state ideology, Pancasila, not the primordial platform, such as Islam. At the same time, there was prohibition to condemn primordial elements in public.

In economy, Malaysia chose the policy of discrimination. To close the gap between the Chinese and the Malays, the government of Malaysia gave certain privileges to the Malays. In the constitution, for example, it is written that the Malays have certain quotas in civil service, bank credits, military and education. The government also developed New Economic Policy (NEP) that intentionally facilitates the economy of the Malays.

Indonesia has no intention to give a privilege to a certain ethnic group. Every ethnic group is treated equally. However, in 1950s, there was an economic policy called “Program Benteng”. This policy –similar to NEP in Malaysia– gave the privilege to the indigenous businessmen. This program did not work and was destroyed by large scale corruption among the bureaucrats. At present, we hardly hear an intention to revive such program as “Benteng Program” anymore.

Why is the Indonesia government nicer to the Chinese? Obviously, many variables should be explored to answer this question properly. However, one of them is a matter of threats. In Malaysia, Chinese make up a round 35% of the population while in Indonesia, Chinese make up a only 4%. In Malaysia, Chinese are more threatening.

There is also the matter of social riots. Indonesia experiences more frequent social riots against the Chinese. However, Indonesia never has a very shaking social riot such as that which stroke Malaysia in 1969. The 1969 riot brought Malaysia to drawing a policy of discrimination to give the privilege to the Malays.

The roles of leaders matter, too. If Indonesia leaders would like to adopt discriminative policies against the Chinese, those leaders could easily get a popular support. However, Indonesian leaders choose not to adopt giving the privilege to indigenous people anymore.

Many variables play important roles in the project of national integration. The perspective of Mainland-Island alone cannot explain all the various phenomena. The Mainland-Island perspective puts too much emphasis only on the composition of ethnic groups. In this modern era, ethnicity is not the only source of conflicts and solidarity. In modern Malaysia, for example, political conflicts also occur within the same ethnic group. The

Malays in Semangat 46 party are in conflict with the Malays in UMNO. The Chinese the Democratic Action Party (DAP) are in opposition to the Chinese in MCA. The Malays in Semangat 46, then, cooperate with the Chinese in DAP for opposing the Malay in UMNO, who cooperate with the Chinese in MCA.

From the case of Indonesia and Malaysia as explained above, beside ethnic problems, the project of national integration will be determined by many other variables too, such as the role and the choice of leaders to manage conflicts, government policies to minimize the gap among ethnic groups, historical background (e.g. existence of serious social riots), and the success of economic programs for fulfilling the basic need of people.

All above independent variables should be added into the perspective of the Mainland-Island theory in order to build a better model explaining national integration in Southeast Asia.

7

DEVELOPMENT IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

In 1993, the World Bank published a policy research report *The East Asian Miracle*. This publication as a regional study loaded with lofty ambitions. It describes economic development in East Asia in order to explain the causes of development and to come up with a recommendation for other regions.

In the East Asian region, according to this report, between 1965 and 1990 twenty-three countries grew faster than those in all other regions of the world. The leaders of East Asia such as Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and China are the new economic powers of the world at present. They are the miracles.

Some of the fastest growing countries in East Asia are located in Southeast Asia: Singapore, Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia. Singapore, according to the above report, is one of the tigers of East Asia. Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia are three newly-industrializing economies. However, Southeast Asia

also has Myanmar. In 1988, Myanmar even had a negative growth rate of minus 11.4%.

This short paper will loosely address the wealth of nations of eight countries in Southeast Asia: Indonesia, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Vietnam, Brunei and Thailand. Compared to World Bank report, this paper uses different measurements of development and adds different explanations too.

A. MEASUREMENT

How do we measure the wealth of a nation? The most popular measurements is Gross National Product (GNP) or Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita as used by the World Bank reports. These two terms refer to the total volume of goods and services in one country. The total volume, then, is divided by the total population. There are four items calculated to get the amount of GNP and GDP: spending of government, spending of consumers, investment of producers and net export (total export minus total import).

The way to calculate GDP and GNP is slightly different. The GDP of Indonesia, for example, includes any economic outcomes in Indonesia territory regardless of the citizenship of the actors, and will not compute any economic activity outside of Indonesian territory although the actors are citizens of Indonesia. On the other hand, the GNP of Indonesia calculates any economic activity of Indonesian in Indonesia also outside of Indonesia. Moreover, the GNP will not take into account any economic outcomes of non-Indonesians although they do their business in Indonesia.

The popularity of GNP and GDP is due to reasons. The first reason is that these measurements are practical. It is easy to collect data and to score the GNP and GDP of a nation. One

just takes all the data needed and sums it up, without giving any interpretation or judgment in order to get final score of GDP and GNP. It is different from, say, the measurement of political freedom. The term political freedom is qualitative. The data for the measurement of this term is nominal and needs a lot of interpretation or personal judgment in determining whether a certain policy will get a certain score – low or high.

For the sake of comparison among countries, GNP and GDP are practical too. The categorization of developed countries and developing countries is a derivation from the total amount of GNP. A country with GNP per capita of as much as \$20,000 would be called a developed country and a country with GNP per capita of \$9000 would be labeled as a developing country.

The second reason is the income of a country or a person reflects their economic power. Since almost every economic activity has a final cost, the more income people have, the more choice they have in spending their income. A person with an income of around \$20,000 per year is obviously more powerful and has many more consumer choices than a person with an income of \$750 per year. GDP and GNP, then, easily reflect the economic power of a country.

However, since last decade many criticisms have been addressed to GNP or GDP as measurements of the wealth of nations. One of them is from the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), an agency of the United Nations. UNDP has issued a new measurement of the wealth of nations since this institution finds a lot of weaknesses with GNP or GDP. UNDP names its measurement the Human Development Index (HDI).

The wealth of nation, according to UNDP (1990) is not the economy but the people. Economy should be one among many measurements, but not the only measurement, since the quality of life of people cannot be reduced to the amount of money

these people have. Putting GNP or GDP as the indicator of wealth and the objective of development, according to UNDP, downgrades the dignity of human beings. Financial possession is only the means for achieving another purpose, not the purpose itself.

A long and healthy life, for example, is not measured by GNP or GDP. The high GNP and GDP of a country do not automatically mean that the people in that country enjoy long and healthy lives.

An increase in GNP may also mean an increase in social ills, such as increasing abuse of drugs and alcohol, AIDS and many things that are detrimental to human health. A greater GNP does not connote a reduction in social deprivation and economic inequality, either. Economic growth is one thing, and social deprivation quite another. Theoretically and empirically, it is possible that an increase in the percentage of people who cannot fulfill their basic need.

The Human Development Index adds other variables to be incorporated with GNP/GDP for measuring the wealth of nations. The first variable is life expectancy. To have a longer life is the purpose of most people. Included in the concept of life expectancy is quality of health, nutrition, and the possibility to fulfill one's dreams. It is assumed that longer someone lives on this earth, the likelier it is he will achieve and experience many choices in life.

The second variable is adult literacy. People who are literate will have more chances to enjoy their lives, especially in the age of information of today. Implicitly, literacy also means the skills someone has to utilize his or her own capability. An increase in literacy rate, according to this perspective, means an increase of the wealth of a nation.

The third variable is the adjustment of Gross Domestic Product (GDP). For comparison among countries, GDP only gives a little help since there are problems of distortion of international exchange and the presence of non-tradable goods. HDI uses an adjusted GDP that reflects more accurately the power to buy. For example, Rp 100,000 in Indonesia has the same value as US\$15 in USA. However, in Indonesia, someone can hire another person to help him everyday for Rp 100,000 a month. In the US we cannot hire a person for that same job for only US\$15 a month. Hence, the buying power of US\$15 in the USA is different from that of US\$15 in Indonesia. The power to buy (adjusted GDP) reflects the real value of money more appropriately.

Instead of GNP or GDP as used by the World Bank, this paper uses the human development index to measure and compare the development of countries in Southeast Asia. Three tables below compare the GDP and adjusted GDP (Table 1), Human Development Index (Table 2), and the growth rates (Table 3) of Southeast Asian countries. The growth rate is added to HDI since it shows the speed of growth in a certain country.

Table 1, Table 2 and Table 3 in this paper give different pictures of the economic conditions of a number of countries in Southeast Asia. Table 1 shows that Brunei has the highest GDP even higher than that of Singapore. However, Brunei's Human Development Index is slightly lower than Singapore's (Table 2). When we elaborate the growth rate (Table 3), Brunei is one of the worst. Brunei, indeed, is a rich country, but unfortunately this country is not growing economically. Brunei is not a success story for a developing economy.

Table 1
Adjusted GDP (\$)

Country	GDP	Adjusted GDP
Indonesia	2,950	2,950
Malaysia	7,790	5,223
Myanmar	751	751
Philippines	2,550	2,550
Singapore	18,330	5,344
Vietnam	1,010	1,010
Brunei	20,589	5,361
Thailand	5,950	5,950

Source: Human Development Report, 1995

Table 2
Human Development Index
Southeast Asia 1992

Country	GDP Adjusted \$	Life Expectancy (years)	Adult Literacy Rate (%)	HD Index
Indonesia	2,950	62,7	82,5	0,637
Malaysia	7,790	70,8	81,5	0,822
Myanmar	751	57,6	82	0,457
Philippines	2,550	66,3	94	0,677
Singapore	18,330	74,8	89,9	0,878
Vietnam	1,010	65,2	91,9	0,539
Brunei	20,589	74,2	86,4	0,868
Thailand	5,950	69	93,5	0,827

Source: Human Development Report, 1995

Vietnam is at other extreme. In Table 3, the growth of Vietnam is one of the best in Southeast Asia. However, GDP and the adjusted GDP of Vietnam are one of the worst. The HDI of Vietnam is also one of the worst, superior to Myanmar only. The Philippines has a better score in GDP and HDI than Indonesia. However, the growth rate of the Philippines is very bad. In 1984, 1985 and 1991 the Philippines experienced negative growth, while Indonesia had stable high growth.

Table 3
Growth Rate (%)
Southeast Asia

Year Country	84	85	86	87	88	89	90	91	92	Average
Indonesia	7	2.5	5.9	4.9	5.8	7.5	7.1	6.6	6.3	5.9
Malaysia	7.8	1.1	1.1	5.4	8.9	9.2	9.7	8.7	7.8	6.4
Myanmar	4.9	9.9	-1.1	-4	-11.4	3.7	2.8	-	10.9	0.9
Philippines	-7.3	-7.3	3.4	4.8	6.3	6.7	2.7	-0.7	0	0.9
Singapore	1.3	-1.5	1.1	9.4	11.1	9.2	1.3	6.7	5.1	6.5
Vietnam	8.7	6.2	2.9	7	5.2	8	5.1	6	8.3	6
Brunei	0.1	1.5	2.7	2	1.1	1.1	2.7	3.6	1	0.3
Thailand	5.8	4.6	5.5	9.5	13.3	12.3	11.8	7.9	7.4	8.6

Source: Statistical Yearbook 1993 (recalculated)

Based on the above three tables, the success story of economic development in Southeast Asia is so far occurring Singapore, Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia. The growth rates of these four countries are, from 1984 – 1991, above 5% on average. The GDP and HDI of these four countries are the highest too, except compared to Brunei and the Philippines. The worst developments are in Myanmar and Vietnam. The Philippines and Brunei are in the middle. Based on the growth rates Brunei is the worst. However, since the GDP and HDI of Brunei are very high, we cannot claim that Brunei is a development failure.

B. EXPLANATION

How should the above cases be explained? Why are Singapore and Thailand successful and Myanmar a failure? Why does Brunei have a high GDP and HDI but also a stagnant economy? Why do the Philippines have a setback economically by experiencing a negative growth rate? To answer these questions appropriately would take very serious research and very long paper. The definitive answer to these question is really beyond the ability of this paper. This short paper only highlights some points and raises some hunches. There are, however, some general explanations for economic growth.

1. The Role of the market

Classical and neoclassical economists explain that the growth of the economy is due to the greater role of the free market. Indeed, economic development is the function of capital, skilled labor, high technology, natural resources and entrepreneurship. However, all of these factors of production are only maximal in the free market system.

The term “free market” refers to economic system where allocation of resources and production are set by the price. In that free market system, price is determined by voluntary

actions and exchanges between producers and consumers, not by the government. An increase in the role of the free market leads to an increase of economic productivity and efficiency.

Why does free market lead to the most productive and efficient economy? The economists, from Adam Smith to Milton Friedman, give three reasons. The first reason is the principle of self-interest and rational being. These economists assume that human being, by nature, is rational and self-interested. The driving force is never interrupted and governs human being to be greater than they were. With the freedom they have, individuals behave rationally to select, to adopt and to apply any means they think fit their interest best. If these people are given the freedom to achieve their own self-interest, they give the maximal effect on developing the society as a whole through the invisible hand.

Free market is the most compatible system with above assumption. Free market let every individual to achieve his or her own interest as long as there is no harm to others. Every transaction in the free market should be based on voluntary actions.

The second reason is the principle of competition. Every individual is driven to be more efficient because he or she is in competition with others. If someone is not competitive, he or she will be defeated. Competition drives individuals to find any means to produce the best quality with the lowest cost since it is the only way to get the highest profit. At the same time, competition also reduces all the unproductive elements of the economy. If other variables are held constant and the same, company A produces 15 units of Y in one week, while company B produces only 5 units of Y in one week, company B is considered inefficient compared to company A. Since company B is in competition with company A, company B will be driven

to produce Y as efficiently or more efficiently than company A because B does not want to be out of the market.

Free market is the most compatible system with the principle of competition. In the free market, every party has freedom to entry or exit from the market. The producers and the customers of any goods could be anyone who is interested. This system lets the mechanism of the market itself, not political hand, decide; to use Lasswell's phrase, "who should get what, when, where and how".

The third reason is the principle of individual as a unit. This principle argues that the society is no more and no less than only the collection of individuals. A society has no interest or goal except the various interest and goals of the individuals that constitute this society. The growth of society is the growth of individuals within this society. In Pareto formulation, it is said that if one individual is better-off too. Individuals are the center of growth of a society. If many individuals increase their income, their society will be growing too.

Free market is the most compatible system with the principle as a unit. Free market lets individuals, regardless of their race, gender, religions, ethnic, nationalities and communities, get their best achievement. All the primordial identities of the individuals are not relevant to the market. A blackman who works better will get more than a white man works worse. A female who has a better skill will be paid higher than a male with a worse skill. In the free market, every individual has an equal chance to grow as fast as possible and as high as possible.

What is the role of government in the free market? As argued by Milton Friedman, the role of government should be as minimal as possible. According to him, the government is only needed when the market cannot work. If the market works, obviously, the government is not needed. The hand of

government in the market, except in the case of a market failure, only raises inefficiency. Friedman proposes these four roles of the government in the case of a market failure: referee or umpire that establishes and enforces law, the role to prevent monopoly, the role to prevent externalities (e.g. pollution) and paternalistic role (protect the elderly and disabled people).

The role of the market in facilitating economic growth in Southeast Asia is salient. All the successful economies in this area: Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand and Indonesia, have adopted free market principles. At the same time, Myanmar and Vietnam as the cases of failure are the countries of socialism, adopting the centrally-planned economy that violates the market principles. However, the economic setback in the Philippines cannot be explained by the market alone. In the Philippines's case, the political environment since the fall of Marcos has not been favorable for the free market.

In Indonesia, open market has been adopted since 1966. The New Order led by Soeharto took over the political power from the socialism-inspired regime under Soekarno. Helped by the liberal economists from Berkeley, USA, Soeharto changed the economic system to the market-friendly mechanism.

In December 1966, in a meeting with the creditors in Paris, Indonesia's new government declared four principles of economy. The first principle is that the market mechanism would play the vital role in economic stabilization. Second, state-owned companies would be in competition with the private sectors. The competition would force state-owned companies to be efficient and rational. Third, there would be reduction on trade barriers. Hence, the private sectors could import any goods they need in cheaper prices. Fourth is that there would be encouragement for foreign investment by issuing a new law with many reductions of tax and addition of incentives.

Indeed, there has been a fluctuation of liberalization in Indonesia's economy since 1966. Protection is still in place here and there, especially for infant industries. However, in general, the liberalization and market mechanism in Indonesia's economy is getting deeper and deeper. In 1995, Indonesia even hosted the APEC meeting. In that meeting, Indonesia strengthened her commitment for free trade and market economy.

2. Developmental State

Obviously, the role of the market is not only independent variable used by the experts to explain the growth of economy. Contradicted with the neoclassical economists, some experts highlight that government intervention and the role of bureaucracy in the market are positive for economic growth. In Japanese political tradition, for example, the most powerful bureaucrats are from MITI (Ministry of International Trade and Industry) and MOF (Ministry of Finance). Both of these departments are pioneers in formulating and implementing economic plans. We can quote Chalmers Johnson (1995) who wrote the book *Japan Who Governs? The Rise of Developmental State*. The term developmental state refers to mechanism where the state (government) plays leading roles in economic planning. Developmental state is different from socialism since in developmental state, the private sectors are still dominant. The government does not own all the important companies as of the case in socialism.

Developmental state is different from western capitalism as well. In western capitalism, the government let free market be a dominant mechanism for the economy. Western economists believe that the role of the government should be as minimal as possible. However, in developmental state, the role of the government is very big in pushing economic growth.

There are four agendas of government in developmental state: giving loans, tax incentives, protectionism and cooperation with the private sector. Cheap loans are available for private companies, especially for small businesses, to enlarge the pie of national productions. There is also tax incentive for establishing research as the infrastructure for industry and export commodity. At the same time, the state protects domestic industries by building trade barriers for imports. The tariff is very high, for example, 40% for automobiles. There are many quotas for foreign products. The state also cooperates with private sectors to identify and formulate policies.

The phenomena of developmental state are evident in some other East Asian countries like South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore. Hence some experts claim the developmental state to be the style of East Asian Government. Different from western countries, such as Britain and USA, East Asian Countries, including Japan, did not link themselves to international trade until very late. The competition in world economy is very high. They have no other choice to win the competition but by involving the government in the trade policy, through protectionism and macroeconomic tools (tax, subsidies and interest rates).

Why is the government intervention to the market positive to economic growth? International economy, according to this perspective, is not as competitive as what the neoclassical economists think. In the real world, for example, there are many trading blocks that discriminate trade barriers. European communities have different taxes for its members and for the outsiders. In the real world, there is no government that does give subsidies to some industries either. Every new state also has infant domestic industries that should be protected against competition. As a consequence, different from the recommendation from neoclassical economists, to deal with

above problems, the government could interfere in the market to create better economic outcomes.

Malaysia is good example of the role of the government in the market. Ling (in McVey, 1993) explains the big change of government role after the big riot in 1969. The big riot forced Malaysian government to be more active in directing the market. Many public enterprises have been established since the riots. Some of the enterprises are MIDF (Malaysian Industrial Development Finance), NISIR (National Institute of Scientific and Industrial Research), and FIDA (Federal Agriculture Marketing Authority).

Through the New Economic Policy (NEP) the government in Malaysia is committed not only to reduce poverty and to increase national welfare but also to reduce the gap between the race of Malay and Chinese. The government gives privilege to ethnic Malay in bank credits, in job markets and in education. The Malays have certain quotas. This privilege is protected by their constitution. In the name of political stability, the privilege for the Malay is unlawful to be questioned. Regardless of the normative considerations, this government-led NEP has brought political stability and economic success to Malaysia.

Two above perspectives might still be insufficient to explain the success stories and the failures of the economy. The economy of Southeast Asia also has its own uniqueness. Different from other areas in Southeast Asia, the Chinese-either as minority or majority, play the significant role in economic growth. To explain the economic growth, Richard F. Donner also proposes other independent variables: the role of non-state institutions such as networking, associations of big businesses. One may put the leadership syndrome in the list of independent variables. This term refers to the role of leaders in utilizing political resources for supporting economic programs.

These additional variables deserve to get a lot of attention from anybody who wants to search the truth on this topic in the future.



8

POLITICAL SCIENCE THEORIES: A CRITIQUE

According to William Rikker, compared to the development of science in economics and natural sciences, political science is backward. In terms of the ability to explain and predict reality, economics and natural science are much more powerful and stronger than is political science.

The backwardness of political science theories is a puzzle since the founders of economics science, natural sciences and political science were born around the same time. Adam Smith (the father of economics), Newton (the father of natural sciences) and John Locke (one of the fathers of political science) were born around the 18th century. However, the development of each science is not equal. According to Rikker, there must be something wrong in the accumulation of knowledge in the history of political science theories . this mistake is hidden in the structures of political science theories.

Barbara Geddes is one step further than William Rikker. According to Geddes, inequality in the development of theories

has also happened within political science in general. American politics and international relations, for example, have much stronger theories than the politics of the developing world. The accumulation of theoretical “as opposed to factual” knowledge is much stronger in American politics of developing world.

Political theories in the developing world, according to Geddes, have risen and fallen within a very short lifespan. A theory rises, and then is easily ignored by the next generation. Consequently, there is little impression that this theory ever existed. She uses the metaphor of a sandcastle. As a sandcastle, theories on developing world (comparative politics) were built by great effort and attention to detail, but then they were swept away by the next wave of theories.

What makes the politics of the developing world different from American politics and international relations? According to Geddes, the difference is not caused by lack of theoretical imagination among the developing world’s theorist. This backwardness is not caused by disloyalty among theorists to their theories either. The difference lies in the power of the theories.

Many theories on the developing world disillusion us. These theories cannot help us to understand and predict the real and complex world. As a consequence, they are not improved upon and replicated by the next generation. These theories are just ignored and forgotten.

There are two basic causes for the backwardness of political theories on the developing world. First, many theories on the developing world are methodologically ill-defined. The generalizations, hypotheses and theoretical claims of these theories are weak and based only on selective cases. Second, these theories have an ideologically-driven approach. Ideology, not reality, drives the theories.

Geddes gives an example of two important paradigms in this field: Modernization and Dependency theories. Both modernization and dependency theories only use selective available information. Instead of elaborating all of relevant data and the universe of case studies, both theories just select whatever they like. The bias in data collection misleads them.

Modernization theories, for example, are obsessed to explain the third world by standing on the experience of western countries. Some prominent theorists in this field are Lipset and Lerner. Lipset makes correlation between economic development and democracy. The more developed an economy is, the more probable democracy will be. While Lerner, explains the progress from traditional culture toward modern culture. Tradition is constraint on development. By the diffusion education and technology, tradition will change to modernity.

The core assumption of modernization theories ignores other available information, such as historical setting from those of the third world countries. Western countries experienced civil unrest and attempted revolution in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, whereas developing countries experienced nationalistic and communistic movements. The difference of historical backgrounds is important since history influences existing institutional arrangement. Ignoring this difference, many theorists of modernization are misled.

They also ignore development in some East Asia and Latin American countries. Although being dominated by tradition, countries in those areas are able to develop economically. Traditional cultures are not as bad as those described by the modernist theorists. They misunderstand traditional cultures and make wrong generalizations because they only use selective information.

The dependency theorists also make the same mistake. The generalizations, hypotheses and theoretical claims of his

approach very much lay in nation of unequal exchanges in world politics and economics. According to dependency theory, third world countries suffer from external exploiters. In this trap, although it develops, the third world dependently. Capitalist centers in the west exploit the peripheries in the developing world. The gap between the centers and the peripheries will get wider and wider.

Again, this theory ignores the miracle in East Asia. Some countries in this region, although related to center of capitalism (western world), grow economically. The rate of growth in some countries (Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore) in some years has been higher than that of “their bosses” in the west. By ignoring these cases, the dependency are misled by wrong generalizations.

The dependency theory also ignores the various strategies of industry among third world nations. Some of them apply import substitution strategy, while others adopt export-oriented strategies. This difference is significant in determining the growth of an economy. The export-oriented strategy endorses economic development much faster than import substitution for a number of reasons. By exporting, those countries have a much larger market in the world and are forced to be more and more efficient since they have to compete with other countries. Although all third world countries are integrated into the centers of capitalism, the result of their development may be quite different since some apply the import substitution strategy while others apply the export-oriented strategy.

The second mistake made by modernization and dependency theories is ideological. Modernization theory is influenced too much by liberal democracy, while dependency theory is prejudice by Marxism. These ideologically-driven approaches are less sensitive toward a complex reality. Since liberal democrats praise the western type of political system

and Marxism is the reverse, their ideological hopes interfere scholarly analysis.

Because of methodologically ill-defined research and ideological sentiments, theorists on the developing world accumulated very little theoretical knowledge.

Geddes also evaluates some new theories in this field: the Institutionalism, State-Centric Political Economy, Contingent Political Decision and the New Utilitarianism. Here are her arguments.

The new institutionalism emphasizes the importance of political institution. Studies from Skocpol about revolution and Barrington Moore on social origin of dictatorship and democracy are best examples. These approaches suffer from lack of data: they are data free. There are strong tendencies to build strong theory in this approach. However, the studies lack sufficient data. The number of cases they study is fewer than their independent variables. Their theories, as a consequence, lack generalizing power (external validity) since they are rooted in the speculative mind, not in various realities.

The other approach, state-centric political economy, suffers from something else. This approach is growing to explain various economic policies taken by states. Much data has been collected from many countries. However, this approach lacks a strong theory. While the new institutionalism suffer from lacks of data (data-free theories), state-centric political economy suffers from theory data free.

Data-free theory and theory-free data are never sufficient to build very strong theories. Data cannot speak about by itself. It should be frame in certain tested theory. However, theories may give us disillusion if they not built firmly on various empirical realities.

Contingent political decision is an approach developed by Juan Linz. This approach is ambitious to explain, for example, the breakdown democracy. However, the independent variables used rely too much on the day-to-day decision making process of political leaders. The outcomes of politics are reduced to the mode of political struggles among political leaders. Since the possibilities of leader's action very wide open and the action themselves are voluntarily, these theories are weak in making predictions.

The only hopeful theory in this field, according to Geddes, is the new utilitarianism. This term refers to rational choice. According to this approach, social outcomes are the result of the purposive action of rational individual, and politicians are autonomous. The basic unit of analysis is the individual (methodological individualism), not macro-variables (e.g. classes, states, interest groups, and cultures). It does not mean that macro-variables are not important. However, the important of those macro-variables should be tested first in the points of methodological individualism.

From the ground of new utilitarianism, three strong types of theory rise. First are theories using economic incentives (profit) to explain economic outcome. Second are the theories using political incentives (e.g. political career) to explain political outcome. Third are the theories using economic and/or political incentives to explain problems of collective action.

Different from other theories, the new utilitarianism based on methodological individualism is promising in terms of accumulating theoretical knowledge since it does not rely on untested macro-variables. This approach's assumption, i.e. rational assumption, is realistic too.

EVALUATION

Geddes's critique over the many theories describes above is very strong. However, Geddes does not apply her method of criticism toward her own beloved theory, the new utilitarianism. Many other theorists have strongly criticized the new utilitarianism (rational choice theory). Surprisingly, Geddes does not mention nor answer this criticism.

In this section I will briefly summarize the criticism of rational choice. Based on this criticism, one may conclude that rational choice is not superior to other theories as claimed by Geddes.

There is no ideology-free theory. Every theory is built on certain assumption. A theory cannot be established on value-free assumption. Every assumption is ideological since it is a matter of belief. From this standpoint, ideology interferes not only in modernization or dependency theory but also in the new utilitarianism (rational choice).

Rational choice argues that every social outcome can be reduced to the result of the rational action of individuals. However, one may skeptically say that this kind of argument is a matter of beliefs and ideology. No one can prove the statement convincingly.

One can easily give an equally valid rival hypothesis. One may say that in history, ideologies (e.g. nationalism or communism) political parties, interest groups, morality, altruism and religions all play important roles.

To claim that the individual is the most important political actor has the same ideological content and weakness as to claim otherwise. For example, one may say that the state or the dominant class or ideology is the most important actor, not individuals. To claim that methodological individualism is superior to the rest, or to claim the reverse, takes a certain degree of belief.

Rational actors' assumptions are also exaggerated. The rational actor concept assumes that human beings are utility maximizers. In any condition, according to this assumption, the individual is always seeking to maximize his self-interest.

Herbert Simon introduces the concept of bounded rationality to counter the rational actor assumption. According to Simon, human rationality is limited and information is imperfect. To maximize utility, one should calculate all the possibilities and consider all the information needed. This method of choice is impossible since one never has perfect information and cannot calculate the total consequences of every option.

In the real world, human beings are just utility self-satisfiers. Human beings just make calculation based on limited information, time, money and expertise. They never know whether their choice is the best among available options. However, they can know whether their option makes them satisfied or not.

Even in economic history one cannot use the rational actor assumption only. As argued by Douglass North, if the rational actor assumption is correct, all the system in the world would be capitalist, with a very limited role for government. According to the rational assumption approach (neo-classical economics), the minimally-interventionist state of capitalism is the best.

However, it is not the case. In history, various types of states exist framing the various structures of property rights. In history, there are not only rational individuals, but also various political interests, morality, altruism and perception (ideologies). History is not the result of the rational action of individuals alone.

As final note, I will say that comparative politics, as with other sciences, is never ruled by single, dominant theory. The reason is simple. As argued by Immanuel Kant, human beings never know reality with the capital "R". What we do know are the "realities". We never know Reality as it is. What we

can know is reality as framed by our own perception. There are always plural perception of reality.

The New Utilitarianism enriches the intellectual enterprise of political theories. However, there is no rational ground to claim that this approach is superior to the best.



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As observed by Rousseau, “The strongest is never strong enough to be always the master, unless he transforms strength into right and obedience into duty”. In the past, tradition, religion and the divine right of kings provided the legitimacy for non-democratic system. Obedience to divine kings became a duty and to be a king became right. This mechanism was then swept away by the process of secularization and liberalization. The source of power shifted from heaven (religions) to the earth (people, dominant classes). To be a king was not a right anymore and to obey the king was not a duty either. This system lost its power and the modern state (nationalism, democracy) took over.



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